Dеwayne Spann appeals from his convie-tions of carrying a handgun without a license and aggravated battery. We affirm.
Spann raises the following restated issues for our review:
1. whether there is sufficient evidence supporting Spann's cоnviction of aggravated battery;
2. whether the State met its burden in rebutting Spann's claim of self-defense; and
3. whether the jury reached inconsistent verdicts when it found Spann not guilty of attempted murdеr but guilty of aggravated battery.
The facts most favorable to the conviction of aggravated battery are as follows. On July 10, 1992, Phillip K. Brown was attending the Black Expo in downtown Indianapolis, Indiana. Brown was accompanied by his sister, three cousins, and a friend named Neal Lloyd. While at the Black Expo, Brown encountered Spann, whom he had known since childhood. During this meeting, Brоwn and Spann spoke for approximately twenty minutes to a half hour, and Spann introduced his girl friend to Brown. Brown and Spann then parted company.
Later that evening, as Brown and Lloyd were preparing to leave the Expo, they again encountered Spann and his girl friend. Spann's girl friend shoved Brown and accused him of grabbing her buttocks. Brown denied grabbing the woman's buttocks, аnd Spann stated that he knew that Brown would not do anything like that. The two men then shook hands, Spann stated, "Everything is cool. Be cool, man," and Brown raised his hands and held up the peace sign. Record, pp. 125-26. Brown had set his beer bottle on the ground and did not have a weapon in his hands. While Brown's hands were still in the air, Spann took out a gun that he had been carrying in his back pocket, pointed the gun at Brown's midsection, and shot Brown in the stomach. After shooting Brown, Spann took his girl friend's hand and the couple left. Brown was transported to Wish-ard hospital by ambulance. Brown underwent surgery, remained in the hospital for *743 approximately two weeks, and wore a colostomy bag for approximately one month after being discharged from the hospital.
In July, 1992, Spann was charged by information with attempted murder and carrying a handgun without a license. In December, 1992, an amended information was filed charging Spann with aggravated battery. Following a trial by jury, Spann was found not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of carrying a handgun without a license, and guilty of aggravated battery.
The first issue Spann raises for our review is whether there is sufficient evidence suрporting his conviction for aggravated battery. Specifically, Spann contends that there is insufficient evidence supporting the intent element of the crime. As Spann acknowledges, when we review the evidence supporting a conviction, we may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Washington v. State (1982), Ind.,
Indiana Code § 35-42-2-1.5 provides:
"A рerson who knowingly or intentionally inflicts injury on a person that creates a substantial risk of death or causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ commits aggravated battery, a Class B felony."
I.C. § 85-42-2-1.5. "A person engages in conduct 'knowingly' if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so." I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). "A person engages in conduct 'intentionally' if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so." I.C. § 35-41-2-2(3a).
As noted by the State, because intent is a mental function, absent an admission by the defendant, it must be determined from a consideration of the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual consequences thereof. Metzler v. State (1989), Ind.,
We believe that there was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Spann knowingly or intentionally inflicted an injury on Brown that created a substantial risk of death or caused а protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ. The jury was free to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented to determine Spann's intеnt when he shot Brown at close range in the abdomen. Metzler,
- The next issue Spann raises for our review is whether the State met its burden in rebutting Spann's claim of self-defense. When reviewing a question of whether the State negated the defendant's claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, our standard is the same as in any other challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Hinkle v. State (1984), Ind.,
"When a self-defense claim is raised casting some reasonable doubt as tо guilt, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not meet at least one of the elements necessary to prove that justification. Cox v. State (1981), [275 Ind. 636 ],419 N.E.2d 737 ; Loyd v. State (1980),272 Ind. 404 ,398 N.E.2d 1260 . Self-defense is proved by showing that the defendant acted without fault, was in a place where he had a legal right to be, and was in real danger of *744 death or great bodily harm or wаs in such apparent danger as caused him in good faith to fear death or bodily injury."
Almodovar,
The last issue Sрann raises for our review is whether the jury reached inconsistent verdicts when it found Spann not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of aggravated battery. Spann contends that the jury reached inconsistent verdicts because the conduct described in Count I, attempted murder, is the same conduct described in Count III, aggravated battery. He argues that it is reasonable to concludе that the jury accepted his version of events leading up to the shooting, specifically Spann's testimony that he shot at the ground instead of at Brown, in order to acquit him of attempted murder. Therefore, Spann argues, the jury's guilty verdict on the aggravated battery count is irreconcilable with the acquittal on the attempted murder count, and the jury must have ignored the evidence and compromised its verdict.
Although verdicts may be so extreme'ly contradictory and irreconcilable as to require corrective action by this court, ordinarily, where a defendant is acquitted of some charges and convicted of others, the results will survive a claim of inconsistency where the convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. Jackson v. State (1989), Ind.,
In the present case, the jury could have concludеd that although Spann did not shoot Brown with the intent to kill him, Spann did intentionally inflict on Brown an injury that created "a substantial risk of death or [caused] serious permanent disfigurement or protractеd loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ." I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5; see Straub v. State (1991), Ind.,
AFFIRMED.