Lead Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
This ease returns to us on appeal for the second time. In the main, it poses a relatively straightforward issue of whether the National Labor Relation Board’s (“NLRB” or “Board”) determination that Southwest Merchandising Corporation (“Southwest”) discriminated against certain employees of its predecessor, Handy Andy, Inc., on the basis of their participation in a strike against Handy Andy, is supported by substantial evidence. We conclude that it is. But we further conclude that .the Board exceeded its authority in extending its remedy of reinstatement and backpay to three former strikers who never applied for jobs with Southwest. Accordingly, we grant only partial enforcement of its remedial order.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1981, Handy Andy, a grocery store chain, filed in bankruptcy. At this point, Handy Andy’s meat department employees were represented by Local 171 of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union. In 1982, the Bankruptcy Court nullified Handy Andy’s collective bargaining agreement with Local 171, and 24 of the meat department workers went on an economic strike shortly thereafter. Handy Andy’s meat department employees subsequently voted against union representation in a decertification election, and, in November, the strikers unconditionally offered to return to work. Handy Andy rejected these offers on the grounds that their positions had been eliminated or filled.
On January 31, 1983, Handy Andy closed down its stores and terminated all its employees. The following day, February 1, 1983, Southwest bought the Handy Andy chain and rehired most of its managers. On February 2, Southwest opened its stores solely for the purpose of accepting job applications for service positions. By February 3,
A. The February 2 Hiring Process
On the evening of February 1, Southwest held a meeting attended by company President Dan Regáis, Personnel Director George Tamez, the officials in charge of the specialized departments — bakery, produce, and meat — and all the individual store managers. Southwest instructed the store managers to open their stores on February 2 in order to accept applications for all departments and to “accept all applications all day long.” Transcript (“Tr.”) 423. New employees would be selected that evening from among those who applied that day. In designing the job application process, Southwest expected that its managers — who were holdovers from the pre-sale company — would look for employees with whom they had prior good experiences, although it stoutly denies any preference for incumbent employees. While local media reported that the new owners of the Handy Andy stores were accepting job applications, they did not state when or where. Nor did Southwest make any effort to publicize that information.
Carl Sehroat was in charge of hiring the meat department employees. According to Sehroat, he was not authorized to hire any applicant who had not submitted an application on February 2, nor was he authorized to contact any employees to notify them of the deadline or request them to submit applications. Sehroat testified that he received between 100 and 150 applications for meat department jobs from individual store managers on the evening of February 2, and that he selected the 77 incumbent employees from among those applications. He further maintained that none of these employees was granted any special notice of the application process beyond that of the general public. The record contains no direct evidence supporting or refuting that contention.
In selecting new hires, Sehroat said he identified “the best people, in the applications, best productive people,” and preferred those “that I had already known and that had been previously employed by us.” Tr. 426-27. Sehroat never said outright, however, that he preferred incumbent employees over strikers. To the contrary, Sehroat maintained that he was familiar with the work of all the former strikers and, although some of them met his criteria, he did not consider them solely because they had not filed applications.
In contrast to the meat department hiring process, individual store managers were responsible for filling the grocery department positions; they were authorized both to notify incumbent employees personally of the application process and to rehire incumbents on February 2 even if they did not formally apply. The store managers were allowed simply to inform employees to come into work on February 3 and fill out a job application at that time. Bob Simmons, one of the store managers, rehired forty of his fifty incumbent employees, even though he obtained no applications from ten of the forty on February 2. He notified the ten on the evening of February 2 that they were rehired and told them to fill out applications upon reporting to work the following day. Simmons further testified that none of the four meat department employees who had worked in his store under Handy Andy submitted applications to him on February 2,
B. The Experience of the Former Strikers
Seven former strikers attempted to apply for meat department jobs on February 2.
C. Post-February 2 Applications and Hiring
Fourteen other former strikers attempted to apply for jobs at some point in February.
Over the next nineteen months,
II. The Boaed’s Deoision
In its first opinion, the Board found that Southwest violated §§ 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to hire former strikers because of their participation in a strike against Handy Andy and ordered backpay and reinstatement for each of the 24 former strikers.
