Thе Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (the Act), aims to encourage competition in the telephone services industry. Among other things, the Act requires telephone companies competing within the same area to “interconnect” their networks to ensure that callers who subscribe to one local telephone service can receive calls from, and place calls to, those who subscribe to a different local telephone service. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(A). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is authorized to establish regulations implementing the requirements of § 251. Id. § 251(d)(1).
The terms under which the networks are connected are contained in “interconnection agreements.” The Act directs telephone companies to attempt to agree upon the terms of interconnection through negotiation. Id. § 252(a)(1). If they cannot agree, the Act directs the governing state commission to arbitrate or mediate disputed issues. Id. § 252(b)(1). The duties which the Act imposes are only minimum requirements, and telephone companies may enter into interconnection agreements “without regard” to the Act’s requirements. Id. § 252(a)(1). The state commission must, however, approve the final agreement. Id. § 252(e)(1). In this case, Plaintiff Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and Defendant Brooks Fiber Communications agreed upon all the terms of interconnection. The Oklаhoma Corporation Commission (OCC) subsequently approved their Interconnection Agreement (Agreement or Interconnection Agreement).
Meanwhile, § 251(b)(5) of the Act imposes a duty on local exchange carriers (LEC) to “establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunication.” Reciprocal compensation is designed to compensate an LEC for completing a loсal call from another LEC. The Act requires that the originating caller’s LEC, in this case Southwestern Bell, compensate the LEC who completed the call, in this case Brooks Fiber. Id. § 251(b)(5). In its 1996 Local Competition Order, the FCC ruled that the Act’s “ § 251(b)(5) obligations should apply only to traffic that originates and terminates within a local area.” 11 F.C.C.R. 16013, ¶ 1034 (1996). Accordingly, the Agreement between Brooks Fiber and Southwestern Bell requires reciprocal compensation only when they exchange “local traffic.” The Agreement defines local traffic as follows:
Calls originated by one Party’s end users and terminated to the other Party’s end users shall be classified as local traffic under this Agreement if the call originates and terminates in the same [Southwestern Bell] exchange area ... or originates and terminates within different [Southwestern Bell] exchanges which share a common mandatory local calling scope. Calls not classified as local under this Agreement shall be treated as intеrexchange for intercompa-ny compensation purposes.
Application of the reciprocal compensation provisions of the Agreement between Southwestern Bell and Brooks Fiber is the subject of this lawsuit. In June 1997, after performing under the Agreement for nearly nine months, Southwestern Bell declared it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls to Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) doing business with Brooks Fiber because, according to Southwestern Bell, calls to ISPs are interstate communications which the Agreement’s reciprocal compensation provisions do not cover. Brooks Fiber then filed an application with the OCC requesting a determi *496 nation that calls delivered from Southwestern Bell customers to an ISP located within the same local exchange are “local traffic” and subject to the Act’s reciprocal compensation requirements.
A statе administrative law judge ruled in favor of Southwestern Bell, determining that calls to ISPs are not subject to reciprocal compensation. Brooks Fiber appealed the ALJ’s decision. The OCC reversed the ALJ’s decision, reasoning that such traffic is local, terminates at the ISP, and is subject to reciprocal compensation. Southwestern Bell sought review of the OCC’s order in federal district court. 1 Southwestern Bell argued that the OCC’s order rested on the erroneous cоnclusion that federal law characterizes calls to ISPs as local traffic. According to Southwestern Bell, this conclusion conflicted with (1) the plain language of the Agreement, (2) state and federal precedent regarding what constitutes local traffic, and (3) the reciprocal compensation provisions of the Act.
The district court concluded that its jurisdiction to review the OCC’s order was limited to determining compliance with federal law, and did not еxtend to review of Oklahoma state contract law issues. Accordingly, the court upheld the OCC’s order as consistent with federal law, but declined to review the OCC’s application of state contract law to the Agreement. Southwestern Bell appeals the district court’s decision. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to review the OCC’s application of state contract law, we ultimately affirm the court’s judgment in favor of Brooks Fiber as modified because the OCC’s interpretation of the Interconnection Agreement is consistent with both federal and state law.
I.
The substantive questions that Southwestern Bell and Brooks Fiber ask us to decide are: (1) whether the OCC properly interpreted the Interconnection Agreement as requiring reciprocal compensation for calls to ISPs, and (2) whether the Interconnection Agreement, as interpreted by the OCC, complies with federal law. At the outset, however, we must address several issues regarding the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation.
