49 Ga. App. 177 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
Lead Opinion
On March 12, 1932, LeRoy McLain was em
“We wish to point out that the manufacture of cottonseed and grinding of meal is more or less of a ‘ dusty ’ business — dust is more or less prevalent at all times. All employees are well acquainted with this fact, and it is necessary several times each day for those at work in the plant to keep the eyes cleansed — in fact, if every time meal or a little dust got in the eye and the cost proportionate to this case, I doubt if the business could be carried on. It is our contention, and sincere belief, that we were really not liable in this case, at least no further than we have already gone, as the cause of his trouble happened elsewhere than at our plant, and his physical condition was at low ebb, both conditions being beyond our control. Asking for an especial ruling on the matter, we are, Tours very truly, The Southern Cotton Oil Company.”
On receipt of the above-mentioned papers, and on May 20, 1932, a letter from the Department of Industrial Delations, by Sharpe Jones, its secretary and treasurer, was addressed to the Southern Cotton Oil Company, which read as follows: “ Southern Cotton Oil Co., Valdosta, Georgia. Gentlemen: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter inclosing memorandum of agreement as to payment of compensation, supplementary return to work report, report of medical expense and final settlement receipt in the above case. In view of the description as to how this disability occurred
The matter remained in abeyance until March 14, 1933, when the Department of Industrial Relations received the following notice: " Department of Industrial Relations, Atlanta, Georgia. Gentlemen: Re LeRoy McLain (colored) vs. Southern Cotton Oil Co., Valdosta, Georgia. In March, 1932, LeRoy McLain, of 421 Mills street, Valdosta, Ga., lost his eye while working for the Southern Cotton Oil Company, Valdosta, Georgia, for which they have failed to make settlement. I will ask that you set this case for a hearing at your convenience. With kind regards, I am, Yours very truly, H. B. Edwards.” A hearing upon the matter was set for April 19, 1933. After evidence was finished at the hearing the defendant’s attorneys made a motion to dismiss the claim, upon the grounds, (1) that it appeared without dispute from the evidence that the injury'was received by the claimant on March 12, 1932, and that claim was not filed until March 15, 1933; therefore under § 25 of the act, requiring all claims to be filed with the Department of Industrial Relations within one year from the date of the accident, such claim was barred; (2) that it appeared from the evidence before the director that the claimant suffered no accident, but that the claimant suffered an occupational disease that did not naturally and unavoidably result from an accident. The director thereafter rendered his decision overruling both grounds of the motion and awarding compensation to the claimant in accordance with the act. This award was appealed to to the full board, which ren
We will consider first the first question raised by the motion, that is, whether the claim was barred under section 25 of the workmen’s compensation act. That section provides: “The right to compensation under this act shall be forever barred, unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident, and, if death results from the accident, claim therefor is filed with the commission within one year thereafter.” It appears that the injury or accident to the claimant occurred on March 12, 1932. The letter of H. B. Edwards requesting a hearing was not received by the commission until March 18, 1938. Therefore, if no other claim was filed with the commission in compliance with section 25 of the act, this court must hold the right of the claimant to compensation barred. The requirement of section 25 of the act that a claim must be filed within one year from the date of the accident is jurisdictional. Bussey v. Bishop, 169 Ga. 251 (150 S. E. 78, 67 A. L. R. 287); U. S. Casually Co. v. Smith, 162 Ga. 131 (133 S. E. 851). It is an essential element of a right to make a claim. “The workmen’s compensation act of this State creates a new right of action, one not existing at common law, of which the requirement that actions for the enforcement thereof shall be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year from the date of the accident is an essential ingredient; and the right ceases and terminates where the claim is not so filed.” Bussey v. Bishop, supra. The workmen’s compensation act is a remedial statute, and must be given a liberal construction. Van Treeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 157 Ga. 204 (121 S. E. 205); Pinkerton National Detective Agency v. Walker, 30 Ga. App. 91 (117 S. E. 281). Such liberal construction of the act can only be had where judicial interpretation is necessary (Austin Brothers Bridge Co. v. Whitmire, 31 Ga. App. 560, 121 S. E. 345), and the act should not be so liberally construed as to defeat the purposes and intents of the legislation. The Department of Industrial Relations is purely an administrative body, created solely for the purpose of administering the act as therein provided. “It possesses only such jurisdiction, powers and authority as are conferred upon it by the legis
