delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent brought this action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act to recover for the death of her intestate, a conductor in petitioners’ employ, who was killed in a head-on collision while riding on the engine of an
“Extra 723 East get this order and meet Extra 483 West at Orangeburg. Engine 483 run extra Branchville to Andrews.”
Such an order is known as a form 31, which has to be signed for by the conductor when delivered to him. The order was transmitted and received by the operators at Branchville and Orangeburg as a “ three copy ” order and the operator at Branchville accordingly made three copies, one for his file and two which he delivered to respondent’s intestate, who signed for the same and delivered one to the engineer. They read it in the presence of the fireman before leaving Branchville. ■ There was nothing on the face of the order to indicate that No. 483 would be given additional copies of it, or would receive any other order, at Orangeburg, the designated passing point. The Charleston dispatcher intended that this order as transmitted to Orangeburg, and addressed at that point to “ Extra 723
Under the rules of the company the eastbound train, 723, was the superior, and it was the duty of 483 to take the siding at Orangeburg and permit the other to pass on the main track. At that point the semaphore signal was located in front of the operator’s office about seventy-five yards east of the east switch of the pass track, so that the westbound 483 approaching Orangeburg would necessarily have to pass this semaphore to reach the entrance of the pass track, which is about three-fourths of a mile long. As 483 was approaching the semaphore the Charleston dispatcher called the Orangeburg operator and inquired as to its whereabouts. The operator replied that it was then approaching. The dispatcher told the operator to “ tell him to go to the west end of the pass track and wait on Extra 723.” Engine 48'3 stopped just east of the semaphore and blew four blasts, a signal inquiring whether the operator has any orders for the train. In response the latter dropped the semaphore, which is an indication to the crew that there are no further orders and that they are to proceed under those they then have. The intended verbal instructions were not given. After leaving Branch-ville the crew of No. 483, having received no further or other orders with respect to passing Extra 723, were under a duty to follow the written orders received at Branch-
There was no allegation of negligence on the part of the engineer of 483 or any member of the crew of Extra 723, the sole claims being with respect to the failure of the operator at Orangeburg to make a five-copy passing order and deliver two copies of it to the respondent’s intestate, and the failure of the same operator to give the verbal instructions to respondent’s intestate to run to the west end of the pass track and wait for 723. A request by petitioners for a binding instruction, on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of petitioners or their employee which in whole or in part caused the accident, was refused. The trial court submitted the case to the jury and a resulting verdict and judgment in favor of respondent was affirmed by the state supreme court.
Beyond peradventure respondent’s intestate disobeyed a definite order which was not revoked or superseded by any other orders, verbal or written. By force of this order and the rules of the company No. 483 was bound to pass the semaphore at Orangeburg, run onto the pass
The suggestion is made that the dispatcher was negligent in not communicating the passing order to the crew of Extra 723 at some point west of Orangeburg, so that they would have known they were to pass Extra 483 at Orangeburg. But such a procedure would not have altered the running of Extra 723 in any particular. It would still have had the right of way over 483 to and through Orangeburg, and the accident occurred over three miles west of that point.
The case comes to this: that respondent’s intestate had clear and definite orders which if obeyed would have avoided the accident and the disobedience whereof was the sole efficient cause of his death. As said in
Unadilla Valley Ry. Co.
v.
Caldine,
“A failure to stop a man from doing what he knows that he ought not to do, hardly can be called a cause of his act. Caldine had a plain duty and he knew it. The message would only have'given him another motive for obeying the rule that he was bound to obey.”
The record is destitute of any evidence of negligence on the part of the petitioners or their servants or agents
The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
