SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner v. Stuart PARSONS et al., Respondents
No. 12-957
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Sept. 12, 2013
2013 Ark. 322
COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Justice
The ALJ further noted that for any act of maltreatment that would also be a criminal act, a petitioner may raise any defense or affirmative defense that would be applicable in the criminal proceeding. The ALJ noted that it is an affirmative defense that the actor reasonably believed the child to be of a critical age or above. The ALJ opined that the critical age in this case was sixteen years old, and if Marrufo could establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he reasonably believed M.H. was sixteen years of age or older when the sexual act occurred, he would have a defense to the maltreatment allegation. The ALJ held that Marrufo did not meet his burden of proof as he “did not testify nor make any statement during the investigation that he believed M.H. was sixteen (16) when he had sex with her,” and “[i]n the absence оf any proof, I cannot find that [Marrufo] carried his burden.” Marrufo sought review by the circuit court, and the circuit court affirmed the Department‘s order, opining that Marrufo failed to prove his affirmative defеnse, as he failed to testify.
On appeal, while admitting that he was eighteen years old and M.H. was fourteen years old at the time of the incident, Marrufo notes that M.H. testified at the hearing that she told him she was sixtеen. He also asserts that the case records show that another person who had sex with M.H. that same night told law enforcement officers that he believed M.H. was nineteen or twenty years old. He cоntends that substantial evidence established that he reasonably believed that M.H. was sixteen years old at the time of the incident and that the ALJ‘s decision was made without consideration and with a complete disregard of the facts.
Here, Marrufo at the age of eighteen, engaged in sexual intercourse with a girl who was fourteen, and this action constituted sexual abuse warranting Marrufo‘s placement оn the Registry. Even though M.H. testified that she told Marrufo she was sixteen years old, it is not sufficient to negate the finding of child maltreatment. It was within the prerogative of the ALJ to consider and reject Marrufo‘s profferеd defense. See C.C.B. v. Ark. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 368 Ark. 547, 547-48, 247 S.W.3d 870, 875-76 (affirming the ALJ‘s rejection of an affirmative defense). Marrufo has not established that the ALJ‘s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and we therefore reject his argument.
Affirmed.
Gibson Law Firm, PLLC, by Jesse J. Gibson, for respondents.
COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Justice.
Petitioner Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau“) has filed a petition for writ of prohibition in this court, arguing that the circuit cоurt did not have jurisdiction after ninety days to set aside its previous order. Pur
On October 30, 2010, Stuart Parsons was injured in a motorcycle-automobile accident with an uninsured driver in Searcy. Parsons had uninsured-motorist coverage of $50,000 with Farm Bureau. As a result of the аccident, Parsons subsequently made a claim against his uninsured-motorist coverage on his policy held by Farm Bureau. He signed a release allowing Farm Bureau to obtain his medical bills and received a personal-injury protection payment.1 Parsons‘s medical bills exceeded the $50,000 policy limit.
On May 17, 2011, Farm Bureau filed a complaint for interpleader, requesting the circuit court to disburse its uninsured-motorist limits of $50,000. At that time, no other party, particularly a medicаl provider, had filed a medical lien or had claimed any interest in the policy proceeds. Acting pro se, Parsons filed an answer and requested that his uninsured-motorist policy be paid to him. On November 8, 2011, the circuit court ordered Farm Bureau to deposit the funds into the court‘s registry and to disburse the money accordingly. Specifically, the court authorized Farm Bureau‘s payment into the registry of the court “until further order of the court” and stated that payment “shall discharge [Farm Bureau] of any liability in connection with the motorcycle/auto accident of October 30, 2010 that occurred in Searcy, White County, Arkansas[.]”
