Southern General Insurance Company (“Southern General”) seeks the reversal of the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment and grant of summary judgment to Wellstar Health Systems, Inc. (“Wellstar”), arguing that (1) a conflict between case law and statutory law requires Southern General to make payments in excess of policy limits with its insured and (2) the conflict in the law denies insurance companies equal protection. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
To prevаil on summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, when viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law. 1 We review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary adjudication, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 2
So viewed, the underlying facts are undisputed by the parties. The record reveals that Southern General issued an automobile liability policy to its insured with a policy limit of $25,000. In September 2007, the insured’s vehicle collided with a bicycle ridden by Norman Gray. Gray’s left leg was fractured as a result of this *27 accident, and he sought treatment at Wellstar, with medical expenses totaling $22,047.50.
Thereafter, in October 2007, Wellstar notified Gray and Southern General of its intent to file liens “for the cost of [the] treatment against recoveries realized from any and all causes of action accruing to [Gray] as a result of [the] accident.” The following mоnth, Wellstar in fact filed two hospital liens covering the total hospital and treatment charges incurred by Gray. 3
But before Wellstar filed a lien, Southern General offered to settle with Gray in the amount of $25,000 (i.e., the applicable policy limits). The settlement letter noted that Wellstar’s hospital lien had been discussed and that Southern General had “confirmation that this lien will be satisfied or that we and our insured will be indemnified from this lien prior to issuing our settlement check.” The insurer indicated that thе settlement check and a general release would be issued after Gray and his attorney signed an enclosed lien statement. But on October 24, 2007, Gray sent a letter to Southern General, demanding that the company tender its policy limits within five days in light of Frickey v. Jones. 4
Southern General responded the following day as to having received the demand letter, and the company enclosed a standard release from liability. Southern General requested that Gray’s attorney review the releаse and agree to have Gray sign it “to conclude his bodily injury claim.” The letter further directed that if Gray agreed with the release, Southern General would forward a check for $25,000. The general release included the following provision:
The undersigned further warrants and represents that there are no medical, hospital or other liens and no claims by any person, firm, corporation or other entity against the consideration paid herein. The undersigned agrees, in considеration of the payment herein, to indemnify and hold said Payer(s) harmless for any and all claims made against said Payer(s) for medical expenses, hospital expenses or any other expenses related or claimed to be related to treatment or services rendered to the undersigned for injuries or claims *28 arising out of the aforementioned occurrence, including the payment of attorneys fees and expenses.
On October 26, 2007, Gray’s attorney responded that his client was “willing to sign a general release but not an indemnification agreement.” Thereafter, by check dated October 29, 2007, Southern General tendered $25,000 to Gray and his attorney. And on October 31,2007, Gray returned a signed release to Southern General that did not include the aforementioned indemnification provision.
This prompted Wellstar to file suit against Southern General, alleging that after receiving notice ofWellstar’s hospital liens, “Southern General willfully ignored the lien[s] аnd made payments directly to the injured person ... and made no payment to [Wellstar].” Thus, Wellstar sought $22,047.50 from Southern General in addition to attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-473 (a). 5 Southern General then filed for summary judgment, alleging that the settlement was made in compliance with Gray’s time-limit demand to avoid the result in Frickey v. Jones. 6 Specifically, Southern General argued that the precedents established by our Supreme Court in Frickey and Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt 7 are irreconcilable with the hospital-lien provisions contained in OCGA §§ 44-14-470 and 44-14-473 beсause an insurance company could be required to make payments in excess of the policy limits with its insured. Southern General further argued that it was denied equal protection by this alleged conflict in the law.
The trial court denied Southern General’s motion for summary judgment, explaining that “[t]he question to be decided is whether [Southern General’s] tender of its policy limits to Gray upon receipt of Gray’s unconditional time-limited demand is a defense to Well-star’s action to enforce its lien.” And the trial court decided that it was not.
