57 So. 11 | Ala. | 1911
This is a suit in equity to enjoin the prosecution of 110 separate actions at law. The sole ground of equity jurisdiction upon which the suit is based is to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The separate actions at law Avere brought by the administrators of 110 unfortunate Avorkmen, Avho lost their lives by an explosion in a coal mine. Each of these 110 actions Avas brought, under the employer’s liability act, to recover damages for the Avrongfnl death of the respective intestate; was brought against the same defendant, the complainant in this suit; and sought to recover on account of negligence in causing or alloAving the explosion Avhich killed the unfortunate workmen.
The prayer for relief is as folloAvs: “Your orator further prays that your honor will grant unto your orator a preliminary writ of injunction, enjoining and restraining each and all of said parties defendant and their attorneys and successors from all further proceedings in said actions at law, or prosecuting the same in any manner, until the further orders of this court, and that your honor Avill proceed to hear and determine the question of the liability vel non of said Alabama Steel & Wire Company, in the premises, and, if there should prove to be any such liability, that your honor Avill further determine the extent thereof, and the manner and mode in Avhich the same shall be prorated or paid.”
This appeal, for the second time, brings up for our decision the equity of this bill, a full statement of the facts of Avhich, and a discussion of the laAV involved, may be found in the reports of the case in 157 Ala. 175, 47 South. 274, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848, 131 Am. St. Rep. 20.
The question of laAV involved in this suit is this: Has a court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin numerous tort
We regret the necessity of overruling our former decision, and recognize and appreciate the wisdom in the maxim, that “it is as important that the law be certain as that it be right;” yet it is not only our prerogative, but our duty, to overrule a former decision, when we are convinced that it is fundamentally wrong, both in theory and in practice.
There is a sharp and distinct conflict in the decisions of the various courts upon this question; but, after a careful examination and review of many of them, and of the text-books upon the subject, we are constrained to recede from the holding on the former appeal, and to follow that line of decisions and those text-books -which deny equity jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits at law, in the absence of a common title, or of some community of right or interest, in the subject-matter among the several parties. To state the proposition differently, Ave noAV hold that a community of interest among the several parties in the questions of law and of fact involved is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court of equity to enjoin the several tort actions at law, though brought against the same defendant, and though each may depend upon the same -state of facts.
The importance of this question of law and practice involved is such that we deem it proper to state, as briefly as we may, the reasons which have impelled us to overrule the former decision.
We have reached the conclusion that the law has been correctly settled, both in England and America, differently from that declared by this court in the former decision of this case. We think there is little doubt that the courts have been led astray upon this subject by following Avhat Mr. Pomeroy stated in his valuable Avork on Equity Jurisprudence (2d Ed.) § 269. We recognize both the ability and the authority of Mr. Pomeroy as a Avriter upon equity jurisprudence; in fact, Ave concede, as Ave have often stated in our opinions, that he is probably the leading and the best authority'upon this subject; but he is human, and must therefore sometimes err. Prior to this text of Mr. Pomeroy, there Avere, we are certain, feAV, if any, adjudicated cases which supported the text, or which would sustain the equity of a bill Avhich rested solely upon the jurisdiction of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits, when there was no common title, no community of interest or of right, in the subject-matter among the several individuals whose actions at law were sought to be enjoined.
It must be conceded, however, that there are a number of decisions, since the text, which support it; some
Chief Justice McClellan, in the Turner Case, 135 Ala. 73, 33 South. 132, after devoting several pages of the opinion to the fallacy of the Pomeroy doctrine, which was followed and given effect to by this court on the former appeal, concluded as follows, which is quoted with approval from the Tribette Case, 70 Miss. 182, 12 South. 32, 19 L. R. A. 660, 35 Am. St. Rep. 642: “But we affirm, after careful examination and full consideration, that Pomeroy is not sustained in his ‘conclusions,’ stated in section 269 of his most valuable treatise, and the cases he cited do not maintain the proposition that mere community of interest ‘in the questions of law and fact involved in the general controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded and obtained by or against each individual member of the numerous body,’ is ground for the interposition of chancery to settle, in one suit, the several controversies. There is no such doctrine in the books, and the zeal of the learned and usually accurate writer mentioned, to maintain a theory, has betrayed him into error on this subject. It has so blinded him as to cause the confounding of distinct things in his view of this subject, to wit, joinder of parties, and avoidance of multiplicity of suits.”
