Spann v. StateSpann v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Anderson
OPINION
ANDERSON, Russell A., Chief Justice.
Appellant Joseph T. Spann appeals from a summary denial of his posteonvietion pe
On October 29, 1995, Spann was found guilty by a Hennepin County jury of first-degree murder while committing an aggravated robbery, intentional second-degree murder, and first-degree aggravated robbery in the shooting death of Marvin Nor-dine, a convenience store clerk. State v. Spann, 574 N.W.2d 47, 48, 51 (Minn.1998). Spann was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 51. On direct appeal, Spann raised multiple issues relating to evidentiary rulings, discovery violations, and the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 48. We affirmed. Id.
On April 26, 2006, proceeding pro se, Spann filed a petition for postconviction relief arguing essentially that (1) he was sentenced in violation of
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), because the jury did not find that he used a firearm in violation of
A person convicted of a crime may petition the district court for postconviction relief “to vacate and set aside the judgment^] ⅜ * * grant a new trial[,] ⅞ * * or make other disposition as may be appropriate.”
On review óf a postconviction court’s denial of relief, we “extend a broad review of both questions of law and fact.” Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn.2003). We review legal issues de novo and review the postconviction court’s factual findings to determine if there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain them. Id. A petitioner is prohibited from raising in a petition for postconviction relief claims that were raised on direct appeal or that were known or should have been known at the time of direct appeal. Boitnott v. State, 640 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn.2002); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). Such claims will be considered on postcon-viction review, even if not raised on direct appeal, only if they are “so novel that the legal basis was not available on direct appeal” or if fairness requires that we review such claims “and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on appeal.” Mckenzie v. State, 707 N.W.2d 643, 644 (Minn.2005).
There is no merit to Spann’s claim that, because the jury did not find that he used a firearm in the commission of the crime in violation of ’
II.
Spann’s next- argument is that he was convicted for multiple offenses arising from the same behavioral incident in violation of
At Spann’s trial the jury returned guilty verdicts for first-degree murder while committing an aggravated robbery, intentional second-degree murder, and first-degree aggravated robbery. A conviction is defined as either a plea of guilty or a verdict or finding of guilty that is “accepted and recorded by the court.” MinmStat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2006). A guilty verdict alone is not a conviction. We have previously instructed sentencing courts:
“[W]hen the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act * * * the court [is] to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only. The. remaining conviction(s) should hot be formally adjudicated at this time. If the adjudicated conviction is later vacated for a reason not relevant to the remaining unadjudicated conviction(s), one of the remaining unadjudi-cated convictions can then be formally adjudicated and sentence imposed, with credit, of course, given for time already served on the vacated sentence.”
State v. Pflepsen,
590 N.W.2d 759, 766 (Minn.1999) (quoting
State v. LaTourelle,
343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn.1984)). In this case, the district court “received” the jury verdicts and sentenced Spann without stating on which offenses the court was entering formal adjudications of conviction. We may also look to the “official judgment of conviction” in the district court file “as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.”
Id.
at 767. In Spann’s case, the official judgment of conviction shows that formal adjudication was entered on all three guilty verdicts. Spann argues that these three convictions violate MinmStat.
III.
Spann’s last claim is that his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated because Henne-pin County did not use racially neutral jury pool selection procedures. This claim was not raised on direct appeal. We have held that claims regarding the racial composition of the jury pool are barred by Knaffla if not raised on direct appeal, because a petitioner knows or should have known such claims at the time of direct appeal. E.g., Buggs v. State, 734 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn.2007). Spann’s claim is therefore Knaffla-barred. Furthermore, in State v. Willis, we upheld the petit jury pool selection process in Hennepin County against constitutional challenge. 559 N.W.2d 693, 700-01 (Minn.1997). Spann has not alleged any facts that, if proven, would suggest that the procedures used in his petit jury pool selection differed in any material respect from those used in Willis, and therefore he has not met his burden of alleging facts that establish a prima facie case under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 862 (Minn.2006).
Affirmed as modified.