Specifically, the trial court held that if Southern General had “satisfied Wellstar by paying the hospital bill as part of the insurance proceeds, Gray would have received the full benefit of the insurance proceeds he demanded,” and therefore, Southern General “would not have been exposed to a claim for bad faith in its failure to settle the *29 claim within policy limits based on the time-limited settlement offer by Gray.” And bеcause the trial court did not find the case and statutory law irreconcilable, it did not address Southern General’s constitutional argument before denying summary judgment to Southern General and sua sponte granting same to Webstar. This appeal by Southern General follows, in which the company makes the same two arguments to this Court that it did below.
1. Southern General first argues that Frickey and Holt, when coupled with OCGA §§ 44-14-470 and 44-14-473, impermissibly set up an insurance company “to pay in excess of its contractually agreed policy limits because it cannot both unconditionally accept a time limit demand, and satisfy the statutorily enforced hospital lien.” We disagree.
At the outset, it is necessary to address an insurance company’s responsibilities in the face of settlement demands and hospital liens.
First, when faced with a time-limit settlement demand, “[a]n insurance company may be liable for damages to its insured for failing to settle the claim of an injured person [when] the insurer is guilty of negligence, fraud, or bad faith in failing tо compromise the claim.” 8 And in deciding whether to settle a claim within the applicable policy limits, “the insurance company must give equal consideration to the interests of the insured.” 9 Whether the insurer “has accorded the insured the same faithful consideration it gives its own interest” is a question for a jury, which must be decided in view of existing circumstances. 10 But an insurance company does not act in bad faith “solely because it fails to accept a settlement offer within thе deadline set by the injured person’s attorney.” 11 Instead, the issue is whether “all the facts show sufficient evidence to withstand an insurance company’s motion for directed verdict and permit a jury to determine whether the insurer acted unreasonably in declining to accept a time-limited settlement offer.” 12
Second, as to an insurance company’s obligation to satisfy a *30 hospital lien, OCGA § 44-14-470 provides that
[a]ny person, firm, hospital authority, or corporation operating a hospital... in this state shall have a lien for the reasonable charges for hospital . . . care and treatment of an injured person, which lien shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the care was furnished ... on account of injuries giving rise to the causes of action and which necessitated the hospital... care .... The lien provided for in this subsection is only a lien against such causes of action and shall not be a lien against such injured person... or any other property or assets of such persons and shall not be evidence of such person’s failure to pay a debt.. . . 13
As our Supreme Court has explained, “the lien allows the hospital to step into the shoes of the insured for purposes of receiving payment from the tortfeasor’s insurance company for economic damages represented by the hospital bill.” 14 And after a hospital lien has been filed, “[n]o release of the cause or сauses of action... shall be valid or effectual against the lien . . . unless the holder thereof shall join therein or execute a release of the lien____” 15 Moreover, “the claimant or assignee of the lien may enforce the lien by an action against the person, firm, or corporation liable for the damages or such person, firm, or corporation’s insurer.” 16
Southern General considers these to be competing duties and argues that under our Supreme Court’s settlement cases of Frickey and Holt, it was “left with no choicе but to unconditionally accept Gray’s demand [to settle within the policy limits] or face liability of any excess exposure for a bad faith refusal to settle.” But the actual holdings in these cases belie Southern General’s assertion that our Supreme Court has created precedents that “impermissibly set[ ] up an insurance company to pay in excess of its contractually agreed policy limits because it cannot both unconditionally accept a time limit demand[ ] and satisfy the statutorily enforced hospital lien.”
*31 Indeed, in Frickey, our Supreme Court held that no binding settlement agreement was reached between an insurance company and an injured party when, in response to a demand letter from the injured party, the insurance company required an additional act— namely, the resolution of all actual and potential liens of health care providers. 17 Thus, the holding in Frickey was limited to issues of offer and acceptance (i.e., the enforceability of a settlement agreement). 18 And in Holt, when an insurance company contended that it was improperly denied a directed verdict on the issue of bad faith, our Supreme Court merely held that there was a jury question as to the company’s potential negligence or bad faith in refusing to settle for the policy limits when (1) liability was clear and (2) the injured individual’s special damages exceeded the applicable policy limits. 19 Given these holdings, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Southern General’s argument is misplaced.
