419 U.S. 983 | SCOTUS | 1975
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Petitioners Linda and Vincent Spady applied for public housing in Mount Vernon, N. Y., in early 1971. Their application was accepted, and in early July they were told that they were eligible for low-income public housing accommodations. On July 9, 1971, petitioners signed a lease, paid one month’s rent plus a security deposit, and were assigned to a specific apartment which would be available to them on July 15, 1971. On or before that date, however, the respondent Housing Authority learned from other tenants that Vincent Spady had previously used the name of Vincent Bentley,
Upon learning these details, the Housing Authority revoked petitioners’ eligibility and removed them from its housing list, on the grounds that their application had been "untruthful” and had failed to reveal Vincent’s prior arrests and certification as a narcotics addict.
Petitioners contend that they were entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing before they could be deprived of their eligibility for public housing; they further contend that the reasons advanced by the Authority in support of that revocation are so arbitrary and so lacking in any rational basis as to constitute a denial of due process of law and of the equal protection of the laws.
Our decisions in recent years have identified a wide range of important interests which the State may not trample upon without a prior hearing. Thus we have required hearings prior to termination of welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); revo
Eligibility for public housing, under the circumstances presented here, arguably merits comparable protection. The long waiting lists maintained for low-income housing projects are ample proof of the pressing demand. An applicant who has been certified as eligible and has spent many months on a waiting list has a substantial interest in maintaining that place and a substantial expectancy of obtaining housing. Summary removal from an eligibility list just prior to occupancy can work serious injury, since the applicant may be relegated to the end of another growing line.
Today’s mounting bureaucracy, both at the state and federal levels, promises to be suffocating and repressive unless it is put into the harness of procedural due process. One who need not explain the reasons for his actions can operate beyond the law. One who need not even hear a complaint from the citizen can turn sheer power into an arbitrary force.
What the decision on the merits should be is arguable. But I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for argument.
His full name at birth was Vincent Spady, but he took the name of Bentley for several years when his mother remarried under that name.
It is undisputed that the application form used by the Authority did not expressly request any information concerning aliases, prior
Petitioners argue that prior arrests, standing alone, have virtually no probative value in establishing actual misconduct or criminal propensities. They further argue that it is wholly- irrational to discriminate against a rehabilitated addict on the basis of his prior addiction or on the basis of criminal acts committed during the period of such addiction, and that such discrimination is fundamentally inconsistent with the nature and purposes of narcotics rehabilitation programs. In the absence of a more specific eviden-tiary record concerning the circumstances of Vincent’s prior arrests and the extent of his rehabilitation, it is impossible to evaluate these arguments as applied to him.
As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 170 (1951):
“The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.” (Concurring opinion.)
Lead Opinion
Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.