44 Kan. 681 | Kan. | 1890
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiff in error asks a review and reversal of an order of the district court of Sumner county, correcting an entry of judgment in a foreclosure proceeding.
James H. Luckey and wife were the owners of a tract of land in Sumner county, and in April, 1878, they gave a mortgage thereon to secure the payment of $300. In January, 1880, they gave a second mortgage to John D. Brown, to secure the payment of $203.75. Afterward, on June 16, 1880, they conveyed a strip of land through the tract to the Southern Kansas & Western Railroad Company, for a projected railroad. Default having been made in the payment of the claims secured by the mortgages, foreclosure actions were begun in 1881 by J. K, O. Sherwood, the owner of the first-named mortgage, and by John D. Brown, the owner of the second mortgage. These actions were consolidated, and the Southern Kansas & Western Railroad Company was made one of the defendants, and in its answer it set up the conveyance by Luckey and wife to itself of a right-of-way across the land, and asked “that if a judgment of foreclosure is made herein in favor of plaintiff, and the sale of the premises covered by the mortgage described in the petition, to sat
The court possessed ample power to correct the entry so that it should correspond with the judgment actually rendered. If the company was improperly designated by the clerk in entering the judgment, it was competent for the court even at a subsequent term to make the correction. (Tobie v. Comm’rs of Brown Co., 20 Kas. 14; Small v. Douthitt, 1 id. 335; Clevenger v. Hansen, ante, p. 182; same case, 24 Pac. Rep. 61; Civil Code, §568.) The change did not involve the correction of any judicial error, but simply a mistake of the clerk. The corrected name was one by which the company was designated in the pleading, and the one under which it answered. The name occurs twice in the judgment entry,
The company claims that the evidence given at the hearing did not warrant the action of the court; but as it cannot be said that the evidence is all preserved in the record, that question is not before us. There is no statement outside of the certificate of the judge attached to the case-made, that it contains all the evidence, and hence the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be considered. (Eddy v. Weaver, 37 Kas. 540; Hogue v. Mackey, ante, p. 277; same case, 24 Pac. Rep. 477, and cases cited.) An examination of that which is preserved satisfies us that the order was rightly made, and that no injustice was done.
Judgment affirmed.