24 Haw. 396 | Haw. | 1918
OPINION OP THE JUSTICES BY
The agreed case shows among other things that Manuel Gaetano Baptista, hereinafter called the deceased, married the mother of plaintiffs when the plaintiff Eliza Cabral Souza was seven years of age and the plaintiff Belina Cabral Jagoe (formerly Costa) was an infant in arms. The deceased cared for the plaintiffs as his own children, reared and educated them during their infancy and until their respective marriages, and entertained an affection for them. He was for many years a member of the defendant society and in good standing as such when he died. Having no wife capable of taking the death benefit payable under the by-laws of the defendant society the deceased on April 25, 1917, a short time before his death, filed in the circuit court of the first judicial circuit of the Territory of Hawaii, his petition setting forth the facts and praying that the adoption of the plaintiffs by deceased be authorized, legalized and declared valid. The petition was granted and the decree prayed for was duly made by the judge of the circuit court. The adoption of the plaintiffs legalized by the said decree was accepted by the plaintiffs. At the time the plaintiffs were of the ages of forty-two and thirty-six years respectively. Soon thereafter the deceased died. By the by-laws of the defendant society when a mem
On the one hand it is contended that the plaintiffs are either the legitimate or legitimated children of the deceased and as such entitled to the death benefit. On the other hand it is claimed that the provision in Article 30 of the by-laws, “to the children, legitimate or legitimated,” does not include an adopted child but applies solely to the offspring of the member either born in lawful wedlock or legitimated after birth by the marriage of the parents; or, if it includes adopted children, the plaintiffs cannot take for the reason that the circuit court or judge had no jurisdiction to legalize the adoption by the deceased of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs being adults at the time of the decree legalizing their adoption.
The argument that the by-law in question contemplates only blood relatives we do not regard as entirely correct as the first person named, the widow, is not related by consanguinity.
The adoption of children was unknown to the common law and is a creature of statute. The statutes of adoption of various jurisdictions are so different that adjudicated
But is the decree A'alidating and legalizing the adoption by the deceased of the plaintiffs void for the reason that the plaintiffs Avere adults at the time the decree was made? By section 2272 R. L. circuit judges are granted power at chambers, among other things, “to legalize the adoption of children.” By section 2994 R. L. a child may be adopted by decree or judgment of a judge or court of record or by agreement of adoption duly acknowledged and recorded, and the adopted child thereafter sustains the relation of child and heir to the adopting parent (Leialoha v. Wotlters,
The relation of parent and child may by adoption exist between adults under the statute Avhich does not confine the adoption to minors, hence the plaintiffs are children of the deceased within the meaning of Article 30 of the bylaws of the defendant society and are entitled to a judgment for the death benefit in the sum of $1500’.
A judgment may be prepared and entered accordingly and it is so ordered.