110 So. 451 | Fla. | 1926
Lead Opinion
The Constitution of this State provides that: "No person shall be * * * deprived of * * * property without due process of law." Sec. 12, Declaration of Rights.
"No private property nor right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation or individual until *619 full compensation therefor shall be first made to the owner, or first secured to him by deposit of money; which compensation, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation or individual, shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men in a court of competent jurisdiction, as shall be prescribed by law." Sec. 29, Art. XVI, Const.
Section 2, Chapter 10118, Acts of 1925, authorizing condemnation by the State Road Department, a corporation, is as follows: "That upon the filing of the petition provided for in Section 1505 of the Revised General Statutes, the said Department shall have the right to enter upon the lands or property sought to be taken and proceed to the construction of the State road or bridge for which said lands or property are necessary. Provided, however, that the right and authority in this Section conferred shall not attach unless and until said Department shall have first secured to the owner of said property full compensation therefor, by depositing with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County in which said petition is filed, double the amount of the value of said property as fixed by the Judge of said Court based upon affidavits of not less than three disinterested freeholders owning property in the vicinity of that sought to be taken."
In condemnation proceedings the following order allowing lands to be taken or appropriated was made by the Circuit Judge:
"This cause came on to be heard this day upon the application of the Petitioner for an order fixing the value of the property sought to be taken, and providing that when the value so fixed shall be deposited with the Clerk of the above styled court, that the State Road Department shall have the right to enter upon the land sought to be taken and proceed with the execution of the work for which said *620 lands are necessary, and it appearing to the court that a petition to condemn the property described therein was filed June 17th, 1926, and the court having heard and considered the same upon said petition and the several affidavits presented and filed this date, and being fully advised in the premises, it is thereupon ordered, adjudged and considered that the value of said property be, and the same is hereby fixed by this court in the sum of $350.00 Dollars.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that if and when compensation for the lands described in the petition in these proceedings is secured to the owner thereof, by depositing with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County in which said Petition is filed, double the amount of the value of said property as above fixed, the State Road Department shall thereupon have the right to enter upon said lands, or property sought to be taken and proceed to the construction of the State Road or Bridge for which said lands or property are necessary."
A writ of certiorari was issued by the court. A restraining order pending the certiorari was issued by this court under Section 5, Article V, Constitution. Astca Inv. Co. v. Lake County,
Section 29, Article XVI of the Constitution expressly provides that no private property nor right of way shall be appropriated * until full compensation therefor shall be first made to the owner, or first secured to him by deposit of money; * which compensation * shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men." Section 2 of Chapter 10118 above quoted clearly conflicts with the organic mandate, and therefore is inoperative, rendering the order made thereunder ineffectual to authorize the appropriation of the lands sought to be condemned. The remainder of *621 Chapter 10118, Acts of 1925, is not affected by the elimination of Section 2 thereof.
It is argued that the quoted Section 29, Article XVI, of the Constitution is not applicable where the State seeks to condemn lands for public purposes. But this is at once met by the provisions of the organic section which applies to all corporations, and by the terms of Section 1, Chapter 10118, providing that the State Road Department "is hereby declared, for the purposes of this Act, to be a body corporate, and the procedure shall be that prescribed and set forth in Section 1503 et seq., Chapter two (II), title nine (IX) division one (1) of the Revised Statutes of Florida, prescribing the procedure for condemnation by counties and the same rights and powers shall accrue to said Department under such procedure"c. It thus clearly appears that the statute intended the right of eminent domain granted therein to the State Road Department to be no greater than that granted to counties for the condemnation of lands for rights of way for public roads; and counties are required to so exercise the statutory right of eminent domain as to comply with Section 29, Article XVI of the State Constitution.
The constitution secures the inalienable right of "possessing and protecting property" and provides that "the right of trial by jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever;" no person shall be * deprived of * property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken without just compensation;" and that "all courts in this State shall open, so that every person for any injury done him in his lands, c.* shall have remedy, by due course of law."
