144 A. 753 | Pa. | 1928
Argued November 27, 1928. Abraham Span claimed under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Law, Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, as amended by the Act of June 26, 1919, P. L. 642, *21 for an accidental injury which happened to him on January 13, 1926; he obtained an award, which was approved by the compensation board, affirmed by the court of common pleas, and, on appeal, by the Superior Court; the case is before us on appeal by defendants from the judgment of the last mentioned tribunal.
For purposes of the present appeal, the parties have agreed upon a statement of facts under Rule 56 of this court, which provides that they "may substitute an agreed statement of facts for all or any part of the evidence, and print it in lieu thereof." This statement is as follows: "The claimant, Abraham Span, was at the time of the injuries in question, on January 13, 1926, a resident of Philadelphia and employed at Philadelphia by defendant, the John Baizley Iron Works. The defendant was engaged in performing certain repairs to the steamship Bald Hill, at Philadelphia, including, inter alia, the painting of the engine room and repairs to its floor. The said vessel had prior thereto steamed to Philadelphia for necessary repairs, and at the time of the alleged accident was tied up to Pier 98 South in the Delaware River. The claimant, in the course of his aforesaid employment by the defendant, was painting angle irons in the engine room of the vessel. Sparks from an acetylene torch, being used by a fellow employee working near claimant, entered the claimant's eyes and caused the injuries resulting in the alleged disability of the claimant." It will be noticed that there is nothing here to show that the scope of Span's general employment contemplated maritime work or that his injury resulted from a tortious act on the part of his employer or any one else.
The above recital of facts covers all the findings of the compensation authorities except a statement by the referee that the boat on which Span met his injuries was at the time "out of commerce and laid up for repairs." Appellants have no fault to find with the statement that the boat was laid up for repairs, but say correctly: "The *22
referee's statement that the vessel was out of commerce is in itself inconsistent with the finding that the vessel 'had steamed to Philadelphia to have certain repairs made.' " Under the circumstances here shown, the ship was not, in a legalsense, out of commerce so as to deprive admiralty of its general jurisdiction in the premises: The Robert W. Parsons,
The principal question involved is, Can this claimant take advantage of our state compensation law, or is his claim cognizable exclusively under the maritime law?
In a rather extensive research, we have particularly studied those opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, from Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
While, possibly, some of the authorities which we intend to consider are not strictly within either of the classes about to be named, the cases, speaking broadly, fall into two general groups: (1) those involving injuries to stevedores and others whose occupation directly depended on navigation or commerce (this group we shall call "stevedore cases"), and (2) those involving injuries to workers, such as mechanics, whose occupation did not necessarily depend on navigation or commerce, but who, when injured, were making repairs to ships in navigable waters (this group we shall call "repair cases"). The latter class will be taken up first. *23
In Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co. v. Kierejewski,
The next case, Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock Repair Co.,
Robins Dry Dock Repair Co. v. Dahl,
In the last of the four repair cases, Messel v. Foundation Co.,
The general nature of the case at bar brings it within the repair group, but, as we proceed, it will be seen that this case differs, in certain more or less material particulars, from those previously decided by the United States Supreme Court.
For the present, it is enough to note that the record now before us does not show any contract of general employment between plaintiff and defendant Iron Works, nor suggest that Span was originally engaged to work on, in or about ships. Apparently he was a land man, under a land contract of employment, who happened to be injured on a ship while doing work of a nature which had no direct relation to navigation or commerce; whereas, in each of the four cases just reviewed, the injured person was employed by a concern directly, and apparently exclusively, engaged in maritime work, and the records there involved indicate or strongly suggest that his original employment contemplated work having some direct relation to navigation or commerce.
