25 Fla. 40 | Fla. | 1889
This cause was tried at the fall term, Circuit Court, 1885.
The jury awarded the plaintiff $5,000 damages, motion for new trial made and overruled, and the case is before
The first error assigned is that the court erred in overruling the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s declara" tion.
The declaration alleges that on the 25th day of April, 1885, the plaintiff was received by the defendants to be carried as a passenger on their cars from Sanford to Orlando, Orange county, Florida * * ; that the defendants did not and would not carry the plaintiff as such passenger as aforesaid, but, on the contrary, without reasonable and lawful excuse therefor, then and there, by their agent and servant, the conductor, and the train hands of their said train, by force and arms ejected plaintiff therefrom, and left him and proceeded on their said journey; wherefore the plaintiff was injured in his person and feelings, and was compelled to travel afoot about four miles back to said Sanford, was prevented from accomplishing his purpose to go to Orlando, and was otherwise greatly damaged. Plaintiff’ claimed $20,000 damages. Second count: Plaintiff claimed from the defendants the further sum of $20,000 for damages for that, whereas, heretofore, to-wit: The 25 th of April, 1885, the plaintiff was a passenger on the railway passenger car of the defendants, and was, with force and arms, without just, reasonable or lawful excuse therefor , ejected from the said car and forcibly prevented from returning to the same.
The declaration was demurred to. First. That it is bad in substance, in that it does not allege that the plaintiff, at the time it is therein alleged he was put off the defendant’s cars, was complying with all the reasonable rules of said defendant. Second. That said declaration does not allege that plaintiff was not violating, or about to vio
There was no error in overruling the demurrer to plaintiff’s declaration. Gfould’s Pleading, 164, sec. 17 ; 1 Chitty on Pleading, 390.
The circuit judge gave the jury a number of charges, or paragraphs of one charge, all of which, except the last, were-excepted to by defendant.
Inter alia, the judge charged the jury that “ Railroad companies, as carriers of persons, are not bound to receive-for carriage, or to carry, persons whose purpose whilst traveling on the cars is to interfere or injure the legitimate' business and lawful profits of the company, nor persons-who are of known and- violently bad character, or persons-offensively gross and immoral in their conduct, habits and behavior, or so intoxicated as to be offensive, nor such as-will not conform with the reasonable rules and regulations'of the company in respect, to the carriage of passengers, they being informed thereof or otherwise having knowledge of’ the same, nor such as refuse to pay their fare, or to procure-tickets before entering the train, such objectionable person, for the objections aforesaid, may not only be refused admission into the cars of the company if their objectionable conduct, purpose, character or intention be known previous to> such admission, but having been received thereon, may be-expelled therefrom on rendering themselves obnoxious to> any of such objections, the officers in charge using no more-force or offensiveness than becomes necessary to effect, such expulsion * * *
“ A railroad corporation has the right to enter into an agreement with other lines of travel for the purpose of en
"Should you find from the evidence that it was a bona Jide agreement, and not entered into for the purpose of an oppressive monopoly, and that the rules and regulations made to enforce same are reasonable, and the plaintiff well iknew such to be the rules and regulations at the time of his ejection from the train, and that he was knowingly and 'wilfully violating the same, or that the conductor had from the facts that occurred to him at the time of the plaintiff's •ejection, good reason to apprehend that the plaintiff would violate one of such reasonable rules and regulations, you -must find for the defendant.
“ If, on the other hand, after- viewing all the evidence, you believe that rules and regulations-were not reasonable, .-.and that the plaintiff did not knowingly violate any rea-sonable rule or regulation, and that he paid his fare and went upon said train as a passenger and properly demeaned himself and presented his ticket to the conductor, and was .-ejected by the conductor, and not allowed to go on the train to the destination his ticket called for, you must find -for the plaintiff at such sum as you may,from the evidence, .-find him entitled to.”
It will be seen that.the Judge, in this part of his charge,
In the case of Ill. C. R. R. Co., & Cole vs. Whittemore, supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois say : “The Circuit Court left it to the jury to say whether the rule was reasonable. This was error. It was proper to admit testimony, as was done, but either with or without this testimony,•it was for the court to say whether the regulation was rea>sonable, and therefore obligatory upon the passengers. The necessity of holding this to be a question of law, and therefore within the province of the court to settle, is apparent from the consideration that it is only by so holding that fixed and permanent regulations can be established,. If this question is to be left to the juries, one rule would-be applied by them to-day, and another to-morrow. In one-trial a railway would be held liable, and in another, presenting the same questions, not liable. Neither the companies nor passengers would know their rights or their obligations. A fixed system for the control of the vast interests connected with railways would be impossible., while such a system is essential equally to the road and t© the public.”
Webster defines a rule to be: “ That which is prescribed or laid down as a guide to conduct; that which is settled -by authority or custom; a regulation; a prescription ; a minor law; a uniform course of things.”
It is the duty of courts to pass upon and construe the laws of the land, and the reasonable rules and regulations established by a railroad being laws — minor laws — there is no good reason why the courts should not pass upon them and pronounce them reasonable and binding, or unreasonable and not binding, as the case may be.
The question as to whether the alleged agreement between the defendant and the DeBarry-Bajm merchants’ line and the People’s line was a “bona fide agreement, and not entered into for the purpose of an oppressive monopoly ” is a mixed question, of law and fact, and was properly left to the jury to decide.