These provisions secure individual rights against unconstitutional invasion by the State as well as from violation by other governmental agencies and individuals. *622
The State has by statute made its instrumentality, the State Road Department, a corporation, and expressly limits the status of such corporation in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, to that of counties which do not have sovereign exemptions that inhere in the State, thus limiting the rights of the State Road Department to those exercised by a governmental agency without sovereign powers, thereby making the rights exercised subject to the provisions of organic law.
Having limited the rights of the State agency, the provision of the statute purporting to authorize an appropriation of land for road purposes before compensation therefor has been ascertained by a jury as required by Section 29, Article XVI of the Constitution, is inoperative, even if the State itself may directly appropriate property before the compensation therefor has been ascertained and paid or secured by deposit of money as is required by the quoted organic provision.
The order herein purports to authorize the taking of lands for public road purposes before the compensation therefor is ascertained by a jury, and as to this property right, vital under the constitution, the order is final, and therefore the order is regarded as so far final as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari to test its validity.
The order is quashed.
BROWN, C. J., AND WHITFIELD, ELLIS, STRUM, AND BUFORD, J. J., concur;
*623TERRELL, J., not participating.
WILLIAM SPAFFORD AND W. H. PRUYN, JR., Petitioners, v. BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, BY E. C. JOHNSON, JOHN B. RODES, GEO. G. BROCKETT, P. W. ROBERTS AND JOHN E. REED, COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SAID COUNTY, AND THE STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents.
WHITFIELD, J.:*624
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *625
Concurrence Opinion
Upon the first hearing of this case the order of the court in which proceedings for the condemnation of a strip of land for road purposes were begun was quashed, the ground being that the agencies of the state had not proceeded properly under the statute vesting them with power to subject private property to public use.
A petition for rehearing was filed. The basis of the petition is that the word "corporation," as used in Section 29, Article 16 of the Constitution, does not apply to a State agency which may have been vested with the powers of a corporation.
But the argument contains a fallacy which is quite apparent. Some corporations are empowered by law to exercise the power of eminent domain.
They are prohibited by the article above referred to from appropriating any private property to their use until full compensation therefor shall be first made to the owner, which compensation shall be determined by a jury of twelve men in a court of competent jurisdiction. If the State Road Board may be distinguished from other corporations in being a state agency and the property which it appropriates is not for its own use but for that of the state does it follow that the property of citizens may be taken for a public or state purpose without due process of law? *634
The words "eminent domain" relate to an authority existing in every sovereignty to own, possess, control and take property. In some cases the authority is complete without any action on the part of the state, in other cases it becomes complete by displacing the right of ownership. This is accomplished in three ways: by contract with the owner, by accepting his gift or by appropriating his property against his will.
It is the last phase of the power of eminent domain with which this case deals.
Our constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law nor shall his property be taken without just compensation.
This guaranty implies orderly judicial process it matters not whom the parties may be, whether state or individual. Does it therefore matter that in this case it is the state through its agencies which seeks to acquire the private property of an individual without due process of law?
I think not.
Concurrence Opinion
Upon a further consideration of the questions involved in this case, on petition for rehearing, I concur in the conclusion that the rehearing should be denied, but I cannot concur fully in all the reasons given in the able opinions of JUSTICES WHITFIELD AND ELLIS.
I have become convinced that Section 29 of Article 16 of the Constitution is not applicable to a public corporation acquiring property for the State for a purely public purpose and the title to and control of which property will, when acquired, be vested in the State of Florida, because certain language of such constitutional provision shows that it does not apply. It reads: *635
"No private property or right of way shall beappropriated to the use of any corporation or individual until full compensation therefor shall be first made to the owner, first secured to him by the deposit of money," etc. (Italics mine.)