To begin with, we are not at all convincеd that Gray’s time-limit demand was even sufficient to invoke a Holt-scenario given the five-day time limit and a lack of documentation to show that special damages actually exceeded Southern General’s policy limits. 20 Nevertheless, the question before us is whether an insurance company’s common law and statutory duties are reconcilable under the law, and we agree with the trial court that they are. Like the trial court, we conclude that it is possible for an insurance company to create a “sаfe harbor” from liability under Holt and its progeny when (1) the insurer promptly acts to settle a case involving clear liability and special damages in excess of the applicable policy limits, and (2) the sole reason for the parties’ inability to reach a settlement is the plaintiffs unreasonable refusal to assure the satisfaction of any outstanding hospital liens.
Consider the following hypothetical: An insurance company— faced with a situation of clear liability and special damages in excess *32 of the policy limits — offers in a timely fashion to tender its policy limits to the plaintiff, subject to a reasonably and narrowly tailored provision assuring that the plaintiff will satisfy any hospital liens from the proceeds of such settlement payment. For example, the insurance company could request that plaintiffs counsel or a third party hold a portion of the settlement proceeds (in an amount equal to that of the hospital lien) in escrow to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to investigate the validity of the liens and to negotiate with the hospital. And once the relevant lien-resolving documents have been executed by the parties, the held-back settlement funds could then be disbursed to the plaintiff. But if the insurer made such an offer or counteroffer (in a timely and reasonable fashion) and the plaintiff unreasonably refused to give the requested assurance, the insurer is (at that point) under no obligation to tendеr policy limits directly to the plaintiff. Indeed, a plaintiff who unreasonably refuses to give such an assurance does so at his or her own peril because the insurance company would thereafter have no obligation to negotiate with the hospital or otherwise advocate on the plaintiff’s behalf. Instead, the insurer would be free (at that point) to simply verify the validity of any liens, make payment directly to the hospital, and then disburse any remaining funds to the plaintiff. 21
If an insurеr so reacted to a plaintiff s unreasonable refusal to assure satisfaction of hospital liens as a condition of receiving policy limits, the insurer would create a safe harbor from liability under Holt and its progeny. 22 And in such a scenario, when the failure to settle a Holt-scenario claim is based solely on the plaintiff’s unreasonable refusal to agree to a reasonably and narrowly tailored provision assuring that any hospital liens will be satisfied from the settlement proceeds, that cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a bad faith failure to settle when the insurer is merely attempting to comply *33 with its legal obligations. 23 Put another way, no reasonable jury could conclude that an insurer has refused to settle a Holt-scenario case in bad faith when the only reason for the insurer’s refusal to settle with the plaintiff is the insurer’s insistence that any settlement payment to plaintiff be conditioned on the satisfaction of hospital liens that the insurer is obligated by statute to pay. In sum, the hypothetical scenario posited supra describes circumstances quite different from those in which an insurer has arguably acted unreasonably, as was the situation in Holt and subsequent cases that have applied the rule from Holt. 24
In some sense, the hypothetical outlined supra was also suggested by the trial court when it denied Southern General’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court extended the logic employed by our Supreme Court to the interplay between uninsured motorist coverage and hospital liens to create a sаfe harbor for insurance companies. And this lends further support to what we suggest supra. Indeed, in the context of uninsured motorist coverage and hospital *34 liens, our Supreme Court has held that a hospital bill is part of an injured individual’s economic damages caused by a tortfeasor and that these economic damages are part of the injured individual’s cause of action against the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor’s insurance company. 25 Thus, payment to a hospital can either represent full or partial satisfaction of the injured individual’s claim, and the “payment inures directly to [the injured individual’s] benefit for payment of a hospital bill for which he is directly responsible.” 26
