*1 owner, Bork, who was not entitled surface
to them.
SOUTH DAKOTA BUILDING
AUTHORITY, Plaintiff and
Allison,
granted
the court also
Appellant,
accounting
the mineral owner
v.
payments
though
specific
even
bonus
ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
GEIGER-BERGER
requested.
relief was not
Because the min
Foreign Corporation; Billy
Beck,
A
R.
petition prayed
owner’s
eral
such relief
H. Blake
Kroeger,
Holman and
R.
Jean
necessary
proper”,
prayer
“as
II,
Kroeger,
Fritzel
d/b/a
Griffin &
was sufficient to entitle the mineral owner
Berg,
Partnership,
A
Defendants and
accounting
statute,
to an
for bonuses. Our
Appellees.
15-6-54(c), provides, “[E]very
final
15141, 15158, 15162, 15173,
Nos.
judgment
grant
shall
the relief to which
party in
15178.
whose favor
is rendered is
entitled,
the party
even if
has not demand
Supreme
Court
South Dakota.
pleadings.”
ed such relief
his
See also
Argued Sept. 16, 1986.
(S.D.
Unverzagt,
Maresh
Rule
quest accounting specific recovery or a rentals, delay
for the bonus and
specific request general and a
request “for further relief as the just equitable.”
court deem Con
sequently, he was entitled to recover the delay though
bonus and the rentals even
they specifically requested.
CONCLUSION incorrectly
The trial court concluded that payments
Bork entitled to the based possession. However, affidavit
Tvedt, as the record mineral owner was
entitled to both the bonus the rentals.
Therefore, reversed
remanded for determination of entitled to recover. Tvedt *2 bidding,
ture. After it was found proposed steel closed structure would cost more than the available funds. These bids rejected. Architect then recom- mended a conventional field house with an open field. *3 Regents,
The Board of anxious to obtain structure, requested an enclosed Ar- that Associates, Geiger-Berger chitect hire P.C. (Engineer defendants) prelimi- do a Gary Thomas J. and J. of Pashby, Welk nary study air supported design. of an roof Greenfield, Boyce, Murphy, McDowell & Ultimately, Authority and con- Architect Falls, appellant. Sioux for and design tracted for building and of an Doyle Harold C. and A. of Hurley, John supported air system. roof Architect then Johnson, Becker, May, Doyle & Siоux Engineer contracted with design for the of Falls, for appellee Geiger- defendant and supported air system. roof Associates, Berger P.C. During construction, the course of the Simko, Woods, Fuller, John of Shultz & roof failed once. After construction Smith, P.C., Falls, Sioux for defendant and completed and Dome was turned Fritzel, appellee Kroeger, Berg; Griffin & Authority collapsed over the roof or tore Timothy Fuller, Bjorkman, Woods, J. of on three occasions. ap- These failures Smith, P.C., Shultz & on the brief. peared to be the direct result of the inabili- ty melt system adequately of snow TICE, Judge. Circuit remove the snow accumulations. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT Statement the Case of Appellant, Au- Building South Dakota Authority against commenced this action thority, appeals from denying pre- an order Engineer and Architect based breach Appellee Fritzel, Kroe- implied warranty, misrepre- of negligent ger, Berg Griffin and filed notice of re- sentation, contract, neg- of breach common appealing view the trial court’s refusal to ligence, implied and breach of contract. grant judgment notwithstanding the ver- Engineer allegations alleged denied indemnity dict on the issue of and on contributory negligence, assumption of grounds estoppel. We affirm. risk, mitigate damages. and failure to Ar- allegations chitect likewise denied the FACTS alleged contributory negligence, assump- University risk, estoppel, South Dakota liability, tion vicarious began the physical creation a new satisfactory performance edu- in the contract. facility ultimately further, crossclaim, cation known as the Da- by way Architect (Dome). Dome sought kota The South Dakota indemnity both contribution Building Authority (Authority) legal Engineer. Authority supervised
