116 Ga. 152 | Ga. | 1902
This was an action hy the father of John W. Webb against the Southern Railway Company, for damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on account of the homicide of his son. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant complains that the court erred in refusing to grant it a new trial.
1. The petition alleged that John W. Webb was a passenger on one of the trains of the defendant; that while in one of the cars of the train, in the exercise of all ordinary care and diligence, and just as he was about to take a seat near the rear door of the car, the train' was negligently, suddenly, forcibly and with great violence jerked, jarred, and jolted, and as a result Webb was suddenly and without fault on his part thrown through the rear door- of the car, and fell across the platform at the end of the car on to the track on a bridge over which the train was passing at the time the jolt took place; that he was stunned by the fall and rendered insensible; and that, while upon the track irt a stunned, insensible, and injured condition and unable to walk or protect himself, he was negligently run over and killed by another engine passing along the track over the bridge. There was evidence authorizing the jury to find that Webb was a passenger upon a train of the defendant, and that while this train was going over a bridge a sudden and violent jolt occurred, sufficient to throw one from his feet who was standing in the train, and which had the effect of jostling the passengers and throwing down bundles from the racks of the car; that Webb was seen upon the train just before this jolt occurred, and he was then near the rear door of the car; that he was not seen afterwards by any one who was in the car; that shortly after the train upon which he was last seen had passed over the bridge, an engine belonging to the Georgia Railroad Company ran over and killed Webb, who was lying across the track on the bridge just at the point where the train was when the jolt occurred; that while the defendant had no control over this engine, the engines of the Georgia Railroad Company had a right to use this track, and it was known to the
“ A natural consequence is one which has followed from the original act complained of, in the usual, ordinary, and experienced course of events. A result, therefore, which might reasonably have been anticipated or expected. Natural consequences, however, do not necessarily include .all such as upon a calculation of chances would be found- possible of occurrence, or such as extreme pruJ dence might anticipate, but only those which ensue from the original act without any such extraordinary coincidence or conjunction of circumstances as that the usual course of nature should seem to have been departed from.” § 33.
“From the very outset, the practical distinction between causes and consequences should be borne in mind in this particular: a consequence of an original cause may, in turn, become the cause of succeeding consequences. But such a cause should.not, manifestly, be regarded as an intervening cause which will relieve from*156 liability the author of the original cause, but rather as only a consequence along with the other consequences. A tortious act may have several-consequences, concurrent or successive, for all of which the first tort-feasor is responsible. It is not intervening consequences, but intervening causes which relieve. The test is to be found, it has been said, not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character, and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and in the injurious consequence. So long as it affirmatively appears that the mischief is attributable to the original wrong as a result which might reasonably have been foreseen as probable, legal liability continues.” § 58.
“ Some authorities have formulated rules on this subject'designed for general application, as that the defendant is not responsible where there has intervened the wilful wrong of a third person, or -is liable where such act is of a negligent character merely. But the better doctrine is believed to be that whether or not the intervening act of a third person will render the earlier act too remote depends, simply, upon whether the concurrence of such intervening act might reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant.” §71.
In Pittsburgh Railway Co. v. Taylor, 104 Penn. St. 315, Mr. Justice Paxson said: “ In determining what is proximate cause the true rule is, that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence, such a consequence as, under the surrounding circumstances of the case might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrong-doer as likely to flow from his act.” In Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 139, Colt, J., said: “ The injury must be the direct result of the misconduct charged; but it will not be considered too remote if, according to the usual experience of mankind, the result ought to have been apprehended. The act of a third person, intervening and contributing a condition necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligence, will not excuse the first wrong-doer, if such act ought to have been foreseen. The original negligence still remains a culpable and direct cause of the injury. The test is to be found in the probable injurious consequences which were to be anticipated, not in the number of subsequent events and agencies which might arise.” In Seale v. Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 278, Chief Justice Willie said: “What character of intervening act will break the causal connection between the original
’ Treating it as established in the present case that Webb was upon the track of the defendant in an insensible condition as a result of the negligence of the defendant, is it reasonable or unreasonable to hold that the defendant should have apprehended that a person in this condition, in such a place, might be injured or killed by the running of an engine upon the track ? Was the defendant bound to anticipate that injury or death might result to a person in such a condition in such a place ? The track was under the control of the defendant; and if Webb had been killed by an engine of the defendant which came along the track after the train from which Webb was thrcfwn had passed, the defendant would have been liable, although the employees in charge of the engine had been wholly free from negligence. South Carolina Railroad Company v. Nix, 68 Ga. 572. In that case Mr. Chief Justice Jackson said: “Suppose there had been a prosecution for murder, who would be found guilty thereof, the conductor of the train w.ho did the deed of throwing him off and under, or the conductor of the other train who ran unconsciously over him ? Clearly he who did the intentionally wrongful act, and whose act caused his death.” The principle upon which the ruling in the Nix case is founded is that a railway company is bound to know that its tracks may be used at any time by the engines and trains of the company, and is bound to anticipate and apprehend any consequence that may result to one who, on account of its negligence, is left in a condition in which and in a place where he is liable to be injured by the running of such trains. If a railway company is bound to anticipate and apprehend that one left in a helpless condition in a perilous place upon its tracks through its negligence may be injured by one of its own engines or trains running thereon, is it not equally bound to so anticipate and apprehend any injury whicli might result to such a person from an engine of another company which the first company knew had a right to and did actually use the tracks from time to time? It would indeed bring about a curious result if the defendant would