The Act here in question (Chap. 10118, Laws of 1925), construed in connection with other prior acts relating to state roads and the State Road Department, shows that whatever property is acquired for state roads and bridges, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, either by such Road Department itself, or by the County Commissioners acting in its behalf, will be appropriated to the use of, and become the property of, the State of Florida, which means the people of Florida, and for the common good. (See Chap. 7900, Acts of 1919; Chapter 9311, Acts of 1923). It will not be "appropriated to the use of any corporation or individual," and hence the constitutional provision referred to does not apply. It is true, the State Road Department is, by the Act, made "a body corporate for the purposes of the Act," and a county has a certain restricted corporate capacity, yet in the exercise of eminent domain for the acquisition of lands for state roads, neither is acquiring anything for itself in its corporate capacity, but only for the state, and all that either may acquire under the Act here in question will be "appropriated to the use of" the state. The fact that the State Road Department is vested with certain duties with reference to the surveying, location, acquisition of right of way, and construction and maintenance of such roads, does not alter the situation, for all of these things pertain to it merely as an agency of the state. Arundel Corporation v. Griffin,
There is, however, another provision of our constitution which does apply to the exercise of the power of eminent domain by public as well as private corporations, and even by the state itself. That is, the limitations imposed by Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights, that, "No person shall * * be deprived * * property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken without just compensation." Does the enactment now before us offend against either of these provisions? To my mind, it conflicts only with the guarantee of due process, and the vested judicial power of the courts.
The right of eminent domain is inherent in the sovereignty of the state, and while it may be limited it is not created, by the constitution. It is an attribute of sovereignty which the state would have even though there were no constitutional grant of the power. While the question of whether the use for which private property is taken is a public use is ultimately a judicial question, where the legislature declares a particular use to be a public use, the presumption is in favor of its declaration, and the courts will not interfere therewith unless the use is clearly and manifestly of a private character. 20 C. J. 549-552, and cases cited; Sears v. City of Akron, 246, U.S. 242,
However, the necessity for taking any particular parcel ofland for the carrying out of even an admittedly public purpose is ultimately a judicial question on which the landowner if he so desires, has a right to be heard. 20 C. J. 629-30. The rule is well settled that wherever land is taken under the power of eminent domain, even for a purpose confessedly public, it is necessary that the owner should have due notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to appear and protect his rights. This is jurisdictional, and essential to due process. Jacksonville etc., R. Co. v. Adams,
There can be no doubt that the purpose of the appropriation *638 contemplated by the Act here involved is public; nor is the point challenged by the petitioners for the writ. Their contention is that Section 2 of Chapter 10118 in unconstitutional, first, because it affords a taking before the amount of compensation is actually determined by a jury, and paid by the petitioners in the condemnation proceedings; and second, that the method outlined by Section 2 denies due process.
The first point is disposed of by showing that Section 29 of Article 16 of our Constitution does not apply. Nor does the provision that "private property shall not be taken without just compensation" require that the compensation shall be fixed and paid prior to the occupancy of the land sought to be taken. Sweet v. Rechel,
"While there is some authority at least to the contrary, the general rule is that in the absence of any constitutional requirement it is not ordinarily necessary for a State or municipal subdivision thereof to pay for property taken for public use in advance of the taking, if provision is made for payment and a proper tribunal constituted, so that the land owner can make his claim and recover compensation or damages, and this is the case where the constitution, although requiring prepayment, expressly excepts from its operation a State or municipal corporation, or limits the requirement to cases of taking by 'corporations' or where the Constitution or statutes require compensation to be first paid or secured. It is sufficient that an adequate or safe fund is provided from which payment is to be made, as, for instance, making the amount payable a charge upon the public treasury either of the State or some municipal subdivision thereof, which is considered equivalent to actual compensation. So it has been held that the power of taxation *639 given a municipality is ordinarily adequate security. Nevertheless, it is generally held that under a Constitution providing generally that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation being first made, prepayment by municipal corporations is as much necessary as in the case of private corporations and individuals, and the rule applies where prepayment is expressly required by statute. An award of damages and a judgment therefor is not a compliance with these provisions." 20 C. J. 833-835, Sec. 269, and cases cited.