Accordingly, in the case sub judice, because Wellstar’s hospital liens were part of Gray’s claim, after negotiating with Gray and receiving Gray’s unreasonable refusal to assure payment of same, Southern General could have satisfied Gray’s claim by verifying the liens, making payment directly to Wellstar, and then remitting any balance of the policy limits to the plaintiff. Because in doing so, “Gray would have received the full benefit of the insurance proceeds he demanded.” And this comports with our Supreme Court’s express disapproval of “placing an affirmative duty on the [insurance] company to engage in negotiations concerning a settlement demand that is' in excess of the insurance policy’s limits,” instead allowing an insurer to create a safe harbor from liability on a bad-faith claim “by meeting the portion of the demand over which it has control, thus doing what it can to effectuate the settlement of the claims against its insured.” 27
In the case sub judice, when Gray demanded Southern General’s policy limits without also agreeing to assure satisfaction of Wellstar’s hospital liens, Southern General was effectively faced with a settlement demand in excess of its policy limits. Thus, had Southern General verified the validity of the liens, made payment directly to Wеllstar, and then paid the remainder of its policy limits to Gray, Southern General would have created a safe harbor from liability under Holt and its progeny. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to Southern General and granting same to Wellstar. 28
2. Southern General also argues that it has been denied equal *35 protection because the interplay between the case law and statutory law “places it in a position of liability in which no self-insured or uninsured driver would ever be рlaced.” Given our holding in Division 1, we need not address this argument. Additionally, this enumeration is not properly before us because the trial court did not rule on the constitutional question. 29 Thus, this enumeration is not ripe for appellate consideration. 30
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
See, e.g., Pew v. One Buckhead Loop Condo. Ass’n, Inc.,
See, e.g., Pew,
The liens stated that Wellstar
claim[ed] a lien on all sums and amounts, whether in property or money, paid to the above named patient or their legal representative by any pеrson, firm or corporation ..., if any, as a settlement, as a release, or as a judgment or as consideration for a covenant not to sue when said sum or amounts represent damages or compensation for the patient’s injuries for which [Wellstar] has rendered its services to such injuries.
Southern General in turn filed suit against Gray, alleging that if Southern General were found liable to Wellstar, Gray should be liable to Southern General “for part or all of any sums it is required to pay [Wellstаr].” This action ended in a default judgment against Gray, with Gray ordered to “indemnify Southern General for all or any part of a judgment entered in favor of [Wellstar].”
Holt,
Id.; see also Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman,
Holt,
Id.
Id. See generally Kingsley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 353 FSupp.2d 1242, 1248-54 (2) (a)-(b) (N.D. Ga. 2005) (providing an overview of Georgia law with regard to settlement demands).
OCGA § 44-14-470 (b);
see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Adams,
Adams,
OCGA § 44-14-473 (a).
Id.
(emphasis supplied).
But see Integon Indem. Corp. v. Henry Med. Ctr., Inc.,
Frickey,
See id..; see also Mealer v. Kennedy,
Holt,
See id.
(“Nothing in this decision is intended to lay down a rule of law that would mean that a plaintiffs attorney under similаr circumstances could ‘set up’ an insurer for an excess judgment merely by offering to settle within the policy limits and by imposing an unreasonably short time within which the offer would remain open.”);
see also Brightman,
The hypothetical posited supra should in no way be read as condoning or encouraging an insurance company to make payment directly to a hospital before engaging in good-faith settlement negotiations with a plaintiff. And while we leave the answer to this question for another day, it is possible that an insurer would be liable under Holt and its progeny if the company made payment directly to the hospital before even attempting to negotiate with the plaintiff.
Cf. Brightman,
See McDonald v. Home State County Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 01-09-00838-CV,
See Holt,
Adams,
Id.
State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
In so holding, we further note that even if we agreed with Southern General that Frickey and Holt were irreconcilable with the statutory law covering hospital liens, those decisions are nevertheless binding precedent on this Court. See Ga. Const. Art. 6, § 6, ¶ VI (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”); see also State v. Smith, 308 Ga. *35 App. 345, 352 (1) (707 SE2d560) (2011) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher court.”).
See City of Decatur v. DeKalb County,
See Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Litsky,