68 W. Va. 362 | W. Va. | 1910
Lead Opinion
The South Penn Oil Company, in 1904, leased land for oil and gas producing purposes from Sarah A. Martin and husband. In the lease the land is described as follows: “All that certain tract of land situate in Clay District, Harrison County and State of W. Ya., on the waters of Coons Run bounded substantially as follows:
On the north by lands of M. A. Whiteman;
On the east by lands of Jno. S. Whiteman & others;
On the south by lands of Steven Yineent & Do; '
On the west by lands of Do Do & Do
Containing Thirty Three (33) acres, more or less, and being the same land conveyed to the first parties by Jacob B- White-man by deed, bearing the date of 28th day of October; 1895. recorded in Deed Book 96 page 219, reserving, however, therefrom 300 feet around the buildings on which no well shall be drilled by either party, except by mutual consent.”
The deed from Whiteman, to which this description refers, conveyed by specific metes and bounds a tract of 30f acres. Besides that tract, Sarah A. Martin owned some small lots ■which had been conveyed to her by other deeds. These l'ots were contiguous to the tract of 3 Of acres. They lay so as to be in one corner of the whole tract when takfen together. When the lease was made, these lots were occupied by the lessors as a part of a farm composed of the several parcels. The dwelling' house and barn were on these small lots which had been conveyed by deeds other than the one referred to in the lease. The ■whole body of land including the lots, containing 31 acres and 150 square poles, could be viewed as bounded “on the south by
Rentals were regularly paid on the lease pursuant to its terms. It remains in full force. In 1909, Sarah A. Martin and husband made an oil and gas lease to Knox and others covering the small lots. Thereupon the South Penn Oil Company brought this suit to remove the later lease as a cloud on the title under its lease, and to enjoin threatened interference, by oil and gas development on the Jots, with the possession which that company alleged it had of the whole body of land for oil and gas producing purposes. On a final hearing of the cause, the preliminary injunction theretofore awarded was wholly dissolved and the bill dismissed. Some interlocutory proceedings were had, but our view of the ease makes it unnecessary to consider them. The appeal presents but one pertinent question: Were the small lots embraced in the land described in the first lease ?
It is submitted that an intention is shown to include in the South Penn lease the small lots. If this is true it must appear from an interpretation of the lease itself. If the terms of the lease are conflicting or ambiguous, we may be aided -in giving construction by the testimony showing the situation and surroundings of the parties at the time the lease was executed. But we cannot look to the testimony of oral declarations of the parties made prior to the execution of the lease. The paper itself must be taken as embodying the- final agreement of the parties. And we must be guided by established rules of construction. We dare not guess or conjecture. “The great object of construction is to collect from the terms or language of the instrument, the manner and extent to which the parties intended to be bound. To facilitate this, the law has devised certain rules, 'which are not merely conventional, but are the canons
The lease is clear in its language. The description of the land to be covered by the lease is plain. That part of the description which locates the land by reference to adjoining-owners, by its own terms, does not purport to be specific. It only purports to bound the land “substantially,” not certainly. “Substantially,” as used here, can mean no more than about, or in the main. It does not mean wholly, or completely. Then, the very terms used in naming the adjoining owners show that completeness and particularity was not intended by that part of the description. The use of the word “others” is not complete, certain, or definite. It does not name the “others.” Nor does such description state the exact courses or distances of the lines which adjoin other lands. It merely puts the land down by other owners. It merely says on what side of some other undescribed land the tract may be found. It does not say from what point, how far, or in what direction a line runs with such other land. Altogether, that part of the description is no more than a general one — a description stating the location of the land, but not particularly describing it. But that which follows is certain and particular. It expressly points to .a deed, its date, its place of recordation, and says that the land to be covered by the lease is the same land which was conveyed by that deed. It makes the description in the deed a particular description of the land intended to be leased. The deed becomes a part of the lease for the purpose of describing the land. The description in the deed has the same effect as if actually incorporated in the lease. Martindale on Conveyancing, section 108. Look
As a general rule, a particular description prevails over a general description and limits the application of the latter. Tiedeman on Eeal Property, section 82. This rule applies here. •The more general description of the land mentioned in the lease is limited by the particular description which follows it. The general location of the land by references to adjoining land owners is limited and defined by the calls given in the deed. First, the land is generally pointed out; then, it is particularly pointed out as the identical land which was conveyed by the deed mentioned. The latter must prevail because it affords a more particular description, unless there is something else in the lease which plainly shows an intention contrary to that which the use of this particular description discloses. Even if there were irreconcilable repugnance between the parts of the description,, the calls for adjoiners must yield to the calls for monuments in the deed to which the lease makes reference. Matheny v. Allen, 63 W. Va. 443.