See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,
A.
We bеgin by recognizing that the OCC acted within its jurisdiction in interpreting the previously approved Interconnection Agreement between Southwestern Bell and Brooks Fiber. The Act authorizes state commissions to mediate and arbitrate disputes over interconnection agreements during the parties negotiations. 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(a)(2) & (b)(1). The Act also specifies that the appropriate
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state commission must approve each interconnection agreement.
Id.
§ 252(e)(1). Courts have held that this grant to the state commissions to approve or reject and mediate or arbitrate interconnection agreements necessarily implies the authority to interpret and enforce specific provisions contained in those agreements.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n,
Moreover, the FCC has concluded that “inherent in state commissions’ express authority to mediate, arbitrate, and apрrove interconnection agreements under § 252 is the authority to interpret and enforce previously approved agreements.”
In The Matter of Starpower Communications,
15 F.C.C.R. 11277, ¶ 7 (2000). We must defer to the FCC’s view because it is a reasonable interpretation of § 252.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
B.
We next conclude that the district court had jurisdiction tо review the decision of the OCC interpreting the Interconnection Agreement. Section 252(e)(6) of the Act states, “[i]n any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of §§ 251 and 252.” In addition, Congress expressly eliminated state court jurisdiction to review actions of state commissions in approving or rejecting interconnection agreements. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(4) (“No state court shall have jurisdiction to review the action of a state commission in approving or rejecting an agreement under this section”). Therefore, federal district court’s jurisdiction to review a state commissions approval or rejection of an interconnection agreement is explicit.
A more difficult question is whether the district court’s jurisdictiоn extends to other actions of the state commission, specifically decisions interpreting or enforcing interconnection agreements subsequent to their initial approval. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that § 252(e)(6) should not be construed so narrowly as to limit federal jurisdiction to only those decisions that either approve or reject interconnection agreements.
Southwestern Bell,
C.
The proper scope of the district court’s review of the OCC’s actions is our next inquiry. We must consider whether
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the district court is limited to reviewing the OCC’s actions only for compliance with federal law, or whether the court’s review may extend to application of state contract law. The district court, relying on decisions from the First and Seventh Circuits, limited its review to determining compliance with federal.law.
See Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Telecomm. Regulatory Bd.,
Subsequent to the district court’s determination in this case, three other circuits have considered this same issue and taken a more expansive view of federal jurisdiction. The Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits direct district courts to consider de novo whether the agreements are in compliance with the Act and the implementing regulatiops.
Southwestern Bell,
In addition, having decided that the state commissions have the authority to interpret and enforce interconnection agreements and that the appropriate forum for review of these decisions is federal court, it would be a waste of judicial resources to limit the court’s consideration to federal issues only. Therefore, we join the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits. We review de novo whether the Agreement as interpreted by the OCC complies with the requirements of the Act, and we review under an arbitrary or capricious standard the OCC’s state law determinations.
Compare Haymaker v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm’n,
II
We first consider whether the OCC properly interpreted the Agreement as re
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quiring reciprocal compensation for calls to ISPs. The Agreement itself and state law principles govern the questions of interpretation of the contract and enforcement of its provisions.
Southwestern Bell,
Under Oklahoma law, “[a] contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties, as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 152 (2000). “When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention оf the parties is to be interpreted from the writing alone, and if unambiguous, the language of the contract controls.”
Malicoate v. Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co.,
The FCC, in its order
In The Matter of Access Charge Reform,
12 F.C.C.R. 15982, ¶ 348,
The OCC determined that the telecommunication traffic in question was local traffic within the scope of the reciprocal compensation provision of the Agreement. The OCC concluded: “[wjhere an interconnection agreement defined ‘local traffic’ as traffic which originates and terminates within a given local calling area, calls from an end-user to an ISP located in the same local calling area are subject to the reciprocal compensation rate.” The OCC then applied this determination to the Agreement.
