47 So. 274 | Ala. | 1908
Two questions only are involved in this appeal: One, whether the appellant was a party who could file the bill; second, whether the court has jurisdiction of the case made. The lower court dismissed the bill for want of equity, deciding both points against the appellant.
The appellant is the resultant or successor and assign by consolidation of two corporations — one the Alabama Steel & Wire Company, and the" other the Underwood Coal & Iron Company — in December, 1905. The Alabama Steel & Wire Company having been sued at law on a liability existing prior to the consolidation, the first question is: Can the appellant, the new company, assert the rights, equities, and defenses of the wire company, as set up in the bill in this case. We think there ought to be no doubt about this right. The appellant is the successor in law of the merged companies. It succeeds to all their respective rights, privileges, powers, and franchises, and becomes liable for all their debts, liabilities, and duties, and thus plainly has the right to defend and prosecute suits at law and in equity for the protection of its rights, the same as the original companies could do. The original company in this case in all prosecutions and defenses in its name would necessarily act for and under the control of the new company. The policy of the law and the character of the change affected by the consolidation of the corporations are shown by section 1151 of the Code, and by Gen. Acts 1903, pp. 331, 332, § 40. See Johnson v. State, 88 Ala. 176, 7 South. 253. If the name of the original corporation was essential in this proceeding on special objection urging and showing such necessity, the defect could easily have been cured by amendment, and therefore was not available on motion to dismiss.
The second question is whether the bill is properly filed as one to avoid a multiplicity of suits. An expío
It is objected, by the appellees, that the negligence alleged being a several and separate wrong as to each party injured, and there being no privity or common . interest betAveen the defendants in the actions at law, the court of chancery has no jurisdiction to enjoin their suits to avoid a multiplicity of suits. The principle upon which this jurisdiction is established is that it is the duty of the government to furnish a full, adequate, and complete remedy for the assertion and protection of all property rights of its citizens; and this bill is filed upon the idea that - it is the peculiar function of the chancery jurisdiction to supplement the law courts and to give such remedy when it does not exist at law in a way “as practical and efficient to the ends of justice as the remedy in equity,” and that there is no plain, adequate, complete, and practical remedy for appellants’ protection in the courts of law. —Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 210, 7 L. Ed. 655; Oelrich v. Spain, 15 Wall.
The right of defense, and of a form of defense as efficient and practical as the nature of the transaction will reasonably admit of, are rights as sacred as the corresponding rights of prosecution for the assertion of property rights. There can be no distinction, nor is there any, between the right to an efficient remedy for defense and one for the reclamation of property, as protection in the acquisition and in the defense of property is only the application of the same principle of-security in different forms. —Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 175, 20 Sup. Ct. 77, 44 L. Ed. 119; West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258-263, 24 Sup. Ct. 650, 48 L. Ed. 965.
Independent of special grounds for proceeding in equity, the court at an early date assumed a jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits by settling in a single case a right or transaction which at law involved the trial of numerous cases, entaining loss of time and perhaps ruin in costs. 1 Spence’s Equitable Jurisdiction, 657; Lord Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483; Hanson v. Gardner, 7 Ves. 309, 310. Lord Hardwicke, in the Case of Tenham, supra, expressed the rule as to when a bill of this kind could be filed and when the right must first he established at law. Not quoting the authorities cited in 26 English Reports (Reprint) 692, sustaining his position, he said: “Undoubtedly, there are some cases in which a man may, be a bill of this kind, come into this court first; and there are others where he ought first to establish his right at law. It is certain, where a man sets up a general exclusive right, and where the persons who controvert it with him are very numerous, and he cannot, by one or two actions at law, quiet that right, he may come into this court first, which is called a ‘bill of peace,’ and the court will direct an issue to
This we consider as expressing the rule of law; the principle dictating the rule being the duty and necessity of affording a practical and efficient form of remedy for protection to persons and property founded in the very conception of government. 6 Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 972. If this case falls within the rule, the allowance of the proceeding is no infraction of the constitutional right of trial by jury, for that guaranty refers to, and is co-extensive only with, the common-law right then existing, and it was always a principle of the common law that the trial by jury must give way to an appeal to equity, when from the nature of the situation, the transaction to be investigated, and the relation of the parties to that transaction the ordinary proceeding at law would not answer sufficiently the purpose of administering justice. —Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510; Oelrich v. Spain, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 211-228, 21 L. Ed. 43; Cook v. Schmidt, 100 Ala. 582, 13 South. 686; 6 Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 972-974. It is the duty of affording an
The question here, then, is, what is the principle upon which equity interferes to avoid a multiplicity of suits? In determining this, it may be borne in mind that the jurisdiction is not to be invoked when the remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, and that no court has the right to infringe upon the wholesome doctrine of multifariousness which prevents a mingling in one suit of entirely distinct and separate causes of action between different parties. Subject to these restrictions, the principle and rule is that where numerous parties are jointly and severally claiming against one, or where one is claiming against many liable jointly or severally, and the same title or right of defense will be called in question, and will be determinative of the issue for or against all, a case for the interposition of equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits is made without the aid of any independent equity. The fact that this unity of claim or defense frequently or generally arises from privity or joint action by or between the many affords an obvious instance of the application of the rule, and it has induced some to suppose that the junction and unity of interest calling for the application of the rule
The case made by the bill in this case is this: An explosion in a coal mine killed 110 persons. The several administrators of these persons have brought several suits against the appellant as the owner and operator for damages, insisting that its negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The appellant in effect says, if these actions are allowed to proceed at law, it will be ruined in costs and expenses, though it be successful in every suit; that the plaintiffs are all insolvent, and thus could not pay the taxed -costs against them, should they be unsuccessful; that the suits are pending in different courts, and will be called for trial in different courts at the same time; that by reason of this, and the necessity of having the same witnesses in each trial, it is impossible for the defendants to present a proper defense to these multitude of claims. The appellant says, moreover, that it has defenses to all these suits, which will be put forward in each case, and which will be determinative of all alike; and on this ground it is insisted that this is a plain case for the application of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits. We agree with this contention on principle.