We have said that the exact lines of the tract cannot be known from the general description by adjoiners. Let us illustrate by referring to the southern boundary. The words used are: “On the south by lands of Steven Vincent and others.” What others ? From what point, how far, and in what direction with them? It does not say. If we accept this description by adjoiners as referring only to the 30f acre tract, the small lots aro to the south and west, and are owned by others than Steven Vincent, namely, the lessors. Or, if we accept it' as referring to the entire body of land, Vincent and others are on the south and' west. So we see this general description is not explicit. Using it, we may or may not take in the small lots. That description does not state whether there is one or more lines on the south, nor does it define the extent and direction of any southern boundary line. And the same fact is true as to the western boundary. As to it the description reads: “On'the west by lands of Steven Vincent and others.” It would seem that this
Effect must be given to the clause of the description which refers to the recorded deed, unless other parts of the lease are, so specific, clear, and certain as to show that clause to be erroneous. It must be shown to be a false demonstration before it can be disregarded. The words of the clause must be taken to mean what they say, unless the remaining parts of the writing-are so plainly and certainly to the contrary as to exclude safely that which those words mean. But as we have shown, the remaining description, when the clause referring to the deed is ignored, is not explicit and. sure. It may include or exclude the small lots. So the clause is of particular use. It harmonizes with one meaning of the more general description. It goes with the more general description acceptably. It cannot be thrown out as erroneous, because the other does not so brand it. It is indeed of necessary use to make certain that which the other left uncertain.
In the interpretation of instruments, it is a familiar principle that force and effect must be given, if possible, to every word employed. Uhl v. Railroad Co., supra. How can we, in the face of this rule, annihilate the words which give a particular and sure description by reference to the deed? Yet, the appellant would have us wholly discard these 'words as false and erroneous. Now, these words must be given force and effect, if that can be done. Is it possible to do so? We have shown that they do not necessarily conflict with the other description
It is argued that the lease calls for 33 acres, and that, therefore, the 30f acre tract alone could not have been intended. But, after using the words “containing 33 acres, more or less”, the lease expressly and particularly, by making the deed a part of itself, says that the tract contains only 3 Of acres. The lease, thus, immediately defines its general statement by a more precise one that states how much less than 33 acres the tract contains — 1 by a statement that the area is 3 Of acres, specifying exact metes and bounds 'which prove it. Which of the statements is the more reliable and certain ? Is it not the latter one ? Must not the particular here again outweigh the general? By the reference to the deed, the acreage is capable of being ascertained by monuments and boundaries. The land may be measured by the particular calls of the deed. Quantity is never allowed to control defined calls by monuments, courses, and distances. It is the least certain and material part of description. It must yield to boundaries when they are as plainly given as in the present case by reference to a deed which contains them, in detail. All other elements of description must lose their superior value through ambiguities and uncertainties before resort can be had to quantity. It. is needless to cite authority for these well known principles. The superior elements of description in this lease are not ambiguous and uncertain, and the general reference to the quantity cannot be a controlling factor.
But it is insisted that the' lease mentions i£buildings” and “one dwelling house on said landand that, since there are no buildings on the Whiteman tract, the lease means to include the lots .on which the buildings are situated. The lease does not directly assert that buildings are actually on the land leased..
There is no convincing evidence in the case that the lessors gave a contemporaneous or practical construction of the lease'
The decree is a proper one in the premises. It will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dÍSS61llÍng) :
As, in my opinion, the’lease has been so construed by my associates as to partially defeat the evident purposes of the parties thereto, without necessity therefor, found in the principles applicable to the interpretation and construction of deeds and contracts, I am compelled to dissent from the decision.