On remand, the Board again concluded that Southwest had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by refusing to hire the former strikers and stood firm on the scope of its original remedial order.
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). An employer violates § 8(a)(3), and thereby § 8(a)(1), which makes it an unfair labor practice “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce in the exercise of rights guaranteed” in the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), if it declines to hire a person because of his union membership or activity. See
In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
Reading Greenwich Collieries and Wright Line together, then, the General Counsel bears the burden of demonstrating that the employer acted with discriminatory motive throughout the ease. Although the Board labels the General Counsel’s burden that of establishing a “prima facie ” case, it has, in fact, traditionally required the General Counsel to sustain the burden of proving that the employer was motivated by anti-union animus.
If [the trier of fact] finds that the stated motive for a discharge is false, he certainly can infer that there is another motive. More than that, he can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to conceal — an unlawful motive — at least where, as in this case, the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference.
Id. at 470; cf. Barbour v. Merrill,
Applying this framework, the Board concluded that the General Counsel had made out a “prima facie" ease that Southwest had discriminated against the former strikers in the design and implementation of its hiring process by (1) refusing to provide applications to five of the six former strikers who attempted to apply on February 2 and refusing to accept applications from all but two of the former strikers who attempted to apply thereafter, and (2) denying employment on pretextual grounds to two of the former strikers who did file applications.
In rebuttal, Southwest argued that it denied employment to the former strikers solely because they failed to submit an application on February 2 and, as to those who applied late, that it did not hire them because they had poor work records. More generally, Southwest had shifted to a hiring policy preferring internal promotion. Southwest offered no explanation for the lack of success of former strikers who tried and failed to get their applications in on February 2.
The Board concluded that Southwest had failed to meet its burden of establishing a nondiscriminatory basis for the treatment of the strikers. The Board rejected the company’s explanation that the poor fortune of the former strikers could be traced to the brevity of the one-day hiring process itself, inferring instead that Southwest actually designed this
First, the Board noted that Southwest’s only stated hiring goals for the meat department were to staff the stores with “the best productive people,” who were “already known and that had been previously employed by us.” Southwest’s one-day, public hiring process, with no special prior notice to Handy Andy’s experienced employees, bore no rational relation to its announced goal of hiring employees with good production records and past experience with the predecessor company. Thus, the Board deduced, the company’s real purpose must be an illicit one of deterring applications from the former strikers: because “the public hiring procedure is so antithetical to [Southwest’s] stated goals ... we can only conclude that, at least with respect to the meat department, the procedure was a sham intended to prevent or discourage the filing of applications by the strikers.”
Second, the Board looked to the actual implementation of the one-day hiring and concluded that it did not, in fact, operate neutrally vis-a-vis strikers and nonstrikers. Southwest hindered some former strikers from entering the applicant pool by denying them applications. Moreover, the Board inferred that Southwest secretly alerted incumbent employees to file timely applications. The Board based this inference on the unexplained yet overwhelming rate of incumbent employees who submitted timely applications, in contrast to the scarce numbers of former strikers among the applicants. The Board surmised from this disparity that “the application procedure was ... weighted toward the predecessor’s employees in some manner.” In particular, the Board “infer[red] that some former employees of the predecessor’s meat department were called by agents of [Southwest] and told about the 1-day application procedure, urged to come into the stores and apply for the jobs, and that these calls explain why the 1-day hiring process resulted in a work force composed entirely of the predecessor’s former employees but no strikers.”
With respect to Southwest’s hiring after February 2, the Board was skeptical about Southwest’s justification for its continued failure to hire or consider strikers as new jobs opened up, noting that Southwest had not “offered any evidence to support [its] contention” “that ‘many’ of these positions were filled by converting part-time employees ... to full-time status_ Neither does it claim that all these positions were filled in this manner.”
Concluding that the General Counsel “established a strong prima facie case to support the allegations that [Southwest] discriminated against the strikers for their protected activity” and that Southwest “has provided no plausible rationale for its course of action,” the Board concluded that Southwest violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3).
