9 Ga. App. 591 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1911
Davis brought suit in a justice’s court against the Southern Railway Company to recover damages for the killing -of his steer. From an adverse judgment the railway company entered an appeal to a jury in the superior court.
The appeal bond was as follows: “J. M. Davis v. Southern Railway Company. Justice court of 1569th Dist. G. M. Floyd county, Ga. Suit for killing steer. Judgment for plaintiff for $75.00. Now comes the defendant in the above-stated case, and being dissatisfied with the judgment rendered thereon, and within the time allowed by law, after paying all costs, enters this its appeal to a jury in the superior court of said county, and brings J. G. Early and tenders him as security on the appeal bond. October 16, 1909, Southern Railway Co., by its attorney, George A. H. Harris Jr., Principal. [Seal.] J. G. Early, Security. [Seal.]” The judge of the superior court dismissed the appeal, holding that the above bond was not sufficient, because it did not contain the words “for the eventual condemnation money.” The judgment dismissing the appeal is assigned as error..
We think that the appeal should not have been dismissed for this reason. The liability of the security on an appeal bond is fixed by
In the case of Shirley v. Price, 30 Ga. 328, the Supreme Court held that the words, “I stand security on the appeal of the above stated case,” signed by the security and following a statement of the case and of the judgment entered therein and the appeal entered therefrom, were equivalent to the words, “I stand security for the eventual costs and condemnation money.”
In Hays v. Eubanks, 125 Ga. 352 (54 S. E. 174), in discussing the statutory requirements as to appeal bonds, the following significant language is, used: “A reasonable intendment and liberal construction has heretofore been uniformly given to appeal bonds, which are not governed by the strict rules applicable to technical pleading, but which are to be held legally sufficient whenever there has been a substantial compliance with statutory requirements on the.part of the appellant, and the contemplated protection to which the opposite party is entitled 'is thereby afforded him.”
The appeal bond in the present case was sufficient to have afforded ample protection to the appellee in the event the appellant did not succeed in its appeal. See Smith v. Jackson, 122 Ga. 857 (50 S. E. 930); Hendrix v. Mason, 70 Ga. 525; Seymour v. Howard, 15 Ga. 110. Besides, if the appeal bond in this case had been deficient for the reason ’ stated, an opportunity should have been afforded for an amendment thereof. Civil Code (1910), § 5707. Judgment reversed.