And if the alleged agreement was legal, the reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by the railroad company to enforce the stipulations of such agreement were also legal and binding, but if the agreement itself was not legal it follows, of course, that the rules and regulations prescribed for the enforcement of the stipulations of the alleged agreement were also illegal and not binding. The rule prescribed by the railroad company inhibiting the wearing on their cars, the uniform caps and badges of the officers and employees of the Independent Line of Steamers, was not a reasonable rule, and hence not binding upon the persons wearing them, and if the company expelled
“ The passenger should first be informed of the occasion and the necessity for leaving and the train be brought to a standstill, at any usual stopping place, or near any dwelling house, as the conductor shall elect * This part of the charge is evidently based upon sect. 41, chap. 1987, Laws of Florida, but the section referred to applies solely to the expulsion of passengers from railway trains for nonpayment of fare. It is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff was not expelled for not paying his fare. Under this charge of the court the jury were compelled to find for the plaintiff'. The plaintiff may have been guilty of the most immoral and indecent conduct; he may have been so intoxicated that he was offensive to other passengers, or his conduct may have been so violent as to endanger the lives of passengers and employees of the road, and yet under the charge, the company bad no authority to expel him at any point other than a usual stopping place, or near a dwelling house. We do not understand this to be the law. The statute only requires passengers who refuse to pay their fare to be put off trains at a usual stopping place or near some dwelling house, and is .silent as to what points passengers for violating other rules of railroad companies may be ejected. In Toledo, Wabash and Western Railway Co. vs. Wright, 84 Am. Repts., 277, it is held that “ a statute providing that if any railway passenger shall refuse to pay his fare, he may be ejected at any usual stopping place, does not prohibit his ejection at any other safe point.” And it is held by the Supreme
The same rule prevails in this State. A railroad company, in ejecting a passenger for non-payment of fare, must do so at a usual stopping place or near some dewelling house. This is the only restriction imposed by statute as to the expulsion of passengers, it applies only to passengers who have not paid their fare. Passengers for other violations of the reasonable rules of railroad companies, may be ejected at any convenient safe point that may be selected by the officer in charge, no more force being used than is necessary.
Thére are many other objections urged against the charge of the court, but after carefully examining and considering the same, it is, in our judgment, unobjectionable, except as before stated.
The defendants requested the court to give numerous charges to the jury, some were given and others refused,
These charges, except the 9th, were properly refused.
The 9th charge requested by the defendants was as follows : “ That the reasonableness of a rule or regulation prescribed by a railroad company is for the court to determine, and not for the jury.” This charge should have been given, and the court erred in not doing so.
The grounds in motion for new trial are: That the verdict was contrary to law ; contrary to the evidence and the weight of evidence; contrary to the charge of the court; and that the damages awarded the plaintiff by the jury were excessive.
Now, as the case, for the errors mentioned, will have to be reversed and a new trial had, we do not desire or intend to express any opinion upon the evidence, except as to the amount of damages.
The evidence sent up in the record conduces to show that the appellee was ejected from the cars of the defendants April 25th, 1885 ; that prior to said expulsion the appellants had entered into a contract or agreement with the DeBary-Baya Merchants’ Line and the People’s Line of Steamers, plying between Jacksonville and Sanford, by which agreement the steamers of said lines were to await the arrival of the trains on the South Florida Road, and that the.trains were to await the arrival of the steamers of said lines; that the steamers were to procure freight and passengers for the road, and that the road was to do the same for the steamers of said lines; that there was an on-position line of steamers running on the St. Johns river, between Jacksonville and Sanford, known as the “ Independent Linethat the competition between the railroad
There was also evidence tending to show that the appellee went on the train of the defendants expecting and hoping that he might be expelled therfrom for the purpose of building a ease of damages against the company.
This is only the substance of the evidence, but we think it sufficient to give a clear understanding of the case.
And now the question arises, how did the jury arrive at the conclusion that the appellee was entitled to $5,000 damages ?
It is clear- that if the appellee, at the time he was expelled from defendant’s cars, had not violated or attempted to violate any reasonable rule of the railroad eompanj7, he was entitled to damages, either compensatory or exemplary. Did the jury find that he was entitled to only compensatory damages, and if so, upon what did they base -their calculation ? Wherein was it shown that from any and all causes the appellee sustained pecuniary loss.to the amount of $5,000 ? The evidence discloses no set of cir
Even admitting that at the time the appellee was expelled from defendants train he had violated no reasonable rule of the company ; that he did not intend to violate any such rule, and then wherein was he damaged to the amount awarded him by the jury? There is nothing in the evidence to show that any indignity was shown the appellee in ejecting him from defendant’s cars, further than to use force sufficient to effect his expulsion ; and in fact, it is shown that the force used in putting the appellee off the train was-only so much as was necessary to accomplish that purpose.
The Circuit Court charged the jury upon vindictive damages as follows: “ Vindictive damages are not allowed unless for acts accompanied with maliciousness-brought home to the intent of the company. If the expulsion be committed with wilful violence or wrong on the part of the conductor as to the manner of putting off the train and in discharge of their duties, then exemplary damages may be given.”
Now, where is there any “ maliciousness ” shown by the evidence which was “ brought home to the intent of the company ?” None such is shown, and this being the caseT the verdict was contrary to the charge of the court.'
The 12th charge requested by defendant was as follows: “ It is not necessary for a party who desires to test the right of a railroad company to eject him from its cars to do more than to express his dissent to such ejection, and if such passenger resist the effort to eject him, and receives personal injury occasioned by such resistance, and no more force was used by the agent of the company in expelling
This charge was given as requested, and we think the charge was proper, and this being the case, how did the jury arrive at their conclusion and award the plaintiff 4)5,000 damages? The testimony shows that the personal injuries received by the plaintiff in consequence of such .expulsion, were but slight and it tends strongly to show that such injuries so received by the plaintiff were inflicted in consequence of his resistance to the officers of the company, and in finding as they did, the jury found contrary to the charge of the court.
The court refused to set aside the verdict; this was error.
Reversed.
