MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS
This mаtter came before the Court on a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiffs South Dakota Libertarian Party (SDLP), its Executive Committee and Ryan Gaddy, and a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by Defendant Jason M. Gant (Gant). Argument on both motions was heard on August 28, 2014, in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The Court orally announced that the motion for a preliminary injunction was denied and that the motion to dismiss the complaint was granted. The Court set forth on the record a summary of the basis for its rulings, and issued a short order on the motions. For each of the reasons stated by the Court on the record, and as follows, Plaintiffs’ mo
FINDINGS OF FACT
South Dakota law requires a political party to adopt a constitution or a set of bylaws, consistent with state law, which are then certified to, and filed with, the Secretary of State. SDCL § 12-5-1. The Libertarian Party of South Dakota certified its bylaws to the Secretary of State on March 23, 2012. The Secretary of State is required to notify county auditors of any party bylaw that affects an election. SDCL § 12-5-1.3. The Libertariаn Party’s bylaws prohibit the nomination of any candidate who is not a registered member of the Libertarian Party at the time of nomination.
The Libertarian Party of South Dakota held its state convention on Saturday, August 9, 2014. That morning, Ryan Gaddy (Gaddy) signed and dated a change of voter registration form, attempting to change his party affiliation from Republican to Libertarian. Later, during the convention, Gaddy was nominated as the SDLP’s candidate for Public Utilities Commissioner. On Monday, August 11, Bob Newland, Executive Committee Member оf the SDLP, mailed Gaddy’s voter registration to the Minnehaha County Auditor’s Office. It was received by the Auditor on August 13, 2014. The Secretary of State’s Office received the SDLP’s official certification of statewide candidates on August 11, 2014. Upon review, the Secretary of State found that Gaddy completed a voter registration card on August 9, 2014, but the voter registration card was not received by the Minnehaha County Auditor until August 13, 2014. A change in voter registration is not effective until received by the county auditor.
Plaintiffs sought a declaration that SDCL § 12-6-3.2 is unconstitutional, as well as injunctive relief directing the Secretary of State to place Gaddy’s name on the general election ballot as the SDLP’s nominee for Public Utilities Commissioner.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
The proper analysis of the preliminary injunction motion is found in Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has recognized that “there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” Storer v. Brown,
It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party 'fielding an ‘independent’ candidate to capture and bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party.
A State need not take the course California has, but California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison). It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State’s interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an early decision to seek independent ballot status. Nor do we have reason for concluding that the device California chose, § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974), was not an essential part of its overall mechanism to achieve its acceptable goals. As we indicated in Rosario,the Constitution does not require the State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims. To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the entire citizenry, merely in the interest of particular candidates and their supporters having instantaneous access to the ballot.
Storer,
Plaintiffs do not attempt to distinguish Storer, and it would be difficult to do so. The South Dakota provision requiring candidate affiliation is far less stringent than the 12-month disaffiliation provision in Storer. The South Dakota statute does not single out independent (non-party) candidates or minor party candidates for separate treatment, nor does it set a time period for disaffiliation from another party. Under Storer, SDCL § 12-6-3.2 withstands constitutional scrutiny even under the strict standard of review.
Nine years after Storer, in Anderson v. Celebrezze,
Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws ... cannot be resolved by any “litmus-paper test” that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.... Instead, a court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude -of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unсonstitutional.
Anderson,
Ohio identified three main interests advanced by the early filing deadline for independent candidates: voter education,
In the present case, Plaintiffs argue that SDCL § 12-6-3.2 should be strictly scrutinized, relying heavily on Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,
Our holding today does not establish that state regulation of primary voting qualifications may never withstand challenge by a political party or its membership. A party seeking, for example, to open its primary to all voters, including members of other parties, would raise a different combination of considerations. Under such circumstances, the effect of one party’s broadening of pаrticipation would threaten other parties with the disorganization effects which the statutes in Storer v. Brown,415 U.S. 724 ,94 S.Ct. 1274 ,39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), and Rosario v. Rockefeller,410 U.S. 752 ,93 S.Ct. 1245 ,36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973), were designed to prevent.
Id. at 224 n. 13,
Indeed, even the Tashjian Court distinguished the challenge brought by the Republican Party from challenges brought by the potential candidates in Storer, and by the voters in another political association
The statute in 'Storer was designed to protect the parties and the party system against the disorganizing effect of independent candidacies launched by unsuccessful putative party nominees. This protection, like that accorded to parties threatened by raiding in Rosario v. Rockefeller,410 U.S. 752 ,93 S.Ct. 1245 ,36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973) [involving a challenge by voters to a New York statute requiring a voter-to enroll in the party of his or her choice at least 30 days before the general election in order to vote in the next party primary] is undertaken to prevent the disruption of political parties from without, and not, as in this case, to prevent parties from taking internal steps affecting their own process for the selection of candidates. The forms of regulation upheld in Storer and Rosario imposed certain burdens upon the protected First and Fourteenth Amendment interests of some individuals, both voters and potential candidates, in order to protect the interests of оthers. In the present case, the state statute is defended. on the ground that it protects the integrity of the Party against the Party itself.