When a railway company negligently leaves a person upon its track in a helpless condition, it will certainly be held liable for any injurious consequences which may result to such a person growing out of the running of trains along the track, without regard to the ownership of such trains, if the company knew or ought to have apprehended that the trains would pass along the track at that point. The present case is very similar to the case of Byrne v. Wilson, 15 Ir. Com. Law Rep. 332. That was a case brought in 1862, under Lord Campbell’s a.ct, by William Byrne, as administrator of Mary Byrne, against a person who was alleged to be the proprietor of certain omnibuses and as such engaged in the business of a common carrier of passengers. Mary Byrne was a passenger in one of the omnibuses, and through the negligence of the servants of the defendant the omnibus was precipitated into the lock of a canal, and Mary Byrne was there in an insensible condition, when the keeper of the lock turned the water therein, and she was drowned. It was held that although the death of Mary Byrne was not caused immediately by- the- act of the defendant, it was such a consequential result of that act as entitled her representative to maintain an action. Lefroy, Chief Justice, said (p. 340): “ It was not the negligence of the defendant that was the immediate occasion of her death; but it was the negligence of the defendant that put her into a position by which she lost her life, as a consequential injury resulting from that negligence; and although that death was not caused immediately by the act of the defendant, nor was the immediate and instantaneous result of his negligence, yet it was the consequential result .of the defendant’s act,
We do not think this ruling is in conflict with any of the cases cited in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error. In Perry v. Railroad Co., 66 Ga. 746, the plaintiff had deposited his luggage in a car of the defendant, intending to go upon the train as a passenger, and left the car and engaged in conversation with another person in the depot. While so engaged his attention was called to the fact that the train had moved off and he ran until he reached the end of the car-shed. While passing through the gateway of the car-shed he came in contact with the engine of another company, which was coming into the shed, and as a consequence received serious injuries. It was held that the negligence of ’the railroad company in starting its train. without giving a signal was not tho proximate cause of the injury which the plaintiff subsequently received by running against the engine of another train in his effort to catch the defendant’s train. The defendant could not have foreseen, nor was it bound to anticipate or apprehend, that, as a result of its negligence in starting its train without a signal, a passenger would, in attempting to catch the train, run against the engine of another train and receive serio.us injuries. In the case of Mayor v. Dykes, 103 Ga. 847, a street-car company had negligently constructed its track so that the rails were above the surface of the street. The plaintiff, while driving a horse attached to a two-wheel road-cart, attempted to drive across the track at an angle of about forty-five degrees; the wheels-of his cart came in contact with the iron rails of the track, slipped along, the track and made a scraping noise, which caused the horse to take fright and run away. The cart collided with a wagon, and plaintiff was thrown to the ground
In Central Ry. Co. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176, the plaintiff was a passenger who had been carried wrongfully beyond her station and when this fact was discovered she was requested to alight at another station, which she did, and was carried to a hotel by the conductor. While at the hotel a lamp in her room éxploded and as-a consequence she sustained damage. It was held that the railway company was not liable for the injury thus sustained. The defendant could not have foreseen, apprehended, or anticipated that the plaintiff would suffer injuries of the character received by her at the hotel; and hence its negligent act in carrying her beyond her station could not be said to be the proximate cause of the injuries thus received. In Central Ry. Co. v. Edwards, 111 Ga. 528, the plaintiff was a brakeman on a freight-train, and was ordered by the conductor to jump off the train for the purpose of changing the switch. In obedience to this order the plaintiff jumped from the car on which he was standing, and being unable to see the ground beneath him-, his right foot was caught in a frog of the switch, the frog not having been blocked so as to prevent such an accident, and the wheels of the car ran over and crushed his foot. The distinction between that case and the present will be apparent when the following language of Mr. Justice Little in the opinion in that case is considered: “ The direct and proximate cause of the in jury which the plaintiff sustained was his jumping from the train; and if he is entitled to recover damages from the defendant company therefor, it is because of some negligence on the part of said company which caused the jump from which the injury resulted, or negligence in not protecting the place where in fact he did jump. As we have seen, it is not charged in the petition that the railroad company was, through its conductor, negligent in directing the plaintiff to-
In the determination of the question just presented we have been very much aided by the carefully prepared brief of counsel for the defendant in error. The brief shows not only laborious research but ability and power of discrimination, and we take occasion to express our appreciation of the valuable aid thus brought to us in the decision of this puzzling question.
