28 S.E.2d 581 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1944
1. A corporation is not liable for slander committed by its employees or agents unless the words of defamation are expressly authorized by the corporation.
2. Where one engaged in a retail mercantile business impliedly extends an invitation to the public to trade there, a customer visiting the establishment in response to such invitation is entitled to protection from the tortious mistreatment or misconduct of the employees of the person conducting such business. This protection is required of a corporation as well as a natural person. The fact that such misconduct or mistreatment by the employees contains elements of slander does not relieve the corporation of its duty to protect the invitee, although no recovery can prevail against it for slander, which may be simultaneously involved.
3. The petition sufficiently set forth a cause of action for tortious misconduct on the part of the corporation in its failure to protect the invited customer. The court did not err in overruling the demurrers, both general and special.
The defendant demurred generally on the ground that no cause of action was set forth, and specially on the ground (a) that the allegation to the effect that the cashier and manager were employees of the defendant and acting within the scope of their employment was a mere conclusion without any facts upon which to base it; and (b) that the allegation of the amendment to the effect that the cashier and manager were acting in what they said and did, "under the express direction and authorization of the defendant," was a mere conclusion, in that it was not alleged in the amendment or elsewhere, "how, when, or in what manner the defendant directed or authorized the statements alleged as spoken and committed by the alleged agents or servants of defendant." The court overruled the demurrers, and the defendant excepted.
1. It is contended by the defendant that the case is one sounding in slander or oral defamation, and that since it is not alleged in response to its special demurrer, or elsewhere in the petition, that the words spoken were expressly authorized by the proper authorities of the corporation, no cause of action was set out against it. At the outset we concede the correctness of this position, if the allegations of the petition must be construed as one sounding in slander or oral defamation. This principle has been many times ruled. The leading case is Behre
v. National Cash Register Co.,
3. We construe the allegations of the petition in the instant case as sufficient to bring it within the doctrine of the duty owing an invitee. We think this theory is sufficiently stated by the petition, although there can be no recovery against the corporation for slander, *478 even though oral defamation might be involved as a simultaneous wrong. It therefore follows that if we are correct in what we have said, it was not necessary to allege or prove that the words alleged to have been spoken by the agents of the corporation were expressly authorized by the corporation, or ratified by it. But the allegation that the manager and the cashier were agents and employees acting within the scope of their authority, and, at the time, engaged in their master's business, are sufficient to withstand the demurrers to the petition. The court did not err in overruling the demurrers.
Judgment affirmed. Broyles, C. J., and MacIntyre, J.,concur.