III. Disoussion
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the Board’s decision, we must uphold any of the Board’s factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(f), and “[w]e owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these facts.” See Caterair International v. NLRB,
In our first opinion in this case, this court asked the Board to explain (1) whether it was holding Southwest as a successor employer to any hiring obligation beyond that of refraining from discrimination against applicants on the basis of their union membership or activity, (2) whether it had inferred that Southwest had secretly favored incumbent employees, and (3) if so, why it had not considered legitimate explanations for such a preference.
First, with regard to the theoretical underpinning of the Board’s initial decision, it appeared to us that, instead of finding actual antiunion discrimination and ordering reinstatement on that ground, the Board might have “rest[ed]” its opinion “upon an unarticu-lated assumption that a successor has a special obligation to favor the employees of its predecessor, or at least to treat them all the same way.”
Second, the Board expressly inferred that Southwest had weighted the application process toward incumbent employees. Whether substantial evidence supports this inference, we discuss at more length below.
Third, in response to this court’s concern that the Board had failed “to consider obvious alternative explanations for the Employer’s hiring as and whom it did,”
With respect to the causes of remand, then, we are satisfied by the Board’s response on the first and third.
C. Substantial Evidence
Remaining is the need for an assessment of whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s inference that Southwest gave special consideration to incumbent employees because it was motivated by anti-union animus. Southwest vehemently disputes that inference. Upon review of the record, however, we conclude that the Board’s finding passes muster.
The Board inferred that both the design and the implementation of the hiring process were motivated by discrimination. Thus, it appears to have concluded that the one-day process was devised with the objective of preventing strikers fi*om entering the applicant pool. We are not persuaded there is enough evidence in the record for the Board to make the inference that the conscious objective of the one-day hiring system was to prevent the former strikers from entering the applicant pool. There was, in fact, no direct testimony on the purpose of the one-day hiring process. Schroat and Simmons, two of Southwest’s supervisors, who did not themselves formulate the plan but were merely informed of it, certainly did not speak to its purpose. Simmons said he considered the process to be “an opportunity to get rid of nonproductive employees.” Tr. 392. Tamez, who was one of the officials responsible for designing the process, did not testify as to why the time period for accepting applications was so short; nor was he
The Board’s second inference, that the process, for whatever reasons designed, did not operate neutrally, despite Southwest’s protestation to the contrary, fares better. The Board found the process was “weighted toward the predecessor’s [current] employees in some manner.”
The Board was also justified in concluding that this “special consideration” reflected an antiunion animus. In the face of ALJ-credited testimony that five former strikers were refused applications on February 2 by supervisors, Southwest has declined to offer any explanation for this odd circumstance. It resolutely stands by its prior assertion that its policy was to accept applications from anyone during that fateful day, and that no meat department positions were filled until evening. Its challenge to the ALJ’s settled finding of fact that these former strikers sought applications on the second of February is not convincing.
Similarly, rather than advancing a nondiscriminatory reason for the fact, as found by the Board, that the application process was weighted toward incumbent employees, Southwest has simply stood fast in its denial of any preference. As our prior opinion noted, an employer might well have legitimate business reasons for preferring incumbent employees and tilting its application process toward those employees.
[Southwest] has never argued that it had a preference for those at work on the predecessor’s last day; only that its criteria were previous employment with the predecessor, a credential each striker possessed, and a good record, a credential many of the strikers possessed.
The Board’s inference of discriminatory intent gains additional support from the finding that Southwest refused to hire the two strikers who did submit applications for pre-textual reasons. From Schroat’s vague and shifting testimony about (1) whether the former strikers were even eligible for the post-February 2 vacancies, and (2) if so, why they weren’t selected, the Board could reasonably infer that the company’s explanations were pretextual and shielded an illicit motive. Cf. EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc.,
In sum, although we find the Board’s inference that Southwest designed the one-day application process in order to disqualify former strikers from consideration unsupported by substantial evidence, we find its inference that Southwest implemented the one-day process in a discriminatory manner and with a discriminatory motive supported by evidence substantial enough to sustain the unfair labor practice finding.