2. The motion for a new trial contains numerous assignments of error on rulings upon the admissibility of evidence. Several grounds complain that the court erred in allowing testimony to be offered for the purpose of impeachment, which reláted to matters which were immaterial and irrelevant. While the judge seems to have permitted the cross-examination of different witnesses, laying the foundation for impeachment, to take a very wide range, we can not say that any evidence he admitted was altogether irrelevant. But even if it was, the error thus committed would not he sufficient to have required the granting of a new trial. The defendant offered in evidence a chain of title showing that the South Carolina & Georgia Railroad Company was the proprietor of the tracks at the point where the injury occurred and the yards adjacent thereto, and also offered a contract between the City Council of Augusta and this railroad company, the purpose in offering this evidence being to show that the engine of the Georgia Railroad Company was upon the tracks at the point where Webb was injured, not by permission of the defendant, but in its own right under a contract made with the city council and the predecessor in title of the South Carolina & Georgia Railroad Company. This evidence was rejected, and error is assigned upon this ruling. It was immaterial who owned the tracks and the yards adjacent thereto. The defendant was shown to be in control of the tracks at the place where the injury occurred and also the adjacent yards in the State of South Carolina. It was immaterial whether the Georgia Railroad Company ran its engine over the track by its own right or by permission of the defendant. It did not matter under whose authority the engine was operated upon the track. The only material question was whether the defendant knew or should have known that the Georgia Railroad Company was in the habit of using the tracks at that point. There was evidence au
It remains only to dispose of that assignment of. error which complains that the verdict was not warranted by the evidence. It was earnestly argued by counsel for the plaintiff in error that there was no evidence authorizing a finding for the plaintiff. It was contended that, as the petition alleged that Webb was thrown through the rear door of the car across the platform at the end of the car. and on to the tracks and as a result was stunned and rendered insensible, the plaintiff can not recover upon a general presumption of negligence against the company, but his recovery must be based upon evidence authorizing the jury to find that he was injured in the manner described in the petition, that is, by being thrown from the inside of the car through the door across the platform on to the tracks. Under the view we have taken of the case it is unnecessary to determine whether a recovery could be had if the evidence failed to show to the satisfaction of the jury that Webb was thrown from the car in the manner described in the petition. There was abundant evidence authorizing the jury to find that Webb was upon the train as a passenger, and that while he was upon the train there was a jolt of the train which was sudden, unusual, and violent, its character being such that the passengers were jostled in their seats, bundles were thrown from the seats and racks, and a person in the aisle of the car would probably have been thrown from his feet. There was no one who saw Webb actually thrown through the door to the platform and upon the track. The last that was seen of him, which was just before the jolt came, he was making his way towards the rear of the car, looking for a seat, and had reached a point near the door of' the car. Nothing more was seen of him until he was found in a mangled condition by the employees in charge of the railroad engine which
To sustain the verdict it is not necessary for us to hold that this testimony of Shinall required a finding that Webb was hurled through the rear door of the car by the jerk of the train. If the jury could legitimately infer from this testimony that such was the case, we have no right to disturb their verdict after it has been approved by the trial judge. The able and learned counsel for the • plaintiff in error presented the case to us in such a way that if we had been sitting as a jury, or even as a court of appeals, with power to pass upon the weight of testimony, we would probably have decided with him at the close of his argument.- It is, however, not within our province to pass upon cases like a jury, nor have we any
Affirmed.