Southard v. . BennerSouthard v. . Benner
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Allen
A creditor at large cannot assail an assignment or other transfer of property by the debtor as fraudulent against creditors, but must first establish his debt by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and either acquire a lien upon the specific property or be in a situation to perfect a lien thereon, and subject it to the payment of his judgment upon the removal of the obstacle presented by the fraudulent assignment or transfer.
Every assignment or conveyance of property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, is void as against creditors, not only at common law but by statute, and every conveyance or transfer of chattels not followed by an actual and continued change of possession is presumed to be fraudulent as against creditors, and such want of change of possession is conclusive evidence of fraud, unless it be shown that the same was not made with intent to defraud. The term “ creditors,” as used in the statute, includes all persons who are creditors of the vendor or assignor at any time whilst the goods remain in his possession or under his control. (2 R. S., 136, §§ 5, 6.) A creditor by simple contract is within the protection of the statute as much as a creditor by judgment, but until he has a judgment and a lien, or a right to
By the statutes of this State (Laws of 1858, ch. 314) any executor, administrator, assignee, or other trustee of an estate, or the property and effects of an individual, may, for the benefit of creditors or others interested in the estate or property so held in trust, disaffirm and treat as void all transfers in fraud of the rights of any creditor, or others interested, and maintain all necessary actions for that purpose. This act, conferring special authority for the benefit of creditors, dispenses with the necessity of any special or other lien in behalf of individual creditors. The act is not for the inforcement of specific liens for the benefit of individual creditors. No statute was necessary for that purpose, as each creditor having such lien could vindicate his rights under the law as before administered. This act gave a new remedy in favor of creditors at large, by giving to an assignee or trustee for their benefit a statutory right to property conveyed in fraud of creditors, and this statutory right took the place of the specific lien of individual creditors required by law as a condition of their right to contest the validity of the transfers. The bankrupt law of the United States, in express terms, vests in the assignee all property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors, and thus gives him a title to all property so conveyed, and supersedes the necessity of a judgment and execution lien in favor of any or all the individual creditors. (Bankrupt act, §14; R S. of U. S., § 5046.) The policy of the bankrupt law is to secure an equal distribution of all the property of the bankrupt among his creditors ; and this object would be defeated if a fraudulent assignor could set the fraudulent assignee at
The same principle was asserted by Chief Justice Chase in the Circuit Court of Virginia in Winne’s Case (4 Bank Reg., 23), and by Judge Curtiss in Carr v. Holton (1 Curtiss R., 230). The latter judge says: “ A fraudulent conveyance is no effectual conveyance as against the interest to be defrauded. This interest the assignee represents, so far as respects all creditors who prove their claims.”
In
Collin’s Case
(12 Blatch., 548), fraud was not alleged. The validity of the chattel mortgage was contested upon the sole ground that it had not been filed as required by law, and Judge Hunt held that within the terms of the act none but creditors who had by judgment and execution obtained a specific lien on the thing mortgaged, or subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in good faith, could attack the mortgage for the reason alleged, and that the assignee was not within the benefits Of the statute. The reasoning of the learned‘judge, it must be conceded, would apply to a mortgage alleged to be fraudulent in fact, but in following it as an authority we think the principle should not be extended so as to prove a shield to actual fraud. .The non-compliance with a statute, merely imposing a new condition to the validity of chattel mortgages for the protection of the particular classes .mentioned, and not involving the question of fraud
The judge presiding at the trial of this action adopted the principle adjudged in Edgell v. Hart, and applied it to an agreement proved by evidence aliunde the mortgage in accordance with the views of the judges named. We are of the opinion that the correct rule was applied, and that there was no error of which the defendants can complain in the submission of the case to the jury. There was no justification under the $25,000 mortgage, the defendants claiming that if not fully paid it was not a valid lien as against them. Their defense was under the $30,000 mortgage, and the jury, therefore, were properly told that the former mortgage had nothing to do with the case. The plaintiff made no claim under it, and the defendants did not justify under it. It was properly withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.
The judgment must be affirmed.
All concur, except Andrews, J., absent.
Judgment affirmed.