The first thing to obliterate from the mind in considering the question is that it is immaterial how the unity of title, claim, or defense is brought about. It is the factum of a single title against many, or a common defense against many, which is the foundation of the
We now examine the precedents to show that the great legal minds who have administered the principles of equity in the past do not disagree with this conclusion. In the Case of Lord Tenham, 2 Atk. 484, the master builder of equity jurisprudence, whose words we have quoted above, lays it down as clear and certain that when a general right is set up, and is disputed by many, the party may come into equity in the first instance against the many, and have that right determined
The same view of the law is entertained by the Supreme Court of the United States and many of the states. In Hale v. Allison, 188 U. S. 77, 23 Sup. Ct. 244, 47 L. Ed. 380, though the court declined to exercise the jurisdiction, it stated with accuracy the rule itself, stating that it did not require a common title, nor community of right or interest in the subject-matter, among the defendants, but only a common interest in the questions of law or fact in controversy. And the statement of law in this case has been approved by the same court at the present term (1907) in the case of Bitterman v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91, 52 L. Ed. — The following, amongst many other, cases strongly support the rule that, when all the cases may be determined on a single question or defense common to all, the. jurisdiction will be exercised. —Wyman v. Bowman, 127 Fed. 263, 62 C. C. A. 189; Milwaukee, etc. v. Bradley, 108 Wis. 467, 84 N. W. 870; Sou. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 132 Cal. 408, 64 Pac. 572, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497; Lehigh R. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 31 N. J. Eq. 730; American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Landau, 56 N.J. Eq. 513, 39 Atl. 400; L. N. A. & C. Ry. v. Imp, Co. (C. C. ) 57 Fed. 45; Osborne v. Wis Cent. R. Co., (C. C.) 43 Fed. 824; Deforest v. Thompson, (C.. C.) 40 Fed. 375; 1 Pom. Eq. §§ 269-274.
We are committed to the same principle in Alabama. In the early case of Morgan v. Morgan, 3 Stew. 383, 21
It is insisted that the case of Turner v. Mobile, 135 Ala. 77, 33 South. 132, is opposed to the view above expressed. That there are expressions in the opinion to that effect is not to be doubted, but there are other expressions which approve and define with accuracy the very basis of our conclusion in this case. Judge McClellan in that case says: “S'o, when one party is subjected to or threatened with numerous and vexatious actions at law, or is the victim of numerous, repeated, and continuing wrongs, so that a multitude of suits would be necessary for his redress at law, he may come into chancery, because the necessity for numerous suits or defenses to numerous suits at law is in itself such a wrong and vexation to him as vests him with an equity.” This case is founded on this declaration of the law, which is clearly and precisely and accurately stated. In reference to other expressions in the opinion it is sufficient to say that every decision must be read in the light of the exact case before the court, and Avhich it
The case however of Tribette v. Railroad Co., 70 Miss. 182, 12 South. 32, 19 L. R. A. 660, 35 Am. St. Rep. 6424, is directly opposed to our views. That case we consider as overruled by the subsequent one in the same court of Hightower & Crawford v. Railroad Co., 83 Miss. 708, 36 South. 83, 102 Am. St. Rep. 476, in which the court expressly approves the view repudiated in the Tribette Case. It is said in the Hightower Cases “We think the doctrine announced by Pomeroy is sound and clearly established by the best considered modern cases.” After this repudiation of the Tribette Gase, by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, we will not follow the reasoning of the opinion in that case to point out its deflection from and opposition, in our opinion, to the ancient as well as modern view of the extent of the jurisdiction of courts of equity in reference to multiplicity of suits. That jurisdiction is too well established and too beneficent, when wisely exercised, to be any longer called in question.
It would be a strange casus in juridicial evolution to meet the needs of society if there was no remedy against
The bill in this case Avas dismissed on motion. The demurrers, therefore, are not before us; nor have wé to do more than to say that the bill on its statements has equity on the single ground of preventing the multiplicity of suits unaided by the other matters averred. The decree of the loAver court is reversed, and one will he here rendered overruling the motion.
Beversed and rendered.