7 Ga. App. 227 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1909
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
The question raised by the foregoing facts is so peculiarly one of judicial discretion that this court would not feel authorized to interfere, unless such discretion was manifestly abused. Under the movant’s own presentation of the facts, we think the court did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant another trial. It is perfectly true, as claimed by counsel for the plaintiff in error, that where an attorney is absent by permission of the court, the court should take no action in his case during the time when he is absent by leave of the court; and it is hardly to be presumed that a trial judge would make anjr disposition of a ease during the absence of an attorney in a case under leave. Here, however, the court was informed that the attorney to whom he had granted a short leave of absence was not in fact the attorney for the defendant against whom the verdict was rendered on the following day; and, when the case was called in its order for trial, the defendant appeared to be unrepresented, and, so far as the court knew, the situation had not changed since the announcement on the previous day. The court had no knowledge that the attorney whose name had been stricken on the previous day had subsequently been employed and was again representing the defendant. This knowledge the court could not have had unless such information had been given to him