*1 Jewish party. Nat. Council complaining sion not benefit County, 198, v. Cobb Women intervenor from an That some future benefit be derived i.e., upon one is not based adjudication question, on an abstract existing and rights, require not a court to retain decide facts or does complained byof intervenor is ca- alleged the case. Id. The error since, pable contrary to the trial court’s determination repetition months, six OCGA 46-2-25 that rate must be within cases decided (b) (c) period only suspension rate is six state the effective appears to months date rates filed. Because no reason from the are cases, why judicial in future review is this issue would evade review 241) Baker, Chastain 432, mandated. superior determination to Accordingly, we reverse the court’s contrary and remand direction to the trial court dismiss with case. unnecessary 2. con- Because of our decision Division it is remaining sider the of error. enumerations Benham, Judgments reversed remanded direction. with J., J., Hunstein, Hines, JJ., Fletcher, Sears, Carley, Judge C. P. J., Seeliger Thompson, disqualified. Clarence F. concur. — May 6, 1996 Decided May
Reconsideration denied Norman, Jr., Norman, D. Long, Aldridge & Albert G. Gordon Rice, Giffin, Craig Dowdy, L. E. Light William for Atlanta Gas Com- pany. Greene, Williams, Sanders, C. Robert P. Susan
Troutman Kevin Wilkerson, P. Company. Georgia for Power General, Cole, Bowers, Deputy H. Attorney Brenda
Michael J. Bond, General, E. K. Assistant At- Attorney Hennelly, John Thomas General, torneys Service Commission. Public Hawes, Peyton S. Textile Association. Georgia Manufacturers COMPANY v. GEORGE. S95G1507. SOUTHWIRE (470 SE2d Justice.
Thompson, Appeals the Court granted We certiorari 362) (1995), posed Southwire following query: psychic trauma Compensation Under the Workers’ when, precipitated by a while not compensable compensable jury, which a it arose out of accident psychic physical injury contributes continuation trauma? scope employment
While in the his George as a truck driver hip, Company, knee, Southwire Denver suffered his *2 passenger a vehicle and chest when his hit broadside tractor-trailer stop sign. The after the other driver ran a driver of other vehicle impact, passenger was was thrown from the stantly. grill and a female killed body George collide with the observed the decedent placed hospital emergency of his He room truck. was the same lung collapsed, with the gled, driver face man- other whose had whose was hollering passenger. gurgling was and who and the deceased upset George became so that he had from the room. removed Approximately George later, months two was released to return duty by treating orthopedist. continued, however, to full his work He by psychiatrist deposed shortly to be his treated who after “began having nightmares, insomnia, knee claimant recurrent irritability epi- crying accident, flashbacks of the and recurrent get picture people sodes, [sic] and could not these who were psychiatrist killed in the accident of his out mind.” concluded George post-traumatic suffered have stress disorder by brought injury.1 on or been cessitated ity intensified his knee This ne- condition continuing psychiatric treatment and resulted his inabil- perform work as a truck driver. psychiatric disability The ALJ denied to the benefits claimant for psychic resulting compensable from trauma to a attendant automo- finding: “Although psycho- accident, bile is a there definite need for logical problems psychological treatment. . . his have resulted disability psychological problems work, I find from that his not were precipitated by specific physical they knee, trauma his and that [he] were caused events accident which witnessed.” George temporary disability was awarded total benefits for the two physically work, months that he was unable to but no benefits there- though working after, “even he is disabled from at Southwire or as psychiatric problems psy- truck driver [because] [t]hese due to . . . problems disability resulting chiatric therefrom do not arise from George’sphysical injury, Mr. but from the events he witnessed at adopted by accident.” The award full was board and affirmed on 1 Diagnostic “Posttraumatic Stress is Disorder” described in the & Statistical Manual of (4th 1994) development symptoms following Mental Disorders exposure ed. “the of characteristic personal experience involving to an extreme direct traumatic stressor of an event injury. or involves actual threatened or . . .” It death serious At 424. is manifested “persistent symptoms anxiety present . . . that were 425. not before the trauma.” Id. at
