21 Vt. 45 | Vt. | 1848
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The only question raised in this case is, whether the notes in suit are barred by the defendant’s certificate of discharge in bankruptcy.
It is urged by the plaintiff) that the certificate relates back to the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy, and is only a bar to such debts, as then existed against the bankrupt. If this proposition be admitted, it would necessarily follow, that the certificate would not be a bar to the recovery of the notes in suit; for there is no pretence, that they had any existence anterior to the sixth of June, 1842, — which was subsequent to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The act of Congress, providing for the granting of certificates of discharge to bankrupts and prescribing the manner in which they might he obtained, does not, in terms, declare the time, to which the certificate shall extend and be a bar to the debts of the bankrupt. It seems to be admitted in the argument, and so are the authorities, that the certificate is a bar to all debts of the bankrupt, (excepting those of a particular character, which are excluded from its operation by the act of Congress,) which were proveable under the commission.
There are some authorities, which appear to countenance the idea, that the operation of the certificate is limited to such debts as existed at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Such are the cases of Crouch v. Gridley, 6 Hill 252, and Thompson v. Hewitt, 6 Hill 254; and if the dicta of the court in those cases are to be regarded as sound, it would seem but reasonable, that the acquisitions of the bankrupt, subsequent to the filing of his petition,
The defendant was decreed a bankrupt on the eighth of July, 1842; and the inquiry arises, were the notes of the sixth of June, 1842, then debts of the bankrupt and proveable under the commission ? To answer this inquiry, reference must be had to the facts in the case. The notes did not pass, directly upon their execution, to the hands of the plaintiff, but were deposited with a third person, together with the old notes, which formed the consideration of the notes in suit, and the other papers made and forming part of the arrangement of the sixth of June, 1842, there to remain until the first of October following, to await the election of the plaintiff as to
The question still remains, how are the notes in suit to be regarded during the interval between the sixth of June and the first of October following, when they were delivered into the hands of the plaintiff and the old notes were surrendered to the defendant by the depositary? We think it quite obvious, that, upon the execution of .the notes and the deposite of them in the hands of Hill, under the agreement which appears in the case, they became and were valid and binding upon the defendant, and that the interest and property in them then vested in the plaintiff, subject, however, to be defeated by the plaintiff, upon the happening of the contingency before mentioned. Such we believe to b.e the fair conclusion to be drawn from the facts presented in the case. Nor does the contingent character of the notes constitute an objection to their being proved under the commission. Upon recurring to the fifth section of the act of Congress, it is apparent, that the contingency, to which the notes were
Inasmuch, then, as these notes might have been proved against the defendant under the commission, we think the county court were right in holding that they were barred by the certificate, and .consequently the judgment of that court is affirmed.