In one of the four cases above mentioned, and in some others to be mentioned, when determining whether the injured person's rights could be affected by a local statute, the terms of his contract of general employment were considered: see Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
The four decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States discussed above, and other federal cases, denote that repairing a completed vessel lying in navigable waters may be accounted part of the maintenance of the boat and hence a maritime act (see also Trainer v. The Boat Superior, I Gilpin's Reports 514, 516); but the mere fact that, at the moment of his injury, one was engaged in performing services which might properly be classed as "maritime in character" is not the final test as to exclusiveness of maritime jurisdiction to adjudge rights growing out of the situation: Sultan Ry., etc., Co. v. Dept. of Labor,
In reading the cases of injuries to stevedores, longshoremen, and others doing approximately like work, it must be constantly remembered that men following such occupations are looked upon by the federal authorities as largely entitled to the protection afforded seamen (Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek,
While none of the decisions already mentioned, nor any of those we are about to discuss, rules the case before us, yet the opinions in many of them contain, as will be shown, enlightening judicial utterances, in which, we think, may be found the key to the present situation.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
In State Industrial Com. v. Nordenholt Corp., supra, (a longshoreman case where the injury happened on a dock, and the state compensation law was allowed to apply), the United States Supreme Court, in the course of its opinion, said (pp. 272-3), in a general way, that, "When an employee working on board a vessel in navigable waters, sustains personal injuries and seeks damages from the employer, __________ the liability of the employer must be determined under the maritime law. __________ The liability of the employer for damages on account of injuries received on shipboard by an employee under a maritime contract is matter within the admiralty jurisdiction." At first glance this judicial utterance may appear to mean that, whenever an employee of any kind, doing any sort of work on board a vessel in navigable waters, sustains injuries, the employer's liability will be determined under maritime law; but the last part of the quotation and the rule that everything said in an opinion must be read in the light of the facts in the case, show, we think, the court's meaning to be that, wherever an employee, working at a maritime pursuit, or, in the words of the opinion, under a "maritime contract," — that is, at some work which has direct relation to navigation and commerce, — suffers an injury on shipboard, the maritime law applies; not that wherever *29 any employee, doing any kind of work under any sort of a contract, is injured on shipboard, the maritime law must apply, simply because the injury occurred there.
Again, in Smith v. Taylor,
As previously noted, there is a doctrine, announced in recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that "state statutes providing compensation" for injured employees may "be treated as amending or modifying the maritime law in cases where they concern purely local matters and occasion no interference with the uniformity of such law in its international and interstate relations": Northern Coal Dock Co. v. Strand, supra, and authorities there cited. In Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Industrial Commission,
In Chelentis v. Luckenback S. S. Co.,
The case mentioned at the head of the immediately preceding paragraph and others following immediately hereafter are inserted at this stage of the opinion because they contain expressed views showing when the application of a state law will be allowed in the field of admiralty, as not occasioning any undue interference with the uniformity of the maritime law, and when it will not; but in reading the Chelentis Case it must be remembered that, unlike the one at bar, it is not one of those dealing with an injury to a laborer on shipboard, who was unconnected with the boat in any permanent sense and who, at the time of his injury, was engaged in work only remotely relating to navigation or commerce; there *31 the claimant was attached to the boat on which he was hurt, his contract of employment was strictly maritime, and he was injured when performing services of a nature relating directly to navigation; so, under all the authorities, he was confined to admiralty relief.
In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
In Grant Smith-Porters Co. v. Rohde,
Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS, who wrote the opinion in the Rohde Case, subsequently explained its meaning, in Great Lakes Dredge, etc., v. Kierejewski,
Miller's Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, last referred to, Northern Coal Dock Co. v. Strand, supra; *35 Sultan Ry. v. Dept. of Labor, supra, and Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Industrial Commission, supra, are the most recent cases to give an indication of what is meant by the expression "purely local."
In the Strand Case, the Supreme Court said, as shedding light on the meaning of the phrase in question: "The unloading of a ship is not a matter of purely local concern; it has direct relation to commerce and navigation." We may here remark that, while the kind of work plaintiff in the present case was doing at the time of his injury might be said to have a certain remote relation to navigation and commerce, yet it seems to us that such work cannot be held to bear any "direct" relation to those subjects.
In Underwriters v. Braud, first of the recent cases last mentioned, a diver employed by a shipbuilding company was killed while submerged in a navigable river, "sawing off timbers of an abandoned set of ways once used for launching ships, which had become an obstruction to navigation." He was awarded damages under a state workmen's compensation law, and in due course this award was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS there said (p. 64): "In the cause now under consideration, the record discloses facts sufficient to show a maritime tort to which the general admiralty jurisdiction would extend save for the provisions of the state compensation act; but the matter is of mere local concern and its regulation by the State will work no material prejudice to any characteristic feature of the general maritime law." This can be as well said of the present case, where not even a tort is shown, merely an accidental injury of a character which might have occurred anywhere but which by chance happened on a boat in navigable waters.
