Appellee injured his back on June 19, 1981, when he caught a 1,500 pound bale of copper wire that slipped as he and his co-workers attempted to load it onto a tractor trailer. He then notified his supervisor of the injury and inquired about a company doctor. The supervisor respondеd that there was no company doctor and that if appellee wanted a doctor, he should see his personal physician. Appеllee consulted and was treated by his family chiropractor, but as time progressed his injury became more painful. Approximately one month аfter the accident, appellee notified his employer, appellant Southeastern Aluminum Recycling, Inc. (“Southeastern”), that his physician rеcommended he be hospitalized. Southeastern then terminated appellee, but for reasons unrelated to his disability. Two weeks later, Southеastern completed a Form WC 1 (Employer’s First Report of Injury) and sent it to the company’s insurer, appellant Morrison Assurance Company, Inc. (“Morrison”). On September 1, 1981, appellants paid appellee $836, without an award, which represented seven weeks of workers’ compensation income benefits at $110 per week and $66 in penalities for the first four benefit weeks pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-221 (e). On September 9, 1981, appellants filed Form WC 3 (Notice to Controvert Payment of Compensation).
After a hearing held pursuant to the decision by the Supreme Court in this case (
1. The board held that appellants failed to file a timely notice to controvert under OCGA § 34-9-221 (d). Appellants argue that since they paid compensation to appеllee without an award, they were entitled to controvert the claim under OCGA § 34-9-221 (h) rather than § 34-9-221 (d). Subsection (d) provides: “If the employer controverts the right tо compensation, it shall file with the board, on or before the twenty-first day after knowledge of the alleged injury or death, a notice in accоrdance with the form prescribed by the board, stating that the right of compensation is controverted and stating the name of the claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the alleged injury or death, and the ground upon which the right to compensation is con
The legislature apparently recognized that two distinct situations could occur when an injured employee sеeks workers’ compensation benefits. Subsection (d) covers the situation in which the employer initially determines it has grounds to contest payment of compensation, while subsection (h) addresses situations in which the employer has begun paying compensation, but subsequently determines that grounds exist for contesting payment.
The Workers’ Compensation Act was designed to provide immediate financial assistance to injured employees and to furnish a speedy, inexpensive and final settlement of their claims.
Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
We have previously ruled that failure to file the notice to controvеrt does not preclude employers and insurers from defending a claim
(Raines & Milam v. Milam,
In this case, appellants claim that their lump sum payment constituted all of the benefits due appellee, along with the 15% penalty imposed by § 34-9-221 (e). However, the board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that the appellee was underpaid and the conclusion that there had been no valid filing of а notice to controvert. OCGA § 34-9-221 (e) states: “If
any
income benefits payable without an award are not paid within 14 days after becoming due, there shall bе added to the
accrued
income benefits an amount equal to 15 percent thereof, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, the
accrued
incomе benefits unless notice is filed under subsection (d) of this Code section or unless this nonpayment is excused by the board after a showing by the employer that оwing to conditions beyond control of the employer the income benefits could not be paid within the period
The Workers’ Compensation Aсt must be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the claimant.
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Hargis,
2. Appellants also claim that error was committed when the board approved the exрress invocation of Board Rule 705 (d), which was declared invalid in
Holt,
supra. The application of a presumption of compensability was imprоper as a matter of law, requiring that the the case be reconsidered by the ALJ. We cannot accept appellants’ suggestion that we affirm the award in spite of the error. “ [Judgments based on erroneous theories of law are generally reversed in the appellate cоurts. [Cits.] Though there is substantial evidence in the record which would have supported [the judgment, it] . . . must be reversed, and this issue considered under a correct thеory of law because we cannot say what the trial judge would have concluded if he had been relying on the correct theory. [Cit.]”
Meyers v. Glover,
3. The attornеy fee award to appellee is also assigned as error. We find that the award was properly made, in accordance with OCGA § 34-9-108 (b) (2), since аppellants did not comply with OCGA § 34-9-221 (b) and (e) and had no reasonable grounds for their noncompliance.
4. The final contested issue involves appellee’s medical expenses, which appellants argue were unauthorized. We disagree. The record shows that Southeastern failed tо maintain the “panel of physicians” as required by OCGA § 34-9-201 (b), and appellee was instructed to consult a doctor of his own choosing. Therefore, appellants were properly held liable for the reasonable medical expenses incurred during appellee’s compensable injury. OCGA § 34-9-201 (e).
Judgment reversed and case remanded.