30 Ga. App. 217 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1923
The judgment entered by the trial judge was in terms as follows: “.The evidence considered, the court holds as a matter of law that the defendant is estopped by reason of the laws of the order as appearing in section 113 thereof, whereby the clerk of each camp is required to forward a detailed statement of the standing of the members in the camp as shall be required for the information of the Sovereign Clerk, upon blanks furnished for
It is contended that the ruling made in the Rides case, supra, is not controlling, since it does not specifically deal with the principle of estoppel as here invoked. It appears that, under the express terms of the insurance contract, the notice required to be given by the insured of his assumption of military duties, and the special premium to cover such extra risk, were each to be sent by the insured direct to the Sovereign Clerk at the home office of the society. Under the terms of the agreement the local clerk was unauthorized either to accept such notice or to receive such special premium. The provision of section 113, requiring a monthly statement of the standing of local members, could not, therefore, have any possible reference to the payment or non-payment of such special war-risk premiums, with the collection of which the local clerk was in no wise concerned. The record shows that, so far as all assessments collectible by the local clerk were concerned, the insured was in good standing, and the record fails to indicate any notice to or knowledge by the home office that the insured
Judgment reversed, with direction.