741 appeal superior court. reversed, discretionary Appeals granted
The Court of review and by a com- disability brought on holding “George’s that: mental injured. Although this pensable physically accident in which he was part of physical disability, it is not the cause his Co., v. Southwire supra for its continuation.” at reason previously had occasion to examine the While Court has question disability Workers’ compensability for mental under the psy in this that a Compensation long it has been the rule state “ ‘naturally compensable or if it chological injury disease is arises Han . . . unavoidably’ from some discernible occurrence.” (292 Chatham, son Buick App. SE2d (1) (120 Indemnity Loftis, Ins. Co. v. App. See also 655) (1961) (a if disability compensable brought Brady Co., Royal Mfg. physical injury); accident (1968) disability origin must (psychic have its Sawyer Indem. injury); Ga. Pacific 227) (1977) (psychic disability is com resulting from Svcs., v. ARA Environmental Williams pensable); 192) (1985) psy (psychic disability resulting purely from *3 Contrac Superior Howard compensable); is chological injury not tors, 563) (1986) (post-traumatic stress compensable); W. W. syndrome arising physical injury a is from 106) (1989) Hamby, Fowler Oil Co. unavoidably some dis (psychic naturally trauma must arise and from cernible, physical injury). “injury” physical
The claimant suffered a discernible herein v. Southwire (4). In that term is defined in OCGA 34-9-1 § disability a is supra, Appeals the Court of concluded that mental compensa- brought a compensable under the Act where it was physically injured, ble in and the accident which the claimant was physical injury psychic trauma. contributed to the continuation the ruling precedent We to upon find this and the which it is based objective sound and consistent with the beneficent in of and the provide injury arising is assistance for an out financial Southern Travelers Ins. Co. v. employment. generally course of See Elec., (1) (434 Accordingly, we Com- under the Workers’ hold that a claimant is entitled benefits which, pensation psychic disability Act for mental and treatment injury, out of necessarily precipitated by physical arose an while a sustained, compensable physical injury accident which a psychic trauma. injury contributes to the continuation of the that psychic the physical injury precipitating need not be cause trauma; compensable if it is contributes psychic continuation of the trauma. imposed requirement
To the extent that the ALJ that claim- precipitating psycholog- his physical injury ant’s must be the cause of condition, applied. legal ical an incorrect standard was an “[WJhere aside, legal theory, may award it be set is entered under erroneous Indemnity and the findings.” case remanded board further Loftis, supra Ins. Co. Ga. App., Accordingly, at 751. the Court Appeals ruling was correct the award must be set aside (c) that, under further OCGA 34-9-105 But its conclusion circumstances, [George compensated] these should be “[u]nder psychic stimuli,” George, psychic precipitated by supra trauma at body. Appeals factfinding the Court of substituted itself as a superior appellate authority Neither the court nor court has to do Petty, App. 497, so. South Ga. Timber Co. v.
176) (1995). The is Appeals case remanded to the Court of with direc- tion compensability the Board determine for claimant’s mental disability expenses and attendant medical under the standard set out herein. Judgment with case remanded direction. All the affirmed concur, Benham, J., Fletcher, J., except J., Sears,
Justices C. P. who specially. concur
Fletcher, Presiding Justice, concurring specially. granted clarify proper
We certiorari standard deter- mining psychic injury compensable when under the Workers’ Com- pensation Act. Language previous Appeals sug- Court of cases has gested, case, as the ALJ held in psychic this trauma compensable only directly if compensable physical it arises from a jury.2 essentially requires This standard proximate link cause be- tween psychic injuries. The Court Appeals others, however, case and in has held lesser that a causation standard is appropriate, psychic compensable and that trauma is when it arises out of compensable an accident in which occurred and the compensable physical aggravates contributes to psychic or trauma.3 I believe this latter is more in keeping standard with the purpose provide of the Act to financial injuries arising assistance for during Therefore, employment.4 the course of disapprove *4 suggest cases proximate that a requirement. causation 2 See, Chatham, 127, Hanson e.g., (292 428) (1982) Buick App. 163 Ga. 129 SE2d (psychic injury compensable only “naturally unavoidably if it arises from some discern occurrence”); Indemnity Loftis, 749, (120 655) (1961) Ins. Co. v. App. ible 752 SE2d (psychic disability compensable arising physical injury”). “if from the 3 See, George Co., (458 e.g., App. 362) (1995); v. Southwire Ga. Howard 217 586 Superior Contractors, 563) (1986). 