115 Ga. 381 | Ga. | 1902
1. Where a petition against a railway company contained two counts, one setting out a cause of action arising ex delicto (being for a breach of its public duty as a carrier), and the other alleging a liability under the statutory obligation imposed by section 2298 of the Civil Code (which provides that the last connecting carrier who receives goods as in good order shall be liable), a demurrer to the petition, undertaking to point out as defects therein that it set forth in one count an action ex contractu, and in another thestatutory liability above referred to, was not well taken, inasmuch as such a petition does not undertake to join two such causes as those referred to in the demurrer. It in fact joins a cause of action ex delicto with a statutory right of action, and not a cause of action ex contractu with the statutory right. Properly construed the first count in the petition filed in this case set forth a cause of action ex delicto.
2. Presumptively the court properly submitted to the jury the question whether under the evidence there was an actual agreement as to the value of the horse, or whether the bill of lading introduced in evidence was merely an arbitrary preadjustment of damages, in case the property shipped was lost or damaged, for the purpose of limiting the liability of the carrier against the consequences of its own negligence.
(o) Such an issue properly arose in the present case, because of the wording of the bill of lading. Central Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 113 Ga. 514.
(5) There was sufficient evidence to support the finding that there was no actual agreement as to value.
3. While a verdict for damages in an action ex delicto can not lawfully embrace interest as such, no such point was properly made on the verdict returned in the present case ; for it was attacked only by a general assignment that it was contrary to law and evidence, which does not present the specific objection that it unlawfully embraced interest as well as principal.
Judgment affirmed.