In State ex rel. Moody v. Jacksonville, T. K. W. R. Co.,
Justice WESTCOTT continues: "The court here has the authority to hear witnesses, to determine the amount of the deposit by virtue of its general power, to determine what is a sufficient sum, and it is a very proper authority to exercise the power."
At the time this decision was handed down, 1884, the then Constitution did not embrace such a provision as Section 29 of Article 16, but if we are correct in our view that this section is not applicable here, all that Justice WESTCOTT said, in the case above cited, is both applicable and pertinent.
See also the opinion of Chief Justice White in Crozier v. Fried Krupp, 224, U.S. 290,
The Act we are considering provides that the State Road Department or counties acting in its behalf shall have the power of eminent domain to condemn lands and property for securing right of ways for State roads and bridges, and that such proceedings shall be the procedure prescribed by Section 1503 et seq. of Rev. Gen. Stats., together with such rights as are secured by Section 2 of said Act.
That this procedure, without Section 2 of the Act, affords a reasonably prompt method for the ascertainment and payment of compensation cannot be denied, and the judgment *641 of appropriation is void unless the compensation is paid within a few days after verdict and judgment. Hence the landowner's title does not pass unless the compensation fixed by the jury is promptly paid. Not only has the landowner this security for payment, but the Act here involved provides for payment out of the road funds of the State Road Department, or of the county, respectively. By implication, the public faith and credit and the power of taxation is also pledged.
As there is no doubt of the right of the State through the agency of its Road Department, or one of its political subdivisions, to take private property when needed for such an admittedly public purpose as a public highway, the only real question involved in these particular condemnation proceedings is the adjudication of the amount of compensation and the payment thereof to the owner, the necessity of the taking of the particular property not being denied. This being the case, and the weight and reason of authority, as above shown, being to the effect that in such cases the ascertainment and payment of compensation need not precede the taking, it might have been within the power of the Legislature to have provided some procedure by which, after the filing of the petition in the form and manner prescribed, and the service of process upon the owner, and after the giving of due and reasonable notice to him, affording due process of law, the State through its Road Department might be authorized by an order of court, before the final jury trial on the question of compensation, to enter and occupy the land or property sought to be taken and proceed to the construction of the State road or bridge for which such lands are necessary; but the method adopted in Section 2 of the Act is void in that it denies due process and hampers the judicial function, as pointed out in the opinion of Mr. JUSTICE WHITFIELD. *642
It is true, this ascertainment by the judge provided in Section 2 is provisional and preliminary as to the amount of compensation, and is not binding upon the jury afterward empanelled to try the question; nor would it be admissible evidence before such jury on the question of value or compensation. But it is not provisional and preliminary as to one important feature — the taking of possession of the landowner's property without notice, and its immediate appropriation to the construction of the road or bridge. As to this it is practically final. The statute does not say upon whose motion the judge shall act, nor that any notice shall be given to either party; but by implication, the Act provides that the petitioner, alone, where immediate possession is desired, may apply to the judge to take action under this proviso, and the judge could proceed to fix the value without notice to the defendant, in this ex parte manner.
It will be observed that the Circuit Judge is given the power to make this preliminary ascertainment of value upon evidence afforded by affidavits alone, of disinterested persons owning land in the vicinity, which must be not less than three in number. It is true he may require as many affidavits as he desires. He need not take any action at all unless he has before him affidavits which in his judgment afford a sufficient basis to arrive at a fair and definite opinion as to such value. There is no compulsion upon the judge. He can refuse to make the finding if satisfactory evidence therefor is not produced. The only limitation is that his finding as to the value must be based upon "affidavits of not less than three disinterested freeholders owning property in the vicinity of that sought to be taken." He can of course require more than three affidavits if desired by him. But he is limited, in effect, to the consideration *643 of such ex parte affidavits as may be submitted to him by the petitioners.
The question arises whether this provision is an invasion of the judicial discretion, which is beyond the power of the legislature. The general principle involved was well stated by MR. JUSTICE WHITFIELD, speaking for this court, in Ruff v. Georgia, S. F. R. R. Co.