Tashjian,
> After Tashjian, the Supreme Court continued tо reiterate that not every election regulation that burdens associational rights is subject to strict scrutiny. For example, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
The New Party’s claim that it has a right to select its own candidate is uncontroversial, so far as it goes. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda,419 U.S. 477 ,95 S.Ct. 541 ,42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) (party, not State, has right to decide who will be State’s delegates at party convention). That is, the New Party, and not someone else, has the right to select thе New Party’s “standard bearer.” It does not follow, though, that a party is absolutely entitled to have its nominee appear on the ballot as that party’s candidate. A particular candidate might be ineligible for office, unwilling to serve, or, as here, another party’s candidate. That a particular individual may not appear on the ballot as a particular party’s candidate does not severely burden that party’s associational rights. . See Burdick,504 U.S. at 440, n. 10 ,112 S.Ct. at 2067 n. 10 (“It seems to us that limiting the choice of candidates to those who have complied with state election law requirements is the prototypical example of a regulation that, while it affects the right to vote, is eminently reasonable”); Anderson,460 U.S. at 792, n. 12 , 103S.Ct. at 1571-1572, n. 12 (“Although a disaffiliation provision may preclude ... voters from supporting a particular ineligible candidate, they remain free to support and promote other candidates who satisfy the State’s disaffiliation requirements”); id. at 793, n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 1572, n. 15 .
Timmons,
Similarly, in Clingman v. Beaver,
Disaffiliation is not difficult: In general, “anyone can ‘join’ a political party merely by asking for the appropriate ballot at the appropriate time or (at most) by registering within a state-defined reasonable period of time before an election.” Jones, supra, at 596,120 S.Ct. 2402 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In Oklahoma, registered members of the Republican, Democratic, and Reform Parties who wish to vote ’in the LPO primary simply need to file a form with the county election board secretary to change their registration. See Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 4-119 (West Supp. 2005). Voters are not “locked in” to an unwanted party affiliation, see Kusper v. Pontikes,414 U.S. 51 , 60-61,94 S.Ct. 303 ,38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973), because with only nominal effort they are free to vote in the LPO primary. For this reason, too, the registration requirement does not unduly hinder the LPO from associating with members of other parties. To attract members of other parties, the LPO need only persuade voters to make the minimal effort neсessary to switch parties.
Clingman,
The Clingman Court questioned why it had applied strict scrutiny in Tashjian, but noted that the Oklahoma statute at issue in Clingman was less burdensome than the one in Tashjian. Id. at 592,
Under Anderson and its progeny, this Court first must determine whether SDCL § 12-6-3.2 severely burdens the constitutional rights of voters, the SDLP and Gad-dy. A severe burdеn would trigger strict scrutiny, requiring the regulation to advance a state interest of compelling importance. If the law imposes a “reasonable, nondiscriminatory” limitation rather than a severe burden on First Amendment rights, the Court applies a more deferential standard of review and the limitation would be justified by the State’s “important regulatory interest.” Accordingly, the Court will consider what burden is placed on the constitutional rights of voters and the plaintiffs, and then will balance that burden against the precise interests identified by the State and the extent to which these interests require that the constitutional rights be burdened.
1. Magnitude of Burden on First Amendment Rights
Plaintiffs argue that SDCL § 12-6-3.2 prohibits a political party from nominating a non-member as a party candidate for public office, thereby burdening their associational rights. According to Plaintiffs, Tashjian requires strict scrutiny of the statute and a finding that it is unconstitutional.
2. Precise Interests Identified by the State and Extent to Which the State Interests Justify the Burden on Constitutional Rights
The State asserts that it has an interest in requiring an individual to affiliate with a
B. Irreparable Harm, Balance of Harms, Public Interest
For the same reasons set forth above, any infringement on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights caused by SDCL § 12-6-3.2, even if irrepаrable, balances in favor of denying the injunction in this case. Requiring the State to place Gaddy’s name on the ballot would thwart the State’s legitimate interests in preserving political parties as viable and identifiable groups, enhancing party building efforts, and guarding against party raiding and “sore loser” candidacies by spurned primary contenders. As discussed above, under the circumstances present here, the harm Plaintiffs will suffer by not placing Gad-dy’s name on the ballot is outweighed by the State’s interests.
The final Dataphase factor is the public interest. South Dakota law, SDCL § 12-6-3.2, only minimally impinges on the associational rights of Plaintiffs who wish to nominate candidates who are not members of the Libertarian Party. The potential candidate need only'register as a Libertarian at any time prior to his or her nomination. The State’s interests are served by this regulation. The public interest factor favors denying Plaintiffs’ request for relief in this case.
II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
The relief requested in Plaintiffs’ complaint is limited to declaratory and injunc-tive relief. Deniаl of that requested relief left no issue before the Court and, therefore, Defendant’s motion to ■ dismiss was granted.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction was' denied and Defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted.
Notes
. Article V § 1 of the bylaws states, "To be eligible for any Party office, a candidate must be a member in good standing of the Party and must reside in South Dakota.”
. If the voter registration card is completed at an agency listed in SDCL § 12-4-2, is received by the auditor within five days following any voter registration dеadline and is dated by the deadline, the registration card is considered effective on the date that it was signed at the agency. SDCL § 12-4-6.1. There is no dispute that Gaddy did not complete his change in voter registration card at an approved agency, thus his registration as a Libertarian was not effective until his card was received by the county auditor on August 13,2014.
. Some language in Storer intimated the balancing test that the Supreme Court would later employ to decide whether state interests are sufficient to support a bаllot access regulation that infringes on constitutional rights.
. Plaintiffs’ argument that the law is unconstitutional is made more difficult because the Libertarian Party’s bylaws also require Libertarian candidates to be registered Libertarians at the time of their nomination.