10 Ga. App. 523 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1912
Lead Opinion
The defendant, having carried the plaintiff beyond the point of his destination, was liable to him in damages. But as the evidence showed a mere negligent omission, unaccompanied by any aggravating circumstances, punitive damages were not recoverable. The conduct of the conductor as set forth in the statement of facts was not such as to authorize the jury to find this character of damages against the defendant. Ga. R. Co. v. Benton, 117 Ga. 785 (45 S. E. 70). In the case just, cited the plaintiff testified that the conductor spoke to him roughly, telling him that he would have to get off or pay more money immediately. The trial judge instructed the jury that they might find punitive damages, and the Supreme Court set aside a verdict of $150, on account of this error in the charge, and because the court charged the law now in the Civil Code (1910), § 4504. See also Sappington v. A. & W. P. R. Co., 127 Ga. 178 (56 S. E. 311). The case differs from
It is true the plaintiff claimed that he had been made sick on account of having been caught in the rain while on his way from Hardcash to his grandmother’s, but any such damages sustained by him were not the legal and natural consequence of the act of the defendant in carrying him beyond his station. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that he unnecessarily walked back to Hardcash and from thence to his grandmother’s home, when he could have gotten there by a much shorter route. The company was under the duty of putting the plaintiff off at Hardcash; it had assumed no obligation to take him to his grandmother’s residence, two miles in the country, and any injury which he sustained resulting from the fact that he voluntarily walked from Hardcash to his grandmother’s home would be entirely too remote to be the basis of a recovery. See Civil Code (1910), § 4510; Sappington v. A. & W. P. R. Co., supra; Central R. Co. v. Dorsey, 116 Ga. 719 (42 S. E. 1024). The case differs from that of Georgia Ry. & El. Co. v. McAllister, 126 Ga. 447 (54 S. E. 957, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1177), for in that case the plaintiff was put off in a! rain-storm, and, therefore, any injury which she received was the direct consequence of the illegal act.
It was clearly error for the trial judge to charge the jury the provisions of section 4504 of the Civil Code (1910), and especially that portion of the section which provides that “the worldly circumstances of the parties, the amount of bad faith in the transaction,* and all the attendant facts should be weighed.” It has been expressly held by the Supreme Court that the provisions of this section of the code have no application in a case like the present. Ga. R. Co. v. Benton, supra.
The case was tried upon an erroneous theory. The only question which should have been submitted to the jury was as to what amount they should find for the plaintiff as nominal damages for the defendant’s negligent act in failing to stop its train at the station. The defendant admitted the technical breach of duty and its consequent liability for nominal damages. There was, therefore,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially. I concur in the decision in this case solely for the reason it is probable that the jury were influenced by the instructions of the court to which reference has been made by Judge Pottle. We are all agreed that the plaintiff’s right to recover nominal damages is undoubted. If the jury had seen proper to return $200 as merely nominal damages, I should be in favor of affirming the judgment refusing a new trial.
While I do not personally assent to the doctrine of some of the rulings cited by my brother Pottle, I am judicially bound by them. In my opinion it should be left to the jury in this ease to say whether there were any such circumstances of aggravation in the manner of the conductor as would have entitled the plaintiff to recover punitive damages, under the ruling in Savannah Electric Co. v. Badenhoop, 6 Ga. App. 371 (65 S. E. 50), and cases therein cited. However, I am compelled to concur in the judgment of reversal, because the case was submitted to the jury on the' theory that they might find punitive damages, as well as damages on account of illness, which are clearly too remote for recovery. As it can not be said with certainty that these errors did not contribute