187 Iowa 357 | Iowa | 1919
On the 21st day of June, 1918, the plaintiff filed its petition in the district court, in which it alleges that, on the 8th day of March, 1916', one W. W. Whitney, then in the employ of Philip Bernard Company, was injured, while in the course of his employment; that the injury sustained by Whitney was caused by the negligence of the defendant herein; that thereafter, the said Whitney brought an action against this defendant, in which he recovered the sum of $2,300, and this sum was paid to Whitney by the defendant company; that, on or about March 1, 1916, and for some time pi^or thereto, this plaintiff had insured the Philip Bernard Company against any liability which might arise out of any injuries received by its employees in the course of their employment, and for which Philip Bernard Company would become liable, under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1913 and supplement thereto; that plaintiff, under this insurance obligation to Philip Bernard Company, paid to Whitney the sum of $572.33, in compensation for loss of time and the necessary medical expenses incurred by him, under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The plaintiff claims that the defendant company, which
The defendant appeared and demurred to plaintiff’s petition on the following grounds:
■First. Because it appears from said petition that this action is brought to recover for personal injuries sustained by one W. W. Whitney on the 8th day of March, 1916, and the action was not begun until more than two years after said date, and said action is now barred by the statute of limitations.
. Second. Because it appears from said petition that the plaintiff was surety for the Philip Bernard Company, the employer of Whitney, and its rights are determined by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as found in Section 2477-m6 of the Supplement of the Code of 1913. This section reads as follows:
“Where an employee coming under the provisions of this act receives an injury for which compensation is payable under this act and which injury was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer, to pay damages in respect thereof:
“(a) The employee or beneficiary may take proceedings both against that person to recover damages and against the employer for compensation, but the amount of the compensation to which he is entitled under this act shall be reduced by the amount of damages recovered.
“(b) If the employee .or beneficiary in such case recovers compensation under this act, the employer by whom the compensation was paid or the party who has been called upon to pay the compensation, shall be entitled to indemnity from the person so liable to pay damages as aforesaid,
It further appears from said petition that Whitney proceeded against the defendant, the actual wrongdoer, and recovered the full amount of his damages from it, and for this reason the plaintiff cannot now recover anything of this defendant, but must recover from Whitney the amount of compensation alleged by it to have been paid to him.
Third. Because, under the facts disclosed in this petition, the plaintiff cannot now recover of this defendant any sum of money paid by it to Whitney, because of full payment made to Whitney of said claim, as disclosed by said petition, and it must, therefore, recover, if at all, from said Whitney.
This demurrer was sustained generally, and, the plaintiff electing to stand on its petition, and not to plead further, judgment was entered against the plaintiff for costs, and its petition dismissed. From this the plaintiff appeals.
Now let us see where we are at: The injured party brings an action, at common law, against the actual wrongdoer, and recovers for all the wrong, presumably, that he has suffered. This included, compensation for medical services, for loss of time, and other matters provided for in the act; but his right to recover is not limited in amount by the provisions of the act as to any of these matters. The wrongdoer must discharge its entire obligation to the injured party, and pay him for his injuries, loss of time, medical and surgical treatment, and all matters which flow as a proximate result of its wrong. If it does this, the injured party is made whole. If this is done before any claim is made under the act, he has no claim for compensation. He has received compensation. If, before recovery from the wrongdoer, he has received compensation from his employer, he must return it. It is true the statute says that the employer, or person making the compensation, shall be indemnified from the person liable to pay damages. This indemnity may come through an action by the injured party against the wrongdoer for damages, or it may come through an action by the employer against the wrongdoer, under the right of subrogation. The employer may then recover all that his employee could recover. There is but one wrong, and there can be but one action. At the time this action was commenced, this defendant owed Whitney nothing. It had made full reparation for the wrong that it had done. There were no rights left Whitney against this company, to which this plaintiff or the employer could be subrogat
We need not proceed to consider the other questions raised by the demurrer. Defendant discharged its full obligation to Whitney. There was nothing ter which Whitney’s employer, or the insurance company, could be subrogated. Whitney had no rights left against this defendant, and there were none .to which this plaintiff could be subrogated. For this reason alone, the action of the district court in sustaining the demurrer must be upheld. — Affirmed.