68 4 Co., Slaten Travelers Ins. Ga. post-trau- that psychiatrist testified Because the claimant’s in- by the knee prolonged was intensified and matic stress disorder psychic trauma of whether question not reach the jury,5 we need by physical trauma. preceded no compensable when Sears, Justice, concurring specially. under is entitled to benefits holds that “a claimant majority disability psychic Compensation Act for
the Workers’ in- by physical a which, necessarily precipitated while not treatment compensable physical injury jury, arose out of an accident sustained, contributes to the continuation injury and that trauma,” whether psychic the case for a determination and remands I Although con- George’s compensable claim is under that standard.6 claim, George’s compensability of cur in the remand to determine the which to make that determina- adopt a different standard that have join majority of courts tion. It is time for this Court from the arbi- legitimate for a right freed the to recover in- physical trary requirement accompanied be just posi- such a persuasively championed jury. Chief Justice Benham Appeals.7 This Court judge on the Court of tion dissent while permitting adopt a rule those leads this case and should follow Compensation Act for mental compensation Georgia’s under Workers’ stimuli, regardless of whether injuries resulting from mental causes or injuries. accompanying there are “in- employees from Compensation protects Act
1. Our Workers’ employment.”8 arising out of and the course jury accident is broad reasonably disputed “injury” the term It cannot injuries. The definition both and mental enough to cover is as follows: harms, unjust or un- damages, act that or hurts: an [A]n hurt, harm;. damage, . or or . suffering deserved infliction of HARM, DAMAGE, sustained; INJURY, HURT, . . . loss act or result of mean common the AND MISCHIEF loss, pain, person something that causes flicting thing on a or comprehensive, distress, most impairment. INJURY is the or or de- involving impairment applying to an act or result freedom, soundness, health, or loss of right, struction of upset something of value . . . or emotional [mental v. Southwire at 587. 6 Majority opinion at 741. Svcs., Williams v. ARA Environmental 664-668 (1985). OCGA 34-9-1 *5 744 body a just truly injury body as an to the as bone frac 9
ture]. addition, Richardson,10 in Hennly In v. Court held that Compensation in Georgia Worker’s Act is intended to have “[t]he application variety injuries so as to a wide of and the broad cover pain suffering &c. injuries. incident to such Southern Wire 738) Fowler, 727, (124 (1962).” Given the 729 SE2d broad Assembly the could have meaning “injury,” given of General easily compensation by modify- physical bodily injuries or limited to ing “injury” words, the term “injury” the word with either those only reasonably interpreted plain meaning can under the mental, physical Indeed, injuries. Georgia statute to as include as well recovery cases precluding for mental mental causes “injury” have not focused on the word but on the word to “accident” deny compensation such cases.11 however,
I conclude,
improperly
cases have
these
limited the
only
physical
word
First,
where
a
injury.12
“accident”
those cases
there is
carry
meaning
physical
“accident” does not
the certain
that a
person
to a
has
That
occurred.13
the term “accident” was not
type
meant
compensation
limit the
which
could be
sought,
merely
type
but
of event
describe a
or occurrence or devel-
opment that
to the injury,
simple
led
is demonstrated
the
fact that
legislature
“injury” immediately
the
preceding
used the term
“accident,”
word
“injury”
and thus
have intended
must
describe
and,
correspondingly,
result of the “accident”
must not
have
tended
type
injury necessary
the word “accident” to
signify
recovery
compensation. Accordingly,
although the word “accident”
encompasses
events,
require
physical
impact
it
a
on
does
person.
9
Dictionary, Unabridged
Webster’s Third New
1164.
