The issue presented in this appeal is whether the District's resolution to apply to the Commission for a dissolution may be challenged through the voter referendum process. We conclude the District's resolution is not subject to referendum because, among other reasons, the Reorganization Act prescribes the exclusive mеthod for dissolving, and/or protesting the proposed dissolution of, a fire protection district ( Health & Saf. Code, § 13812 ; Gov. Code, §§ 56100, 56021 ) and the resolution was administrative in nature under the Reorganization Act. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, and the judgment is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
The District was formed pursuant to the Fire Protection District Law of 1987 (Fire District Law; Health & Saf. Code, § 13800 et seq. ), to provide fire protection and emergency medical services to the unincorporated communities of Julian and Lake Cuyamaca. Plaintiffs consist of volunteer firefighters, voters, and/or residents of Julian.
On April 10, 2018, the board of directors of the District passed a "resolution of aрplication" to dissolve the District (Resolution). The Resolution, which recites that it is made "pursuant to the ... Reorganization Act,"
In May 2018, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court to compel the District to either rescind the Resolution or set the matter for election. In June 2018, following a hearing, the court denied plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate. The court decided that the District's Resolution was "not subject to referendum" in light of the state's system of regulation over district dissolutions. Judgment was entered accordingly, and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Reorganization Act
A. Background and Legislative Intent
In the Reorganization Act, "the Legislature enacted a broad statutory scheme covering changes of organization of districts as well as cities." ( Las Tunas Beach Geologic Hazard Abatement Dist. v. Superior Court (1995)
The "Legislature has occupied the field with respect to changes of organizations of districts, thereby preempting local law[.]" ( Las Tunas Beach, supra ,
Under the Reorganization Act, a local agency formation commission (LAFCO) exists within each county. ( Gov. Code, §§ 56027, 56325.) It is LAFCO's duty to "review and approve with or without amendment, wholly, partially, or conditionally, or disapprove proposals for changes оf organization or reorganization ...." ( Gov. Code, § 56375, subd. (a)(1) ; see Fallbrook Sanitary Dist. v. San Diego Local Agency FormationCom. (1989)
Proceedings before LAFCO "for a change of organization or a rеorganization may be initiated by petition or by resolution of application ...." ( Gov. Code, § 56650.) A resolution of application is a resolution adopted by the legislative body of an affected local agency proposing a change of organization. ( Gov. Code, § 56654.)
After approving a propоsed change of organization, LAFCO conducts further proceedings on the proposal, such as holding a noticed hearing. ( Gov. Code, § 57000 et seq. ) At the hearing, LAFCO receives any protests, objections, or evidence on the proposal. ( Gov. Code, § 57050, subd. (b).)
B. Reconciling the Reorganization Act with Other Statutory Schemes That Address Particular Types of Districts
The Reorganization Act "is not the sole statutory scheme pertaining to district formation. It shares the field with other such statutory schemes applicable to particular types of districts." ( Las Tunas Beach, supra ,
II. The Fire District Law Mandates Compliance with the Reorganization Act for any Change of Organization, Including Dissolutions
The Fire District Law authorizes the formation of fire protection districts to
However, the Fire District Law does not contain any specific provisions covering dissolutions of fire protection districts, except to mandate compliance with the Reorganization Act.
III. The Right of Referendum
The California Constitution, article 2, section 9, subdivision (a) provides: "The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual сurrent expenses of the State." Article 2, section 11, subdivision (a) of the Constitution provides: "Initiative and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each city or county under procedures that the Legislature shall provide."
"It is the 'duty of the courts to jealously guard' the people's rights of initiative and referendum. [Citation.] But a fundamental principle of referendum law is that a referendum may be used to review only legislative acts and not executive or administrative acts of a local government. [Citations.] 'Legislative acts ... which establish general policies and objectives, and the ways and means of accomplishing them, are subject to the referendum process.' [Citation.]" ( Worthington v. City Council of Rohnert Park (2005)
Generally, an act is legislative in nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; it is administrative in nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it. ( Worthington, supra , 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1140-1141,
"When implementing a plan adopted by a superior power, a city acts in an administrative capacity. 'Acts of a local governing body which, in a purely local context, would otherwise be legislative and subject to referendum may, however, become administrative "in a situation in which the state's system of regulation over a matter of statewide concern is so pervasive as to convert the local legislative body into an administrative agent of the state." ' ( Yost v. Thomas (1984)
Based on the foregoing principles, we conclude the District's "resolution of application" ( Gov. Code, § 56650 ), which proposed a plan of dissolution for the Commission to consider, is not subject to the referendum process.
As recognized many years ago in Friends of Mount Diablo, supra , 72 Cal.App.3d at pages 1010-1011,
Moreover, the Reorganization Act contains detailed provisions regarding the method of protesting a proposed dissolution of a district and when elections are required. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 57051, 57077.1, 57078.) "Where the Legislature has enacted a comprehensive regulatory system with exprеss provisions for elections under limited conditions we may infer a negation of election under all other circumstances." ( Ferrini, supra ,
Plaintiffs argue that the District's "initial" decision to apply to the Commission for dissolution is distinct from the process of applying to the Commission for dissolution and that the initial decision should be subject to referendum. We are not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument. A "resolution of application," like the one рassed here by the District, is one of two ways to initiate a proceeding before LAFCO ( Gov. Code, § 56650 ) and is included with the application filed with LAFCO ( Gov. Code, § 56652, subd. (a) ). A resolution of application is thus part of LAFCO's process. ( Gov. Code, § 56654.) Even if it is theoretically possible to separate the District's "initial decision" to apрly to the Commission from the subsequent application, subjecting the "initial decision" to referendum creates a dueling process that manifestly interferes with the Commission's ability to act. ( Friends of Mount Diablo, supra ,
Plaintiffs also assert that "all doubts" as to whether the District exercised a legislative act in passing the Resolution must be resolved in favor of the referendum process. However, we have no doubt as to the Legislature's intention. Fire protection districts are purely creatures of statute, from which they derive all of their rights and powers. ( Las Tunas Beach, supra ,
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
Notes
See Elections Code section 9141 et seq.
In July 2018, plaintiffs also filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court to have the Resolution placed on the November 2018 general еlection ballot and to stay any further efforts to dissolve the District. Plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate was denied.
While the appeal was pending, plaintiffs notified this court that they and the District had agreed to a tentative settlement that might obviate the need for our decision. None of the parties contend this cаse is moot, i.e., that no practical relief may be provided by a decision. Moreover, even when a case is technically moot, the court has inherent power to decide it where the issue presented is important and of continuing interest. (San Diego Housing Com. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016)
