(After stating the foregoing facts.)
Under the evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we think it clear that a verdict in his behalf was wholly unwarranted. That no person can recover damages from a railroad company for injuries to himself or his property, where the same are caused by his own negligence, or where by ordinary care he could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the company’s negligence, are familiar declarations of our Civil Code (§§2322, 3830) which have been applied by this court in a great number of cases. We will refer to only a few of them, which we consider to be directly in point here. In Samples v. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 110, at page 112 (22 S. E. 136), Justice Lumpkin refers to “the well-known rule of law that one who voluntarily attempts a rash, imprudent, and dangerous undertaking is to be presumed to have assumed the risk incident thereto, and can not afterwards complain if he is injured.” So, in City of Columbus v. Griggs; 113 Ga. 597 (38 S. E. 953, 84 Am. St. R. 257), it was held: “One who knowingly and voluntarily takes a risk of physical in
As to the other features of the present case, the rulings made in the following • cases are controlling. In Coleman v. Wrightsville R. Co., 114 Ga. 386 (40 S. E. 247), it was held: “A railroad company is under no duty to a person unloading merchandise from a car on a side-track to a wagon, to which a horse is hitched, to comply with the requirements of the Civil Code, §2224, respecting the giving of signals and checking the speed of the train before reaching a public crossing.” And in Chalkley v. Central Ry. Co., 120 Ga. 683 (48 S. E. 194), the well-settled rule was stated, that “Where a railroad company’s servants make unusual noises in the operation of one of its trains, and there is no necessity for the making of such noises, the company is liable for injuries resulting in consequence thereof. [Citing cases.] But unless it is shown that the noise made was unusual and unnecessary at the time when and place where it was made, the railroad company will not be liable in damages to the person injured, even though such noise was the proximate cause of the injury.” Citing cases. In the present case, the plaintiff attempted a rash, imprudent, and dangerous undertaking. He admitted on the trial that he knew that it was risky, and that it was dangerous if he failed to get the usual warnings of the approach of the train. He knew it was perfectly safe to load from the other side, and his driver informed him that he preferred to load from the other side because of the danger of going between the tracks, and testified that plaintiff’s son had suggested to him to load from 'the other side. Plaintiff’s witnesses testified that driving between the tracks to load was obviously dangerous to any one. Plaintiff must have known that, even if the opinion which the young man in the office gave him as to the length of time before another train would n-jss .should be correct, he would have barely time before its arrival in which xo drive in between the tracks, transfer the wood from his wagon to the car, and drive his team out to a place of safety. Besides, he had reason to apprehend that the supposition of his informant as to such time might prove to be unreliable, as he had, on the same day,
Judgment reversed.