International
at
10
(1) (444
For similar conclude that the injury be caused interpreted not be to contain a limitation that the stimulus, instead should be single, physical or mental but traumatic interpreted physical and mental stimuli.16 gradual to include
Further, is consistent with interpretation this broad of “accident” Appeals. For ex- prior interpretations this Court and the Court of Brands Helton Interstate Corp.,17 Appeals Court of ample, stated that act, in- every “The word as used includes ‘accident/ naturally
jury except growing diseases not out employment, [except] arising out of and in the course of person directed juries the wilful act of a third him, personal against employee such for reasons [ex- cept] part employee, wilful misconduct on the precludes act action at common law or otherwise. [Cits.]” (197 184, Reid v. Lummus Cotton-Gin App. 185 58 Ga. 904) (1938). SE v. ARA in Williams
And, recognized as Chief Justice Benham Environmental Svcs.: 14 (1971); City 346) Neal, 750, (2) (186 Travelers Co. v. App. Ins. 124 SE2d Ga. 751 227)
Augusta Williams, (223 (1976) (“[e]motionally 177, App. initiated 137 Ga. 178 SE2d (317 Fender, Zippy App. Mart v. injuries”); 617 attacks 170 Ga. heart constitute accidental 612) (1995). 575) (459 (1984); Reynolds Reynolds, App. Constr. Co. v. SE2d SE2d 218 Ga. 23 15 Mart, Neal, 750; Williams, Zippy 177; App. 617; App. App. 170 Ga. 124 Ga. 137 Ga. Reynolds, App. 218 Ga. 16 (b) (1995). Larson, Compensation, 1B 42.23 See The Law of Workmen’s 1 17 (271 739) (1980). App. 155 Ga. SE2d early Compen- very interpretation
Even in a
of the Workers’
opined in Lumbermen’s Mut.
Supreme
sation
Court
(9
84) (1940),
Griggs,
Cas. Co. v.
Further, permit employees to injuries to recover for mental from purpose mental trauma is expressed consistent with the of the Act as in OCGA provides 34-9-23. That Code section as follows: chapter liberally only
This shall be construed for the at 665-666. purpose bringing employers employees pro- and within the chapter provide protection visions of this and to for both. chapter provide complete This is intended to exclusive and system procedure disputes and for the resolution of between employers employees subject chapter who are to this concerning injuries arising accidents and out of and employment chapter. provi- course of as defined The chapter impar- sions applied of this shall be construed and tially employers employees. to both liberally The Act provide thus directs that it should be construed to compensation employees long protection provided to to so is also employers. goals easily accomplished regard Both of these can be with injuries brought already to mental trauma. I have using demonstrated that the terms of the construction, even less than a liberal enough provide protection employees are broad injuries, fulfilling part such thus 34-9-23. directive of § First, employers
Can adequately protected such cases? Yes. by bringing employees injuries, employers within the Act for such are protected Second, injuries. perhaps from tort actions those significantly, precedent more there is abundant from across the coun- try adopted Georgia protect employers that should be and that will spurious from claims for mental stimuli. Chief Justice Benham set forth one such solution in Williams: system jurisprudence spirit hallmark of our is its ability
of fairness and
adjust
its
to new situations.
can
think
greater
protect
of no
need than the need to
workers
Therefore,
system.
who form the
backbone
our economic
eye
we
progression
must view this matter with an
toward
retrogression.
expressed
rather
than
The concern for abuse
in the
analysis
excellent
in Hanson Buick19 dissuades me
jerry-rigging
just
particular
from
rule
suit this
case. We
develop
simple
easily
must
rule
understandable
appropriate
fair and
but which does not lend itself to fla-
grant
An overriding
abuse.
the Hanson Buick case
concern of
malingerers
compensated
was the fear of
un-
being
psychological
injuries.
founded and
. . .
manufactured
proposes
adoption
What
this dissent
is the
of the Wis
I.L.H.R.,
approach
Colony
Dept.
consin
in Swiss
128) (1976), quoting
Wis.2d 46
NW2d
from School Dis
*8
373) (1974):
I.L.H.R.,
trict v.
Although approach illustrative of the find Wisconsin inju- claims for mental standard that can be used to curtail frivolous ries that result from mental standard that has been standard, adopt stimuli, I a variant of that would adopted Wyoming Iowa. Under that employee may compensated in- for a mental-mental by jury injury if he that the mental ‘was caused work- “establishes place greater magnitude day-to-day than the mental stresses stress of experienced by employed jobs,’ other workers the same or similar regardless employer.”20 Supreme noted, of their As the Iowa Court adopting Wyoming First, there are three reasons for standard. “[b]y similarly comparing employees, the stresses endured situated Wyoming provides employees compensation the legitimate ployers’ liability oming standard with injuries
work limits the em- related while at the same time industry.”21 Wy- injuries Second, caused its meaning standard avoids confusion that has arisen over the phrase employees” Third, the that have “all in the Wisconsin standard.22 states experience
extended with mental-mental claims “are creasingly enacting proof employee’s require statutes which that the similarly greater employees.”23 stress is than that of situated Requiring employee prove injury that an that his mental greater experienced by similarly stresses than those situ- employees provide protection employees legitimate ated ensuring work-related, mental while at the time same employers protected injuries.24 are from frivolous claims such § OCGA 34-9-23.