I find no fault with the legal proposition, giving control to a particular description over a general one, nor with the rule which denies controlling effect to a specification of quantity over calls for monuments, courses and' distances. But certain other propositions are stated in the opinion of the majority which do not seem to be sustained by the authorities. One of these, namely, that a reference in one deed to another always incorporates it therein for purposes of description, and makes it controlling, seems to have been made the decisive test. Such a reference is not always made for descriptive purposes, and is not always controlling in its effect, when it has been made for that purpose. It is only one element to be considered among others and may yield under the rule, requiring effect to be given to the instrument according to the intent of the parties as gathered from all of its parts.
■ The reference to the deed in this lease is preceded by a clause, inserted for the express purpose of describing the land. The lease does not say this reference is for the purpose of a more particular description of the premises or for any description at all. For is it coupled with any expression of intent that
Taking that portion of the deed which has been expressly made descriptive and reading it in the light of the evident purpose of the parties, a lease of the lessor’s lands for oil and gas operations, giving to the lessor the exclusive right to operate thereon for such purposes, references found in other portions thereof to the condition of the property at the time, and specification of the quantity of land, every doubt as to the general intent to include the lots on which the buildings stood, logically and necessarily disappears. Gas and oil wells drilled on these lots in the corner of the farm would necessarily drain the oil and gas from portions of the land, admittedly covered by the lease. The lessee could never have intended any such result, nor could we reasonably impute to the lessor secret intent thus to withhold a part of what there was plain intent on the part of the lessee to obtain. There are two references in the lease to buildings. One clause provides that no well should be drilled within 300 feet of the buildings. The other secures to the lessor free gas for light and heat in “one dwelling house on said land from any gas well thereon." All the buildings owned by the lessor, except a pig sty, were on the lots. To say this reservation 'was made for the benefit or protection of a pig pen would be ridiculous. It was made for the protection of buildings, such as barns and dwelling houses, substantial structures. All of
The purpose of description is to afford means of identification of the subject of the grant with a reasonable degree of certainty. I know of no rule that demands such a description as will preclude every possibility of either inclusion or exclusion. What passes by a grant is a question of intent, to be derived from the manifest purposes of the instrument and the descriptive terms. There is no rule requiring accuracy of description to the limit of possibility, or designation of every, possible element thereof. It suffices to describe the land substantially, and I perceive no reason or. force in the view that the word "substantially” shall be taken to mean that the description in which it is used shall be regarded as a general and not a particular
Admitting that the main functions of the two clauses, relating to buildings, were not descriptive, and that the minds of the parties were not directed particularly to the matter of description, when they were inserted, I think it nevertheless remains that, under the general principle I have stated, these clauses must be regarded, in so far as they relate to the condition of the property, as defining its condition at that time, and thus indicating what the terms of the demise and the description mean. The form in which the parties expressed themselves in these clauses assumes the existence of buildings then on the land. Why was that form adopted? The logical answer is, because they asserted the then condition of the property. It had buildings on it. We may reasonably and logically assume that, if these clauses were intended to relate to buildings thereafter to be erected, a different form or mode of expression would have been adopted, indicating the fact; for men seldom speak of things yet to be, as if they were existent.
It is admitted that the description by adjacent lands is capable of a construction that will place the lots at the southwest corner within the lease. As that description will bear such construction, and other portions of the lease, by their references, show assumptions in harmony therewith, and such construction is necessaty to prevent results, absurd and variant from the general purposes of the parties, disclosed by the instrument itself, read in the light of the actual state of the property, both the legal necessity and propriety of adopting it are plainly manifest.
Assuming that the particular description, unaided by anything else disclosed by the lease, signifying intent and purpose, respecting the subject matter thereof, would be susceptible of two constructions and therefore ambiguous, as to the western and southern boundaries, this ambiguity is removed by the
Moreover, the evidence discloses conduct on the part of the lessor in harmony with the interpretation I give the lease. She