On March 6, 2012, Parsons filed a counterclaim seeking a statutory penalty, interest, and attorney‘s fees. In his counterclaim, Parsons asserted that Farm Bureau allegedly acted in bad faith by filing an interplеader action instead of paying the money to him. Parsons also filed a motion to dismiss the interpleader action. Citing Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Guyer, 2011 Ark. App. 710, 386 S.W.3d 682, Parsons asserted that Farm Bureau‘s interpleader action was misplaced because there were no legitimate competing claims to the money, as no medical liens had been filed or actual claims made asserting entitlement to the money. In turn, on March 12, 2012, Farm Bureau filеd a motion to strike Parsons‘s motion to dismiss the interpleader and counterclaim, arguing primarily that, pursuant to
On July 11, 2012, the cirсuit court held a hearing on the pending motions. Following the hearing, in its August 1, 2012 order, the circuit court vacated its November 8, 2011 order, thereby allowing Parsons to proceed with his counterclaims of bad faith and brеach of contract against Farm Bureau. Subsequently, Farm Bureau filed a writ of prohibition with this court, arguing that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the November 8, 2011 order after ninety days from the entry оf the order. Parsons responded. We took the petition as a case and ordered the parties to brief the issues.
Farm Bureau, in support of its petition for writ of prohibition, argues that the circuit сourt was wholly without jurisdiction in granting Parsons‘s motion to
Parsons counters that Farm Bureau mistakenly argues that the cirсuit court abused its discretion and that the circuit court‘s ruling was simply a valid exercise of its discretion by either (1) continuing jurisdiction or (2) setting aside or vacating the order pursuant to
The Pulaski County Circuit Court also filed a brief, asserting that it did not abuse its discretion in granting Parsons‘s motion to dismiss the interpleader action. The court asserts that it acted within its jurisdiction when it vacated its November 8, 2011 order pursuant to
A writ of prоhibition is extraordinary relief that is appropriate only when the trial court is wholly without jurisdiction. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Cir. Ct. of Clark Cnty., 2013 Ark. 287, 428 S.W.3d 506. The purpose of the writ of prohibition is to prevent a court from exercising a power not authorizеd by law when there is no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. Parker v. Crow, 2010 Ark. 371, 368 S.W.3d 902. Prohibition is a proper remedy when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends on a legal, rather than a factual, question. Porocel Corp. v. Cir. Ct. of Saline Cnty., 2013 Ark. 172. We have repeatedly held that a writ of prohibition challenging an exercise of jurisdiction, even if erroneous and an abuse of discretion, is an improper usage of the writ. Savage v. Hawkins, 239 Ark. 658, 391 S.W.2d 18 (1965). However, a writ of prоhibition cannot be invoked to correct an order already entered. White v. Palo, 2011 Ark. 126, 380 S.W.3d 405. Each of the allegations in Farm Bureau‘s petition concerns orders already entered by the circuit court. Becаuse the circuit court has already acted, a writ of prohibition does not lie. Thompson v. McCain, 2013 Ark. 261, 428 S.W.3d 502.
On occasion, this court has treated a petition for writ of prohibition as a petition for writ of certiorari. Patsy Simmons Ltd. P‘ship v. Finch, 2010 Ark. 451, 370 S.W.3d 257. A writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief. Boyd v. Sharp Cnty. Cir. Ct., 368 Ark. 566, 247 S.W.3d 864 (2007). In detеrmining its application, we will not look beyond the face of the record to ascertain the actual merits of a controversy, or to review a circuit court‘s discretionary authority. Id. Two requirements must be satisfied in order for this court to grant a writ of certiorari. Id. First, a writ of certiorari lies only when (1) it is apparent on the face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, cleаr, and gross abuse of discretion, or (2) there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the rec
With these requirements in mind, we now consider Farm Bureau‘s writ of certiorari. In terms of subject-mаtter jurisdiction, the circuit court clearly had jurisdiction to determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties, namely insurance coverage and its policy limits. Nat‘l Sec. Fire Cas. v. Poskey, 309 Ark. 206, 828 S.W.2d 836 (1992). Further, Farm Bureau has the opportunity to raise the issues of jurisdiction pertaining to
Petition for writ of prohibition treated as a writ of certiorari and denied.