99 So. 259 | Miss. | 1924
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a judgment against appellant for two thousand, one hundred and forty dollars in favor of Mrs. Luly Hynde, beneficiary in a certificate of insurance issued upon the life of her deceased husband by the appellant, Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World. The benefit certificate was of the usual form, which provided that, if the insured died while in good standing in the order, that is, had paid all dues and assessments required of him by the constitution and by-laws of the order then in existence or that might be enacted in the future, the beneficiary, the appellee here, would be entitled to receive the amount of the certificate. The application for the benefit insurance is made a part of the contract of insurance along with, the constitution and by-laws of the order, and is binding upon both the insurer and insured. The by-laws of the order require that all assessments and dues must be paid on or before the last day of each month; otherwise the beneficiary shall stand suspended, and the benefit certificate becomes void upon such suspension.
The facts of the case in short are as follows: The insured, Mr. Joseph Hynde, husband of appellee, died in July, 1921. He was a member of the appellant order, which had issued a benefit certificate to him, and upon which he paid all assessments and dues for twenty years before his death., and up to the 1st day of January, 1921. He failed to pay the dues and assessments on his certificate for the month of January, 1921, and was in default for his assessments for all the months thereafter up' to the time of his death. His failure to pay the January assessment before the last day of that month, as required, was reported by the local camp clerk to the Sovereign Camp, which resulted in the suspension of the insured and causing his certificate to become void under the contract of insurance. Consequently the appellant refused to pay the amount of the certificate when demand was made by the appellee after her husband died.
In the court below the appellee introduced testimony showing’ that the insured became disabled some time in 1920, and was confined to his room, and the appellee, his wife,, had been paying the dues on her husband’s certificate by giving checks to the camp clerk for several months ’ dues at a time, which the clerk had already paid;
The camp clerk testified that, while he had paid the dues for some of the months in 1920, he had made no promisé to continue to pay the dues, but that he notified the insured that unless he paid the dues for January, 1921, and the following months he would be suspended; that upon the failure of the insured to pay the January, 1921, dues he reported the suspension to the Sovereign Camp.
The record also discloses, without contradiction, that the Sovereign Head Camp had no notice or knowledge of any character whatever that the clerk of the camp or the local camp itself had been paying the dues of the insured,
We think the statement of the case makes it obvious that but one conclusion can be reached by this court, and that is, no, recovery can be had in the case because the benefit certificate was void on account of the suspension of the member for failure to pay the January, 1921, assessment. It is plain the constitution and by-laws of the order are part of the insurance contract which the insured is charged with knowledge of and required to comply with in order to receive the benefit of the insurance certificate. There was no authority, under the contract, vested in the camp clerk, or the local camp, to waive or extend the time for the payment of the monthly assessments. His agency authorized him to do nothing more in that regard than to collect the monthly assessments before the end of the month, and a failure of the insured to pay the assessment as required vitiated the certificate of insurance.
It is contended by counsel for appellee that the clerk was clothed with real or apparent authority to waive or extend payments, or to agree to pay the assessments himself, or that the camp together'with the clerk might waive or extend the payments by agreeing to do so. But we see no merit in the contention, for the reason that the contract of insurance, as expressly provided in the constitution and by-laws of the order, forbids the clerk or the local camp from waiving or extending payments, but requires that the assessments must be paid during the month or suspension will follow, and the beneficiary is charged with this knowledge.
It is urged by the appellee that the acts and conduct of the clerk and camp in having paid some of the assessments for the insured and agreeing .to pay subsequent assessments had become a custom, and amounted to a
The fact has not escaped our attention that the deceased insured paid his dues and assessments and was in good standing in the appellant order' for about twenty years and it is indeed unfortunate that his widow is to be deprived of the needed benefits of the policy on account of fatal neglect at the very time when it was most important to pay the assessments and keep the policy in force; but contracts must be construed and enforced by the courts as written.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and judgment entered here for appellant.
Reversed, and judgment here for appellant.
Hevers'ed.