On the other hand, the opinion of Chief Justice Tyson, on the former appeal, referring to the same doctrine, quotes approvingly from another Mississippi case, as follows: “We think the doctrine announced by
In this last statement as to the Turner Case, we think the opinion in the former case is in error. It is certain that the Turner Case followed the Tribette Gase, and gave sanction to every doctrine announced therein. Chief Justice McClellan, in Turner’s Case, referring to the doctrine that, in order for a court of equity to enjoin a multiplicity of actions at laAV, there must be a common title to, or common interest in, the subject-matter involved, and that a mere common interest in a question of laAV is not sufficient, states that, “this position is noAvhere better nor more fully stated than by Campbell, C. J., in Tribette’s Case, * * * and as the opinion treats fully of Mr. Pomeroy’s position, and demonstrates its fallacy we quote it in part,” etc., and then proceeds to quote several pages from the opinion in Tribette’s Gase.
The opinion in the Turner Gase thus shoAvs on its face that Chief Justice McClellan therein quoted more .than half of Chief Justice Campbell’s opinion in the Tribette Gase. This, Ave think, makes it certain that if the decision in the Tribette Gase was in conflict with Chief Justice TysOn’s opinion it was unquestionably in conflict Avith the decision in Turner’s Gase which not only folloAved the decision in Tribette’s Gase, but literally quoted pages of it, and thus expressly adopted it.
Chief Justice McClellan, in the Turner Gase, says: “This court has never undertaken to define the jurisdiction of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits, nor to
It was pointed out by Chief Justice Campbell, in the Tribette Case, and by Chief Justice McClellan, in the Turner Case, that the authorities cited by Mr. Pomeroy do not support the text upon which the former decision of this case was based. We will now proceed to show that the authorities cited by Chief Justice Tyson, in his opinion in the former decision of this case, do not support the text of Mr. Pomeroy, nor the former decision in this case.
We think we have shown that the Turner Case, cited in favor of it, not only fails to support the opinion to which it is cited, but is diametrically opposed to it, and is based solely upon the Tribette Case, which Chief Justice Tyson concedes is opposed to his opinion and de
We base our conclusion chiefly upon the Tribette Case, which we concede to be the leading authority in the world upon the question of the jurisdiction of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits. It has been reprinted, time and again, and copied into the latest editions of most of the text-books upon the subject, as stating the true doctrine. This case has been folloived by Mr. Bliss (Code Pleading, § 6), by Mr. Beach (Injunctions, § 543), and Mr. High (Injunctions, § 65a).
Mr. Pomeroy, in his last edition on Equity Jurisprudence, devotes a great deal of space and attention to the Tribette Case, because it had taken him to task on this question, and adds two new sections to that edition, to wit, 25% and 25%, to set himself right in this matter. It is quite evident from an examination of this last edition that the author does not go to the extent of upholding the equity jurisdiction of a case like the one under consideration. While he does criticise the tone of the opinion, and some things that are said by Chief Justice Campbell in the Tribette Case, yet, in the notes to his text, he admits that the decision in that case was correct.
The entire subject under review has been fully considered, and the authorities thereon discussed, in the recent case of Vandalia Coal Company v. Lawson, 43 Ind. App. 226, 87 N. E. 47. That opinion fully sustains the decision of Chief Justice Campbell in the Tribette Case, and that of Chief Justice McClellan in the Turner
There is also a recent case (that of Ducktown v. Fain, 109 Tenn. 56, 70 S. W. 813) which cites approvingly the Tribette Gase, and sustains the proposition that a community of interest in the subject-matter is necessary, in order for equity to take jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The last two cases cited and reviewed many authorities upon the question, and, we think, show beyond question that our former decision in the jEoplcins Gase was wrong, and should be overruled. In fact, we are of the opinion that the two new sections (the only ones) added in the last edition of Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence support us in the contention that there is no equity in the bill under consideration.
