Lead Opinion
Thе defendant, Anthony Hayes, appeals: (1) an order of the Superior Court (Brennan, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC), with respect to Karen Hayes’ unpaid medical expenses; (2) an order of the Superior Court (Nicolosi, J.) granting SNHMC’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that Karen Hayes “eloped” under the doctrine of necessaries; and (3) a ruling on the merits (Smukler, J.) finding Anthony Hayes liable under the doctrine of necessaries for Karen Hayes’ medical bills. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The record suрports the following facts. Anthony and Karen Hayes married in 1977. In July, August, October and November 2006, Karen, who did not have health insurance, received emergency medical treatment at SNHMC for complications stemming from alcoholism, leaving a balance due of $85,238.88. The record contains conflicting evidence about the status of Karen and Anthony’s marriage during this time. While Karen’s medical records indicate that she was living with Anthony, Anthony disputes this, asserting that he and Karen “did not live as husband and wife for the past seven to eight years . . . when [the medical bills] were . . . incurred.” For еxample, Anthony testified that sometimes Karen was admitted to SNHMC after being “taken out of hotels, motels, and other people’s houses.” SNHMC filed suit against the Hayeses, and successfully sought a real estate attachment on two unencumbered parcels owned jointly by the Hayeses. When SNHMC placed an attachment on the properties, Karen and Anthony were still married. The Hayeses were divorced in January 2007 pursuant to a stipulated agreement. Under the terms of the divorce, each party was responsible for his or her own medical expenses not covered by insurance. Specifically, “Karen [was] responsible for paying the debt to [SNHMC] as well as any other medical debts or bills.” Karen received one automobile valued at $1,200, her bank account with a balance of $0.00, and all of her debts. Anthony received the marital properties subject to SNHMC’s attachment.
Prior to trial, SNHMC moved in limine to prohibit Anthony “from introducing at trial any information, documentation or witnesses concerning or in any way referencing an alleged common law doctrine of elopement.” SNHMC argued that elopement is an аffirmative defense, and that Anthony failed to give adequate notice, pursuant to Superior Court Rule 28, that
The trial court granted SNHMC’s motion. It ruled that elopement is an affirmative defense, but that Anthony failed to properly raise it. The court found that it would be unfair to require SNHMC to counter this defense, given that “the legal fact of marriage was not in dispute.”
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SNHMC against Karen, finding “no issue of material fact” that she was liаble for the balance owed to SNHMC. The trial court, however, denied SNHMC’s motion for summary judgment against Anthony, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained with respect to his liability for Karen’s medical expenses. Following a bench trial on the merits, the trial court found that Anthony was liable, under the doctrine of necessaries, for Karen’s medical debts to SNHMC. During the pendency of these proceedings, Karen passed away.
On appeal, Anthony argues that: (1) elopement is not an affirmative defense; (2) even if it is, he provided sufficient notice; (3) pursuant tо Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook,
I. Summary Judgment: Karen Hayes
We first address, as a preliminary matter, SNHMC’s argument that Anthony lacks standing to appeal the summary judgment against Karen. Specifically, SNHMC contends that only Karen’s estate would havе standing to appeal and “as of this time, no estate has been opened,” and that “Mr. Hayes has suffered no legal injury that an appeal to this Court will protect and he may not seek relief for the benefit of another.” Although Anthony did not address these contentions in his brief, at oral argument he argued that he has standing to challenge the judgment against Karen because, under the necessaries doctrine, he is potentially liable for her debt. We assume for the purposes of this appeal that Anthony has standing to attack the judgment against Karen.
Anthony argues that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment against Karen. He contends that whether he and Karen were married for the purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine, and whether SNHMC’s charges and the medical services provided to Karen were reasonably necessary, were material, disputed issues of fact. He argues that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment against Karen because the evidence was insufficient for such a ruling. Anthony also maintains that the affidavit supporting SNHMC’s motion for summary judgment was incompetent because
‘When reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we consider the affidavits and other evidence, and inferences properly drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
In its motion for summary judgment against Karen, SNHMC contended that it provided medical care to her and that, as a result, she owed SNHMC for the services provided. In support of its motion, SNHMC attached an affidavit from its Credit and Collection Manager who stated that she was “familiar with the books and records of [SNHMC]” and had “personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.”