It appears that on May 6, 1932, an agreement was entered into between the employer and the claimant, providing for the payment of five weeks’ compensation, which represented payment for temporary total disability. The department, first doubting the compensable nature of the claim, and ascertaining from the agreement and the doctor’s report that the claimant had lost the sight of his eye, and would therefore be entitled to compensation for the loss of his eye if entitled to compensation as recited in the agreement, and there being also enclosed a final settlement receipt reciting that the payment of $25 under the agreement was '“the final payment of compensation due me [claimant] under the Georgia workmen’s compensation law for all injuries received by me on or about the 12th day of March, 1932, while in the employment of the Southern Cotton Oil Company,” did not approve the settlement, awaiting to see if the employer would agree, under the claim, to payments for the loss of the use of his eye, in accordance with the provisions of the act. No further official action was taken by the department with reference to the matter.
If this agreement can be considered as taking the place of a formal claim on the part of the employee, we are of the opinion that the department retained jurisdiction over the matter and properly held that the claim was not barred. The act, by § 19, encourages settlements between the employer and employee of claims arising under the act, so long as the amount of compensation, the time, and the manner of payment are in accordance with the provisions of the act. It further provides for the filing of such agreements subject to its approval. Where such procedure is taken, the approval of the department acts as a judgment, the same as if a hearing had been had. U. S. Casualty Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363 (129 S. E. 880). The agreement itself, which was fur
In the administration of the workmen’s compensation act, technical nicety of pleading and procedure is not required. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Gill, 46 Ga. App. 746 (169 S. E. 245). No settlement is effective without the approval of the industrial department. Department of Industrial Relations v. Travelers Insurance Co., 177 Ga. 670 (170 S. E. 883). We think the case is sustained by the fact that the department did not judicially determine the rights of the claimant by an approval or rejection of the agreement and final receipt, but retained jurisdiction of the matter waiting further action by the parties. Sad they formally approved it, it would be reviewable only upon a change in condition. Section 45. See also U. S. Casually Co. v. Smith, supra. If they had judicially rejected it, we construe the law to be that the claimant would have had to file a claim for compensation for his injuries before the expiration of a year from the date of the accident. Section 4381 of the Civil Code, prescribing that where a suit is dismissed a renewal may be had within six months, has no application under the workmen’s compensation act. See, in this connection, Chamlee Lumber Co. v. Crichton, 136 Ga. 391 (71 S. E. 673); Parmelee v. Savannah, Florida and Western Ry., 78 Ga. 239 (2 S. E. 686); Porter v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 46 Ga. App. 86 (166 S. E. 675). The department properly held that the claim was not barred.
The next contention of the employer, the defendant, is that the employee, the claimant, did not suffer an accident within the meaning of the act, but suffered an occupational disease, and that therefore he was not entitled to compensation. The evidence shows that the claimant was employed by the defendant as a cooker of cottonseed in its plant. It appears that from the nature and
Clearly the claimant suffered an accident within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation act. It is true that he intentionally rubbed his eye in an effort to extract the meal, but certainly he did not intend that it should scratch his eye. It was an unexpected result from an intentional act, which our courts have held to be an accident within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation act. The testimony of Dr. Thompson shows clearly that the germ that caused the disease infests the head and would only attack the eye where there was an abrasion or scratch on it. It was an injury received while in the course of the employment; it was unexpected and was the unusual effect of a known cause, which was undesigned by the workmen. The disease was clearly shown to have flown naturally and unavoidably from the injury. We are therefore of the opinion that the award is correct. See Brown v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., 49 Ga. App. 99 (174 S. E. 359), and cit.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. It clearly appears from the record