Finally,
present
easy
provides
proof why
case
injury requirement
protection
arbitrary
nothing
is but an
one that adds
employers.
George
tragic
horrifying
Here,
witnessed
events. He claims that he suffers a
bating
In
mental
a result.
com-
injury,
this claim of of what avail is it to Southwire
George
injury?
physical injury provides
suffered a knee
no
proof
suffering
provides
no
assur-
20 Dunlavey
Economy
Co.,
(Iowa 1995)
Fire &c.
Graves v.
(quoting
2. In language purposes Compensa of our Workers’ inescapably tion Act lead employees to the conclusion that should protection have for mental In stimuli. rule, adopting such a join majority we would states this country provide who protection.25 such As Chief Justice Benham elo quently stated Williams: “The life of dependent the law has been upon proper however, precedent; adherence to quality of the law’s jeopardized life is precedents when contrary experience, run reason, and fundamental precedents preclude fairness.”26 As the compensation for contrary experience, mental-mental claims run reason, fairness, them, fundamental would overrule adopt permitting recovery rule in those cases under the standard set forth special this concurrence.
I am authorized to state that Chief joins Justice Benham special concurrence.
Decided June Smith,
Kenneth A. appellant. Jr., Drew, Charles H. Lumpkin, Farnham, Eckl & John G. Blackmon, Jr., Handley, Marion M. appellee.
Hamilton, Westby,
Antonowich,
Marshall &
Andrew J. Hamil-
25 See, e.g., Dunlavey,
Case,
845;
(Mass.
1993);
Robinson’s
ton, C. amicus curiae. Robert THE ELLISON v. STATE.
S96A0179.
(470 SE2d Sears, Justice. Ellison, mur- of the malice appellant, Anthony was convicted during the commis- Billy Hagin, possession of a firearm der of felon, crime, of a firearm a convicted possession sion of officers, simple and of two counts of three counts of obstruction error, battery.1 We find no and affirm. days alter- about four before the
Stephanie Darnell testified that *10 Riordan, Sammy Hagin she moved with cation between Ellison and Ellison, wife, his Tabitha Anthony that time Ellison and and that at day killing that on the living were with Riordan. She added present she, Tabitha Ellison were at Acrey, Billy Hagin, Junior driveway in Anthony sped Ellison into the Riordan’s trailer when porch in sitting on a front car. Darnell testified that she was car, Ellison; Anthony he got after out of the trailer with Tabitha that why he get gun; that when Tabitha asked wanted told Tabitha to his gun”; Tabitha gun, Anthony get told her to his “damn and that Anthony’s Darnell stated got gun. in the trailer and further then went porch; Hagin then around the corner of the trailer that walked Anthony jumped porch gun gun off the with the and stuck the that face; your pockets”; Hagin’s Anthony Hagin “empty told that that face; pocket kept one hand his Hagin reached one hand into a gun Hagin’s into face. Darnell added Anthony and that then fired the Hagin gun did not have a his hands and that she did not see shot, person. on his After the Darnell ran into the trailer. She one wiping gun and saw Ellison testified that she looked out a window cloth, She with a but that she did not continue to watch Ellison. added, however, that he came inside about two minutes after the hand; shooting, put gun Hagin’s her that he had told “narc”; if Hagin Hagin he to shoot was a and that she had because say happened, Hagin playing were asked what she should was gun with the and it went off.
Gary Acrey essentially shooting also witnessed the and testified September The crimes occurred on 1994. Ellison was indicted on November 12, 1995, jury May 1994. The returned its verdict and the trial court sentenced Ellison on 31, 1995, reporter day. May trial on and the court that same Ellison filed a motion new 31,1995. transcript August The trial court denied the motion for new trial on certified the on 21,1995, appeal appeal September on October 18. The was dock and Ellison filed a notice January 17, 27, 1995, orally argued eted this Court on October