75 Pa. Super. 107 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1920
Opinion by
Tbe plaintiff, on December 18, 1917, filed a statement of claim in the court below, without filing a praecipe for a summons and no such writ was ever issued. The statement averred that the defendant was a common carrier and that the plaintiff had delivered to it at various times goods to be transported, which had been lost during the course of transportation. The cause of action was such that the plaintiff might, at its election, have proceeded for the recovery of the value of the goods, either by an action in assumpsit or in trespass. The plaintiff, on January 30, 1918, caused a copy of the statement of claim to be served upon an agent of the defendant, and, on March 6, 1918, entered judgment against the defendant for want of an affidavit of defense. An execution was after-; wards issued on said judgment and the defendant subsequently moved to strike off the judgment, upon the ground that no praecipe for a summons had been filed by the plaintiff, that no summons had ever issued in the case and that the action had never been commenced in any manner authorized by law. The court granted a rule to show cause why the judgment should not be stricken off and vacated, which rule, after an answer and hearing, it made absolute. The plaintiff appeals from that order.
The appellant contends that the Practice Act of 1915, P. L. 183, furnishes a course complete in itself of the procedure and pleadings in all actions of assumpsit and trespass and repeals all prior legislation relating to the commencement of personal actions. If this be so; if the only proceedings authorized by law for the collection of personal claims, by action of assumpsit or trespass through the court of common pleas, are such as this act affords, the procedure is very simple but might not be wholly satisfactory. The act deals only with the pleadings, in the technical sense of that word, in actions of assumpsit and trespass, it abolishes pleas in abatement, pleas of the general issue, payment, payment with leave,
The same legislature which adopted this statute passed the Act of May 3, 1915, P. L. 226, which clearly demonstrates that that body well understood the difference between the commencement of an action, the invoking of the jurisdiction of the court, and the pleadings filed by the parties after the action was brought. The act last mentioned establishes the fees to be charged by
The order of the court below is affirmed and the appeal dismissed at cost of the appellant.