In Sultan Ry. Co., etc., v. Dept. of Labor, appealed from a state court (the third of the recent cases referred to above), the application of a local workmen's compensation law was resisted on the ground that the workers *36 affected, — loggers employed by timber and mill companies, — fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty because their labors carried them upon a navigable stream. In deciding that the local act could apply, the United States Supreme Court said, "It is settled by our decisions that where the employment, although maritime in character, pertains to local matters, having only an incidental relation to navigation andcommerce, the rights, obligations and liabilities of the parties, as between themselves, may be regulated by local rules which do not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interfere with its uniformity." The above italics are ours. The original contracts of land employment and the incidental going upon navigable waters in the Sultan Case and in the one now before us seem analogous. As of the loggers in the former, so it may be said of the present plaintiff: that the labor of a maritime character at which he was engaged at the time of his injury had "only incidental relation to navigation and commerce," and since his contract of general employment is not shown to be other than a land contract, the mere incident that its performance carried plaintiff temporarily on navigable waters, was not sufficient to cause that employment, and the rights and liabilities which pertain to it, to be so deprived of their essentially local character that admiralty would take jurisdiction to the exclusion of a helpful state law.
In Alaska P. Assn. v. Industrial Commission (the last of the recent cases above mentioned), claimant, originally employed to do both land and sea work, was injured while endeavoring to push a stranded boat into a navigable river; an award under a state compensation act was sustained by the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS saying, inter alia, "When injured, certainly he [the claimant] was not engaged in any work so directly connected with navigation and commerce that to permit the rights of the parties to be *37 controlled by the local law would interfere with the essential uniformity of the general maritime law. The work was really local in character." (Citing the Rohde and Braud Cases.)
It is difficult to deduce and state any general rule by which to judge whether a particular set of facts constitutes a "purely local" situation, within the meaning of the federal authorities, to which a local act may apply, or a situation governed exclusively by the maritime law; but, after studying the relevant authorities, it seems to us that in each case the determining questions are: (1) Did the injured person's activities at the time of the accident have a direct relation to navigation or commerce? (2) Were his activities of such a nature that the application of a particular local law, as between the parties, would work material prejudice to some characteristic feature of the general maritime law or interfere with its proper harmony or uniformity? See Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co. v. Kierejewski,
In the present case, plaintiff was a mechanic; not a seaman in any proper sense of the term. So far as the record shows, he had no general maritime employment; he happened to be sent by his employer (a third party engaged by the shipowner) to do some painting in the engine room of a vessel laid up for repairs in navigable waters, and was injured while thus engaged, not by any act on the part of either the shipowner or its employees, nor because of any motion of the boat or other matter peculiar to navigation or commerce, but by pure accident, contributed to by one who, like himself, was working for the contractor engaged by the shipowner. This contractor, third-party employer, and the plaintiff had agreed generally between themselves that, in case of injury to the latter during the course of his employment, he would be entitled to compensation according to a schedule in the state compensation act. Here, as much as in the Rohde Case, we think it can be said, "the parties, plaintiff and defendant, contracted with reference to the state statute" and "the application of the local *38 law" to "their rights and liabilities" "cannot materially affect any rules of the sea whose uniformity is essential." Furthermore, if a state statute providing for recovery in cases of death due to a maritime tort, — a recovery which was not permitted in admiralty, — can be allowed application to a stevedore case, as not interfering with the proper harmony and uniformity of the maritime law (Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra), surely a state statute, — giving rise to an implied agreement for compensation to a mechanic (whose general employment, so far as the record shows, was not maritime) accidentally injured during the course of his work, which, at the time of the injury, happened to be on a boat in navigable waters, — can be permitted application to the facts in this case, without undue interference with the uniformity of the federal law: see Great Lakes D. D. Co. v. Kierejewski, supra. As we view it, there is nothing in the situation here presented which will cause material prejudice to any characteristic feature of the general maritime law or interfere with its proper harmony or uniformity if the rights of the parties, between themselves, are adjudged according to the local statute; therefore, we hold that the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act was properly applied.
In the cases which we have discussed, where admiralty took jurisdiction to the exclusion of the local law, the injury occurred while the person in question was engaged in activities which had a much plainer and more direct relation to navigation than the work of the present claimant. Moreover, in each of those cases the injuries resulted from a maritime tort, — that is, a wrongful act committed on the high seas or on navigable waters: Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek,
We may add, in conclusion, that, since the opinion of the Superior Court in this case, — accompanying the final judgment appealed from, — was written, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Northern Coal Dock Co. v. Strand, supra, has definitely held, as we understand the majority view there expressed, that the states have no power, on the ground of implied contract, voluntary election, or any other theory, to put upon an employer, "in respect of men engaged to perform work __________ on shipboard," when their labor bears direct relation to navigation or commerce, obligations of the kind imposed by the workmen's compensation acts; and, in our opinion, the insurance carrier can be held to only such liabilities as may be imposed on the employer. When, as here, however, the labor in question is not shown to bear any direct relation to navigation or commerce, a different situation is presented; and that is the key to the solution of this case. The judgment is affirmed. *40