Because of the failure of the provision in Section 2 to afford due process, and its invasion of the judicial power, its invalidity clearly appears, and the motion for rehearing should be denied.
TERRELL AND STRUM, J. J., concur.
Addendum
Section 29, Article XVI of the State Constitution mandatorily applies when private property is appropriated to the use of any corporation or individual;" and even if a corporation that is created and used as a State agency, is not subject to that organic section, when a delegated right of eminent domain is exercised by it, such corporate State agency is subject to the dominant *627
organic provisions requiring due process of law and just compensation in appropriating private property to the use of highways or other public purposes under the law. Sec. 12, Declaration of Rights. Even if the owner is not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before his property is taken for a public use by direct Act of the Legislature, if the means of obtaining just compensation is reasonably secured to him, yet the owner has a right to be heard as to the amount of compensation that should be paid or secured to him; and such right extends to a determination of amounts to be paid into court or secured to meet an ultimate adjudication or compensation where such amounts are to be paid into court or secured as a prerequisite to an appropriation of the property pending condemnation proceedings. When the right of eminent domain is delegated with conditions to its exercise, the performance of the conditions is subject to judicial cognizance; and judicial authority is exercised upon notice and hearing. See Mississippi and Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson,
In this State the determination of what is just compensation for private property that is taken for public use, is a judicial function that cannot be performed by the Legislature either directly or by any method of indirection.
Even if under the present constitution of this State, the Legislature may lawfully authorize private property to be appropriated to a public use upon the institution of condemnation proceedings and the payment into court or the securing of such an amount as the court may direct, to pay the adjudged compensation when finally ascertained, the amount so paid into court or secured should be duly determined by the court in the orderly course of judicial *628 procedure. The means and processes of such determination cannot lawfully be so circumscribed or arbitrarily controlled by legislative action as to make the amount to be paid into court or secured, a legislative and not a judicial ascertainment and determination.
Section 2, Chapter 10118, delegates to the State Road Department the right to condemn "all necessary lands * for rights of way" and any property "necessary and useful for road building purposes;" and purports to authorize said department to "enter upon the lands or other property sought to be taken and proceed to the construction of the State road or bridge for which said lands or property are necessary" provided the department shall have "secured to the owner of said property full compensation therefor, by depositing * double the amount of the value of said property as fixed by the judge of said court based upon affidavits of not less than three disinterested freeholders owning property in the vicinity of that sought to be taken."
This provision purports to authorize an appropriation of private property upon making a deposit and arbitrarily requires the judge to determine the amount of the deposit upon ex parte affidavits of not less than three disinterested freeholders, without affording the owner any notice of opportunity to be heard and without using any other appropriate means or processes for determining the proper amount to be deposited from which to pay the compensation when the amount thereof has been duly adjudicated. Such provision is clearly an attempted statutory limitation upon the judicial powers that are by the constitution vested in the Courts of the State. And such legislative limitation of judicial powers necessarily invades the organic rights of the owners to due process of law and just compensation when private property is taken for public use. *629
In State ex rel. Moody v. Baker,
The statute, Chapter 10118, delegates to the several counties of the State the power of eminent domain to condemn at the request of the State Road Department, all necessary lands for the purpose of securing rights of way for State roads, by the procedure prescribed and set forth in designated statutes, such lands to be first surveyed and located by the State Road Department.
The power of eminent domain is an incident of sovereignty and, within the limitations of organic law, may be exercised by the law-making power or may by it be delegated with appropriate limitations and conditions, such delegated power to be exercised subject to controlling provisions and principles of law. Whether the purpose for which private property is taken under the power of eminent domain is a public purpose is ultimately a judicial question. Hairston v. Danville W. R. Co.,
While under the sovereign power of eminent domain the Legislature, unless restrained by the Constitution, may by direct statutory enactment appropriate particular private property to a public use without notice to the owner, provided just compensation for the property be paid or adequately *630 secured after being duly ascertained upon notice to the owner with a reasonable opportunity afforded to him to be heard in the premises; yet where the sovereign power is delegated with limitations or conditions upon the exercise of the right of eminent domain; the owner of property sought to be taken under such delegated authority has a right to be heard in an appropriate tribunal upon the question of whether delegated authority is being duly exercised in taking his property.