In her objection, Karen denied “that medical and health care services and/or supplies were properly administered to [her] оr that they were reasonable or necessary.” She also asserted:
In determining whether or not the charges rendered by [SNHMC] in this case are reasonable, the court needs to consider other issues, such as the fact that [SNHMC] is allegedly a non-profit organization and needs to consider billing rates or cash payments as opposed to insurance payments or [Medicaid] payments.
Karen neither referred to anything in the record nor filed an affidavit contradicting SNHMC’s motion.
We agree that whether the Hayeses were married for the purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine was irrelevant to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against Karen. Moreover, Karen failed to allege that there were any disputed issues of material fact, or that SNHMC was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot “rest upon mere allegations or denials of [the] pleadings, but [her] response, by affidavits or by reference to depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” RSA 491:8-a, IV. Karen failed to refer to any facts in the record, or to present the trial court with an affidavit, supporting her allegations that the hospital’s charges were not reasonable.
In her motion to reconsider, Karen raised a new challenge to the affidavit supporting SNHMC’s motion for summary judgment:
[SNHMC] submitted an Affidavit in support of its Motion For Summary Judgment, along with a copy of an invoice for services that were rendered to the Defendant.The Affidavit was signed by an employee that works in the business department of the hospital, and not by a doсtor or a medical practitioner.
The motion thus challenged the competency of the affidavit. The motion, however, failed to identify any facts supporting Karen’s claim, and failed to demonstrate that SNHMC was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
II. The Doctrine of Necessaries
The ancient common law doctrine of necessaries imposed liability on husbands for “essential goods and services provided to [their wives] by third parties” if they faded to provide their wives “with such necessaries.” Holbrook,
This doctrine originated as a result of draconian legal restrictions on the rights of married women to “contract, sue, or be sued individually” or exercise control over their property or financial affairs. North Ottawa Community Hosp. v. Kieft,
“A man has as good a right to his wife, as to the property acquired under a marriage contract; and to divest him of that right without his default, and against his will, would be as flagrant a violation of the principles of justice as the confiscation of his estate.”
Holbrook,
Accordingly, the law of necessaries “attempted to obviate some of the victimization which coverture would otherwise have permitted” by “providing a common-law mechanism by which the duty of support could be enforced.” Kieft,
Husbands could avoid liability under the necessaries doctrine under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Tebbets v. Hapgood,
“In modern America, ‘no longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.’ ” Steiner,
When considering the application of the doctrine in the modern day, some courts have outlined a prima facie case under the law of necessaries as follows:
In order to establish a prima facie case against one spouse for the value of [services or goods] provided to the other spouse, the .. . provider must show that (1) [services or goods] were provided to the receiving spouse, (2) [they] were necessary for the health and well-being of the receiving spouse, (3) the person against whom the action is brought was married to the receiving spouse at the time the [sеrvices or goods] were provided, and (4) payment for the necessaries has not been made.
Wesley Long Nursing Center, Inc. v. Harper, No. COA06-1706,
A. Elopement
We next consider whether elopement is an affirmative or general defense to the law of necessaries. As stated above, the trial court ruled that elopement is an affirmative defense, and barred Anthony from presenting evidence that Karen “eloped,” finding that Anthony had failed to give adequate notice of his intention to rely upon that defense. We conclude that “elopement” is no longer a defense to the doctrine of necessaries. Cf. Chisholm,
As noted above, the necessaries doctrine developed during a time when married women were severely restricted in their ability to contract, sue, or be sued, or to exercise control over their property, services, or earnings. See Kieft,
Given that the “historical purposes underlying the [elopement] exception to the necessaries doctrine are incompatible with current mores and laws governing modern marital relationships in [New Hampshire],” we find that the elopement exception “has no placе in the common law.” Chisholm,
The non-debtor spouse’s liability under the necessaries doctrine depends on a mutual expectation that the spouses will share assets, expenses, and debts. Accordingly, factors to consider in determining whether the marriage is nо longer viable for the purposes of the necessaries doctrine might include whether the parties were separated, when they separated, whether they are living apart, and whether they share their living expenses and debt. See Mercado,
For the reasons described above, “elopement” is no longer a defense to the application of the necessaries doctrine; rather, the third party seeking to impose liability on the non-debtor spouse — in this case, SNHMC — retains the burden to demonstrate that the parties were “married” for the purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine. Because we hold today that “elopement” is not an affirmative defense, we reverse and remand to the trial court for a new trial on the merits.
