4 Ga. App. 399 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1908
The National Bank of Tifton, in a suit against T. M. Mangham, had summons of garnishment issued against the Southern Express Company. The return of' service of the summons of garnishment was as follows: “I have this day served the Southern Express Company with a summons of garnishment, based upon the within affidavit and bond, by handing same to T. M. Mangham, agent of said company, at Tifton, Tift Co., Ga. This August 1, 1907. J. O. Thrasher, City Court Bailiff.” On November 11, 1907, a default judgment was rendered against the Southern Express Company, garnishee, by the city court of Tifton.
It is insisted by the plaintiff in error that the service of the summons of garnishment was void, (1) because it was not served by an officer who had the authority to serve it, and, therefore, the service was a nullity; (2) because the return of service was not made in the manner required by law; the officer signed the return as court bailiff, and such officer had no authority to make such a return; and (3) because the return was insufficient to justify the judgment against the garnishee, for the reason that the person upon whom the service was made was not described as an agent in charge of the office or business of the garnishee corporation, in the county of the defendant or in the district where the cause was pending, at the time of service. We think the. court did not err in allowing the officer to make the amendment of the return of service by him of the summons of garnishment, so as to make the defective return conform to the facts. Civil Code, §5116; Jones v. Bibb Brick Co., 120 Ga. 321 (48 S. E. 25). It is immaterial to decide the question made as to the authority of the city-court bailiff to serve a summons of garnishment. Bailiffs of county
The plaintiff in error contends that after the return had been amended, service upon the garnishee should have been considered as having been made as of that date, and that therefore the garnishee should have had the time the statute allowed in which to answer the summons; in other words, that the judgment entered against it by default should have been set aside by the court as having been improvidently entered, when there had been in fact no legal service upon the garnishee. But it is apparent that service of the summons of garnishment had in fact been made upon the garnishee at the date of the original return, and that this return was defective only in the manner cured by the amendment; and, according to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. Bibb Brick Co., supra, the defective return, when property amended to conform to the facts, “related back so as to make the record complete and the judgment perfect.”
We therefore conclude, that the judgment of the court in allowing the amendment to be made to the return, in order that it