IV. Remedy
On limitless occasions we have reiterated the large measure of deference we owe to the Board’s selection of remedy. “In fashioning its remedies under the broad provision of § 10(c) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 160(e)), the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
In its first opinion, the Board granted relief to all the former strikers — the timely, late, and non-filers alike — on the grounds that it would have been futile for the late- and non-filing strikers to attempt to make timely applications, since the system was tainted to begin with. In the prior panel opinion, we questioned this rationale because the Board had found neither that Southwest had taken any action which would lead the former strikers to believe that applying would be futile, nor that the strikers actually believed it to be futile.
On remand, the Board abandoned its futility rationale, agreeing that “while, as an objective matter, it would have been futile for employees to apply, there is little or nothing to demonstrate that was the reason that these former strikers did not apply or did not do so on February 2.”
In our first opinion we speculated on possible alternative grounds for the Board’s extension of its reinstatement and backpay remedy to the late-filers: the Board might have “implicitly relied upon [the late-filers’] lack of notice regarding the application procedure” in granting relief to them, but we also noted that the Board had not specifically advanced this explanation and had not “expressly made the necessary factual finding— that concealment is what prevented each striker, other than those who did attempt to apply on February 2, from making timely application.”
We conclude, however, that there is no basis to extend the remedy to the three former strikers who never submitted applications at all.
Instead, the Board suggested that the Union’s requests that all the former strikers be reinstated — made in November, 1992, and June, 1993 — established that Southwest’s management knew these former strikers wanted jobs,
In the end, we enforce the Board’s order granting reinstatement and backpay to the twenty-one former strikers who attempted to apply for jobs at some point in February— subject to Southwest’s opportunity at compliance to assert any legitimate defenses to hiring particular individuals other than Dan-mon and Huerta — but we deny enforcement of the order with respect to the three former strikers who never submitted applications.
V. Conclusion
The Board’s finding that Southwest discriminated against former strikers on the basis of their protected activity is supported by substantial evidence. We deny Southwest’s petition for review except for modifying the remedial order so as not to apply to non-filers. To that extent, the Board’s application for enforcement is granted in part and denied in part.
So ordered.
Notes
. Sehroat testified that he did not recall seeing the application of the one striker who actually submitted an application on February 2. Tr. 430.
. Simmons received only one application for the meat department on Februaiy 2, from an individual who worked for a different chain. Tr. 385.
. The Board states that in addition to the six who spoke to supervisors, "[o]ne and perhaps two former strikers were similarly turned away on February 2 by the nonsupervisory personnel.”
. These former strikers generally attempted to apply at the courtesy booth; seven established that they spoke with an identified supervisor.
. The Board’s opinion states that sixty employees were hired over the next seven months, but this appears to be a miscalculation.
.Arriaga, a third striker, submitted an application and spoke to Schroat in August, 1983, after learning that there were meat department vacancies. Schroat told her that he would contact her if there was an opening, but she was never contacted. At the hearing, Schroat testified that he did not have any subsequent full-time openings. Tr. 462. The Board did not expressly find that this was pretextual.
. The Board uses the Wright Line test in both "dual motive" cases — in which the employer acts with a legitimate and an illegitimate motive and the purpose is to determine whether the legitimate motive would have caused the action on its own — and in "pretext” cases, where the employer's purported legitimate basis for action is not a factor at all.
. Presumably, in the wake of Greenwich Collieries, it will no longer be appropriate to term the General Counsel's burden that of mounting a prima facie case; his burden is to persuade the Board that the employer acted out of antiunion animus. The Board, of course, decided this case before Greenwich Collieries, and neither party has argued that Greenwich Collieries should affect our analysis.
. The Board found that “agents of [Southwest]” notified incumbent employees of the one-day hiring process but declined to "second-guess the judge by finding that either Schroat or Tamez was untruthful.”