In section 25%, speaking to this question, it is said: “The equity suit must result in a simplification or consolidation of the issues; if after the numerous parties are joined there still remain several issues to be tided between the several parties, nothing has been gained by the court of equity in assuming jurisdiction. In such a case, while the bill has only one number upon the docket and calls itself a single proceeding, it is in reality a bundle of separate suits, each of which is no doubt similar in character to each of the others, but rests nevertheless upon the distinct liability of one defendant.” (The author must have had this case in mind.)
All the text-writers on the subject, who have revised their texts since the decision in the Tribete Case, seem to have followed it; some of them literally quoting it at length. Beach, in his work on Injunctions (section 543), says: “While courts of equity will freely exercise their jurisdiction in order to prevent an unnecessary and vexatious multiplicity of suits, they will not enjoin the prosecution of several pending actions at
Mr. High, in his last work on Injunctions, adds a new section (65a), which states the rule as follows: “It is to be observed that, in order to justify relief by injunction for the prevention of a multiplicity of suits, there must be some common subject-matter in controversy, or some common right of interest .therein, and that without this a mere community of interest in the questions of law and fact to be determined constitutes no basis for equitable relief. Thus, where numerous actions at law have been brought by separate plaintiffs against the same defendant to recover damages resulting from a fire started by sparks from complainant’s locomotive, the mere fact that the questions of law and fact are the same in all the actions, and that the various parties have a common interest in those questions, will not authorize an injunction against the prosecution of the actions and the determination of the issues in equity.” The only authorities cited in support of this text are the Tribette and Turner Cases.
The distinction between a community of interest in the subject-matter which will support the jurisdiction of chancery to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and a common interest in the questions of law and of fact which will not support it, is well illustrated in the Tribette Case and the authorities cited. It must be a right enjoyed in common with all the parties, and in such manner that the invasion of the right of one is an
“Two or more owners of mills propelled by water are interested in preventing an obstruction above that shall interfere with the downflow of the water, an.d may unite to restrain it or abate it as a nuisance; but they cannot unite in an action for damages, for, as to the injury suffered, there is no community of interest.”' — Bliss, Code Pl. § 76.
“Where several persons, acting independently, combine to produce a nuisance, such persons may be joined as defendants in a suit for injunctive relief. But there can be no joinder, either of complainants or defendants, for the purpose of recovering damages for the injuries caused by such nuisance.” — Demarest v. Hardham, 34 N. J. Eq. 469; Vandala Coal Co. v. Lawson, 43 Ind. App. 242, 8 N. E. 53.
It is thus made to appear that all of the text-writers, who have written since the Tribette Case have followed it and revised their texts accordingly. Even Mr. Pomeroy, though he speaks of the case as sensational in many of its statements, says “it has been so frequently reprinted that it appears to call for special notice,” and he proceeds to quote from it and to comment adversely upon it as to those statements which he calls sensational ; yet the effect of his text and notes, as revised, is. to say that the case was correctly decided. — See section 25% and note, 1 Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur. p. 425. This being true, it follows that our decision in this case on the former appeal was Avrong. — Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders, 173 Ala. 347, 56 South. 198. We deem it just, to Mr. Pomeroy, however, to say that Ave do not think his original text supported the decision of this court on the former appeal, and it is certain that the revised text does not.
It. would be difficult to select a case that would more clearly demonstrate the impracticability of the rule than the one under consideration. Contemplate 110 separate ansAvers, and as many pleas and demurrers in one suit, and the innumerable issues of laAV and of fact that Avonld be raised thereby, and the defense being conducted by 110 different attorneys, or the parties deprived of the right to have the counsel of their choice— a worse confusion could scarcely be imagined. It could be likened unto the confusion of tongues at the building of the Tower of Babel.
To reach a final decree in this case that would approach justice for all, by a trial of all these issues, and a trial in accordance Avith our statutes and the rules of law and chancery provided for such cases, would be
No error appearing in the record, the decree of the chancellor is affirmed.
Affirmed.