Where the taking or appropriation of particular private property for a public use is not by direct act of the Legislature, but is by a corporate State agency under delegated authority with conditions attached to the exercise of the power, the organic law contemplates that such taking or appropriation shall be by due course of law after notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard in the premises have been given to the owner. See Cotulla v. LaSalle Water Storage Co., (Tex.Civ.App.)
The statutes confer upon the State Road Department, a corporation, and the several counties, authority to exercise the right of eminent domain to condemn property "necessary and useful for road building purposes subject to stated limitations and conditions, and such exercise is subject to applicable provisions of organic law as well as subject to the authority of the courts to determine, upon notice and other requirements of due process, whether the delegated authority is being duly exercised within the conditions and limitations imposed by law.
In this case the exercise of the right of eminent domain is by a subordinate agency upon which conditions are imposed, and the order authorizing the appropriation of private property was made ex parte without notice or an opportunity to be heard being given to the owner and without a hearing or determination that the statutory conditions of *631 the authority had been complied with; and likewise the sum required to be deposited for subsequent use as compensation for the property taken when the amount is determined, was based upon ex parte affidavits without notice to the owner who had an organic right to be heard upon matters affecting the compensation for property taken.
The Constitution commands that all courts in this State shall be open so that every person for any injury done him in his lands, c., shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered. If delegated authority to exercise the right of eminent domain is not exerted in accordance with the authority as conferred and thereby injury is done to any person, the courts are by the Constitution required upon proper procedure to afford appropriate remedy by due course of law.
Where, pursuant to the sovereign right of eminent domain, and in the absence of organic limitations, private property is appropriated by direct action of the law-making department, such action is controlling, provided the appropriation is for a public use and just compensation is duly paid or adequately secured; but where the right of eminent domain is delegated with limitations and conditions upon its exercise, the Legislature has no facilities for enforcing the conditions and limitations imposed upon the exercise of the right, and the authority and duty devolves upon the courts in appropriate procedure by proper parties to prevent an unlawful exercise of the delegated authority.
The intent of the law is the controlling element; and it seems clear that the intent of Section 29, Article XVI, of the Constitution is that no private property nor right of way shall be appropriated until full compensation therefor has been first paid or secured by deposit of money, which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men in due course of law.
In this case the property was by interlocutory order in *632 effect authorized to be appropriated upon deposit of an amount determined by the court upon ex parte affidavits without giving the owner any notice or opportunity to be heard as to what is "full compensation;" and the interlocutory order made upon exparte affidavits as to the amount of the deposit to be made, necessarily embarrasses the owner in showing what is "full compensation," and denies the express organic right to have the compensation determined by a jury of twelve men before the property is appropriated to a conceded public use.
The order to which the writ of certiorari herein is addressed, authorizes the State Road Department, a corporation, to enter upon the lands sought to be condemned and to construct a highway thereon, upon depositing in the registry of the court a sum that is double the value of the lands as determined fromex parte affidavits, no notice or opportunity to be heard being given to the owner.
The organic provision that private property shall not be taken without just compensation, contemplates that before private property is taken for a public use, just compensation therefor shall be paid or adequately secured, and the owner is entitled to be heard as to what is just compensation before the property is appropriated, at least where the right to condemn is delegated to an agency with attached limitations and conditions to the exercise of the delegated authority. The statutes provide for orderly judicial proceedings to be had in due course of law, except that the provision of Section 2, Chapter 10118, for an order for the entry upon and the construction of a highway on the lands sought to be condemned upon the making of a deposit, the amount of which is determined upon ex parte affidavits without notice to the owner of the property, is an arbitrary attempt to appropriate property without due *633 process of law and without a lawful determination of what is just compensation for the property taken.
The petition for rehearing should be denied.
ELLIS AND BUFORD, J. J., concur.