B. Liability of Non-Debtor Spouse
We next consider Anthony’s argument that SNHMC must determine that his wife could not satisfy her debt before seeking reimbursement from him. Anthony relies primarily upon Holbrook,
Under the doctrine of necessaries, “a husband or wife is not liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by his or her spouse unless the resources of the spouse who received the services are insufficient to satisfy the debt.” Holbrook,
The defendant argued before the trial court that SNHMC was required to demonstrate that Karen could not pay for her medical services before pursuing his assets. The trial court stated'that it did “not necessarily agree with... Mr. Hayes[’] legal position,” citing the language in Holbrook which states that the medical provider must “first seek payment from the spouse who received its services before pursuing collection from the other spouse.” The trial court reasoned that the Holbrook “language is directed at collection efforts” аnd “does not necessarily restrict a finding of liability.” However, the trial court,
We clarify our holding in Holbrook by confirming that the trial court applied the correct standard when it determined that Karen could not satisfy her debt to SNHMC. On remand, the trial court should apply the standard set out above, thаt the non-debtor spouse is liable for his or her spouse’s necessaries if the debtor spouse is unable to pay for his or her necessaries.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially. I concur in the judgment of the majority because the issue of abolishing the common law necessaries doctrine was not raised by either party. I write separately, however, because anachronisms in the doctrine, which are evident in the court’s discussion of its origins, raise questions about its continued aрplicability in the modern world.
The necessaries doctrine “originated in English common law over three centuries ago when married women had no property or contractual rights and their husbands controlled their financial affairs. . . . The primary purpose of the doctrine was to assure that dependent wives received support from neglectful husbands.” Medical Center Hosp. of Vt v. Lorrain,
In Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook,
Although we purported to “determine whether the [necessaries] doctrine should be abolished or revised,” id. at 190, we undertook none of the traditional analysis for determining whether to abolish existing precedent. Thus, while the holding in Holbrook may appear broad, it bears recalling that the specific question before us was whether the gender distinctions in the common law necessaries doctrine violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Thus, Holbrook’s revision of the doctrine may be viewed as simply the abolition of gendеr distinctions that violated equal protection, rather than a considered expansion of the doctrine. An examination of the doctrine under the traditional factors for determining whether to abrogate precedent, however, reveals that it has long outlived its relevance and should be abandoned.
We do not lightly overrule longstanding precedent.
(1) whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of ovеrruling; (3) whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; and (4) whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
Id. (quotation omitted). Most, if not all, of these factors apply to the common law doctrine of necessaries.
The necessaries doctrine arose out of the legal disabilities imposed upon married women under the сommon law; those restrictions on property ownership and contractual capacity are the raison d’etre for the doctrine. As we stated in Holbrook, “Because the wife could not contract for food, clothing, or medical needs, her husband was obligated to provide her with such ‘necessaries.’ ” Holbrook,
The doctrine also defies practical workability. See id. As the Supreme Court of Vermont noted in Lorrain, “because the husband’s liability under the doctrine had substantial limitations, the doctrine never accomplished its purported purpose — to be an effective support mechanism for neglected wives.” Lorrain,
Finally, there appears to be little reliance upon the doctrine “that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling” it. Alonzi,
Consideration of the foregoing factors leads to the conclusion that the common law doctrine оf necessaries is no longer viable. Furthermore, while our gender-neutral revision of the doctrine in Holbrook may have alleviated then extant equal protection concerns, it is doubtful that it solved any of the underlying problems with the doctrine or rendered the