The Agreement defines “local traffic” as traffic which “originates and terminates within a [Southwestern Bell] exchange including mandatory local calling scope arrangements.” “Terminating traffic” is defined as “voice grade switched telecommunications service which is delivered to an end-user(s) as a result of another end-user’s attempt to establish communications between the parties.” Thе OCC reasoned that because the FCC treats ISPs as end-users, the point of termination of calls to ISPs is the location of the ISP. Moreover, where the calling party and the called party, in this case the ISP, are located in the same local calling area, the call is “local traffic” under the express terms of the Agreement. See supra p. 495. The OCC also concluded that calls to ISPs are “terminating traffic” as defined in the Agreement because “by placing a cаll to an ISP the end-user originating the call in effect ‘establishes communications’ with another end-user.” We believe the OCC reasonably interpreted the Agreement to mean that calls to ISPs are “terminating traffic” subject to reciprocal compensation. Therefore, we find that the OCC’s interpretation of the Agreement was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Ill
Finally, we consider whether the Agreement, as interpreted by the OCC, violates existing federal law, namеly the Act and the FCC’s regulations or rulings pursuant to the Act. Southwestern Bell argues the district court erred in determining the Agreement does not violate
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federal law. Specifically, Southwestern Bell argues the OCC’s interpretation of the Act and the FCC decisions relied upon in reaching its decision were erroneous in light of the FCC’s ISP Declaratory Ruling,
In The Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996 Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bоund Traffic,
14 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1999),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Bell Atlantic Tel. Co. v. F.C.C.,
In the ISP Ruling, the FCC attempted to clarify whether a local exchange carrier is entitled to receive reciprocal compensation for traffic delivered to an ISP. Both Southwestern Bell and Brooks Fiber rely heavily upon the ISP Ruling in their briefs. Southwestern Bell argues’ the FCC’s determinations support its argument that calls to ISPs are not local calls and, therefore, not subject to reciprocal compensation. Brooks Fiber relies upon the ruling for the proposition that existing interconnection agreements, as interpreted by state commissions, are binding until the FCC issues a definitive rule on the subject. Id.
Although the
ISP Ruling
was vacated and remanded “for want of reasoned decision-making,”
Bell Atl.,
The OCC analyzed the FCC’s regulatory treatment of ISPs at the time the Agreement was signed and prior to the issuance of the
ISP Ruling.
The OCC looked to the specific language of the Act which imposes a duty “to establish reciprocal compensation for the transport and termination of ‘telecommunications.’” The OCC explained that the FCC, in its
In Matter of Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Service,
12 F.C.C.R. 8776,
The OCC concluded that “reciprocal compensation is due between the carriers pursuant to whatever compensation arrangement the parties have contractually established through their interconnection agreement.” We agree with the district court that the OCC did not misapprehend federal law in reaching its decision. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision that the Agreement, аs interpreted by the OCC, does not violate federal law.
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court as modified is AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Southwestern Bell also appealed the OCC’s order to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. The supreme court dismissed the appeal, holding that the federal district court has ex-elusive jurisdiction to review the OCC's actions. We express no opinion on the supreme court’s determination.
. The Seventh Circuit noted that a rule where jurisdictiоn was limited to determining compliance with federal law creates an absurd jurisdictional scheme in which:
[EJvery time a carrier complains about a state agency's action concerning an agreement, it must start in federal court (to find out whether there has been a violation of federal law) and then may move to state court if the first suit yields the answer "no”. This system may not have much to recommend it, but, ... the 1996 Act has its share of glitches, and if this is another, the legislature сan provide a repair.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
. The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
.While we could remand this matter to the district court for a determination in the first instance as to whether the OCC's construction of the Interconnection Agreement complies with Oklahoma state contract law, we conclude such a remand is unnecessary because no fact-finding is required to resolve the state contract law issue.
See Trierweiler v. Croxton and Trench Holding Corp.,
. In Bell Atl., the ccmrt reviewed the FCC's ruling that calls to ISPs within the caller’s local calling area are non-local for purposes of reciprocal compensation. In reaching this conclusion, the FCC applied an "end-to-end” analysis which foсuses on the end points of the communication. Bell Atl., 206 F.3d at 4. Based on this analysis, the FCC determined that calls to ISPs are non-local because the communication travels beyond the ISP to the various websites located around the world. Id. at 2. The court noted:
The end-to-end analysis applied by the Commission here is one that it has traditionally used to determine whether a call is within its interstate jurisdiction. Here it used the analysis for quite a different purpose, without explaining why such an extension made sеnse in terms of the statute or the Commission’s own regulations. Because of this gap, we vacate the ruling and remand the case ...
Id. at 3.
. The Act provides the following relevant definitions:
The term "telecommunications” means the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.
47 U.S.C. § 153(43).
The term "telecommunications service” means the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used.
Id. § 153(46).
The term “information service” means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, *501 retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.
Id. § 153(20).