110 Ga. 808 | Ga. | 1900
The plaintiff below was an employee of the Southern Railway Company. While engaged with some of his fellow-servants in shoving a loaded “ push-car ” over a trestle upon one of the company’s lines in the State of Alabama, he fell to the ground and was very seriously injured. He brought an action against the company, alleging that his injuries were occasioned because of the rottenness of a wooden'guard-rail fastened to cross-ties constituting a part of the trestle in question. His particular complaint was that, because of the defectiveness of this guard-rail, it gave way under one of his feet and in consequence he was precipitated from the trestle. The plaintiff predicated his action upon a statute of the State of Alabama, now embodied in section 2590 of the Alabama code, which, among other things, declares that: “When a personal injury is received by a servant or employe in the service or business of the master or employer, the master or employer is liable to such servant or employe as if he were a stranger, and not engaged in ■such service or employment, in the cases following: 1st. When the injury is caused by reason of any defect in the construction of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the master or employer.” There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the verdict was contrary to law. and to the evidence and to the charge of the court. The motion also assigned error upon various rulings made during the trial. We shall not, however, undertake to deal with the special grounds of the motion, because we are clearly of the opinion that, upon the merits, the plaintiff’s recovery is not maintainable. The
The case necessarily turns upon the construction which should be placed upon the Alabama statute as applied to the facts above set forth. It therefore seems entirely proper for us to follow the decisions Avhich haA^e been rendered by the Supreme-; Court of Alabama with reference to this very statute, and so doing leads, we think, to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to a verdict. In the case of Wilson v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 85 Ala. 269, which was an action for personal injuries by an employe 'against the defendant company, it was held thatj
The superior court ought to have sustained the motion for a new trial on the general grounds contained therein.
Judgment reversed.