. Each of the five strikers testified that he sought to apply on February 2, 1983. Before the AU and again on appeal, Southwest attempted to discredit the testimony of several of the strikers by arguing that the actual status of the store on February 2 was different from their description. (For example, while several of these former strikers stated that the store was “open for business" when they applied, Southwest argued the stores were open only to accept applications, and not, technically, “for business”.) In eveiy case, the ALJ resolved the dispute in favor of the striker, and we defer to that resolution as conclusive. See Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. NLRB,
. In this regard, as the dissent points out, Southwest had no “obligation to seek out the strikers for employment,” Diss. Op. at 1347, and we do not understand the Board to be asserting such an obligation. See
. Although the Board "note[s]" that Southwest hired sixty employees after February 2, this observation does not appear to be the basis for its remedial order. We, in turn, are hesitant to rely too heavily on the fact that Southwest filled positions after February 2, because the Board’s inferences of discrimination derive largely from Southwest’s February 2 hiring process and not from its hiring practice thereafter.
. The Board’s opinion identifies these three as Shirley Walker, Roger Wendel, and Alice Arria-ga.
. The Board has disavowed reliance on a suc-cessorship theory in this case, and thus points to the Union’s request for reinstatement only to establish that Southwest had knowledge of the former strikers' interest, not to establish any legal duty on the part of Southwest.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Stretching to its very limits that deference we owe the Board’s factual inferences, I agree with the majority that the Board’s finding concerning the six strikers who applied for jobs on February 2 is supportable. I also agree that the Board’s finding that Southwest’s one-day-only hiring technique was “designed” to circumvent applications from strikers is not supported by substantial evidence, since the general counsel failed to put on any testimony directed to this point. Nor did the general counsel sustain his burden of showing that the strikers who applied subsequently during the month of February were ever discriminated against with respect to their applications, since no evidence was produced to show that there were vacancies for outside hires at the time those applications were received. The majority does not rest its opinion on a contrary determination.
The majority would instead affirm the Board’s finding of discrimination as to the post-February 2 striker applicants (but not as to those who never applied) on the theory that the Board legitimately inferred that Southwest had notified incumbent employees about the hiring date but did not so notify the strikers — for discriminatory reasons. According to the majority, if the strikers who eventually applied had known about the one-day hiring period, they would have applied on February 2, and would have been rejected
The Board, however, did not rely on the majority’s logic to extend its discrimination finding to the post-February 2 striker applicants. It said that
the Respondent hired 60 meat department employees after February 2. No striker was hired. With respect to those who never applied, we note that the Union had made a request for reinstatement for all strikers, and thus the Respondent knew that they all wanted to work for it. In addition, the Respondent’s policy was to hire experienced employees. Finally, we note that the Respondent hired some employees in other departments without application. However, it failed to extend that privilege to strikers.
I think it is a fair inference that incumbent employees had superior information than did any and all nonincumbents, but as is well known with or without expertise, information of this kind has a way of being shared among employees in an organization even against the wishes of management (it is often called scuttlebutt). In this ease, the ALJ and the Board specifically credited the testimony of Southwest’s managers who stated that they had not given preferential notice to incumbent workers.
Furthermore, even if Southwest had preferred incumbents to all nonineumbents through notification or otherwise, that would not be evidence of discrimination against strikers qua strikers. In that event, the strikers would have been treated precisely as were all other nonincumbents. Only if the Board had asserted a proposition that it has expressly disavowed — that Southwest owed a special duty to the strikers beyond the requirement that it treat them in the same manner as it treated nonstriker nonincum-bents — could a discrimination theory be based on the company’s failure specifically to notify the strikers of the February 2 hiring.
The difficulty with the Board’s position is that the general counsel never made out a prima facie case that Southwest had discriminated against the post-February 2 applicants. Evidence of a general antiunion animus is certainly by itself not adequate to show discrimination against any particular employee. Power, Inc. v. NLRB,
This is a difficult case — I suspect because the Board, drawing upon its expertise, is rather certain that this employer deliberately did something to exclude strikers from new employment opportunities. I am by no means unsympathetic to the Board’s conviction. I, too, strongly suspect that Southwest somehow did that which the Board believes. But there is simply not substantial evidence to prove it, and neither the Board’s fixed determination, notwithstanding our remand, nor the majority’s imaginative reading of the Board’s decision will fill the gap.
The Board stated:
We find that the pertinent testimony is that the Respondent’s witnesses did not themselves contact any meat department employees or know of any contact of meat department employees before the 1-day hiring process and we will not second-guess the judge by finding that either Schroat or Tamez was untruthful.