owner of the Dome. Authority’s original complaint recited no its construction into and entered contracts damage figure. January On in an building. for its interrogatory concerning answer to an Fritzel, outset, damages, Authority Authority At the asked itemized (Architect $461,464.26, Kroeger, Berg Griffin and the amount of but indicated defendants) opinion damage figure. for as to not a their the best final 8, 1985, facility April Authority an manner which enclosed field On moved stating designed. initially complaint could be rec- its Architect amend against supported unascertained, ommended air dome still would be ultimately, arranged $500,000.00. system, May excess On trial, days prior issuance bids on enclosed steel struc- five amended interrogatories, ISSUES original its answer $461,- figure from changing damage its I. $454,760.64. During course 464.26 to DE- DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN еxhibits, trial, set Authority, through MOTION FOR NYING AUTHORITY’S $464,- in the amount forth AN- INTEREST? WE PREJUDGMENT dispute was significant No factual 160.64. NO. SWER or the concerning the existence raised damages set line items of amounts II. damage exhib- Authority’s primary
forth $325,- it. awarded IN DE- DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR $46,920.00 past damages 261.44 FOR NYING ARCHITECT’S MOTION damages. future FROM THE INDEMNITY ENGINEER? ANSWER NO. WE trial, Authority, subsequent to moved *4 on prejudgment interest the verdict III. five
past damages. suggested determining inter- alternative methods DE- DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN est: NYING THE ARCHITECT’S MOTION 1) after commence- interest accrued A ES- FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON court of ment of the action circuit ANSWER TOPPEL? WE NO. judg- of eighteen percent day to the
ment;
DECISION
2)
subrogation
accrued after the
interest
I.
24,1983,
October
action commenced
THE
DE-
DID
TRIAL COURT ERR IN
per-
judgment
eighteen
the date of
at
FOR
NYING AUTHORITY’S MOTION
cent;
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST?
3)
the amount
interest accrued
on
prejudgment
issue of
is a
The
interest
past damages of
allocated to
70.07%
start
complex one. To consider one must
recovery
of the total
and attributed
origin.
pro-
at its
The Civil Code of 1877
damage
to each
item
proportionately
prejudgment
un-
vided for
interest awards
future;
past or
codified as 21-1-11
der two sections now
4)
first item of
interest accrued
1877,
1887,
1943,
21-1-13.
CL
CivC
§
damages
each subse-
sustained and
today
The
exist
in es-
provisions
§
quent
up
incurred
item
thereafter
origi
sentially
they
form as
did
same
damages equal
to the
an amount
nally.
Chicago,
St.P.Ry.
See Uhe v.
M. &
verdict;
505,
(1894);
Co., 4
484
v.
S.D.
57 N.W.
Uhe
5)
of
accrued
the last item
interest
563,
3
54
Chicago,
St.P.Ry.
M. &
S.D.
damage
previous item ac-
and each
(1893);
Halloran,
v.
20
N.W. 601
Corcoran
up
crued
to an amount
(1906).
S.D.
N.W.
equal
to the
verdict.
provides
SDCL 21-1-11
that:
$464,-
Authority argued
that
of
Every person
is entitled to recover
who
trial and
160.64 were ascertainable before
certain,
capable
being
or
Authority’s
damages exhibit.
evidenced
calculation,
certain
and the
Authority’s motion
The triаl court denied
right
is
in him
to recover which
vested
being
for interest as
uncertain under SDCL
upon particular day,
is entitled also to
court
interest
21-1-11. The trial
did allow
day,
from
recover interest thereon
amount from the date
on the verdict
except during such time
the debtor
judgment.
verdict
the date
law,
act of the
prevented by
creditor,
paying
from
the debt.
for a
notwith-
Architect moved
hand,
21-1-13,
pro-
standing
indem-
on the other
the verdict
issue of
motion.
that: “In an action
the breach
nity. The
court denied the
vides
trial
contract,
obligation
arising
Varilek,
(inter
(S.D.1985)
N.W.2d 200
fraud,
oppression,
every
case of
mal-
est awarded on costs
by quan
determined
ice,
meruit).
given,
be
in the discretion
tum
jury.”
The certainty relating to
day
of vest-
ing and amount under contract actions
applying
these statutes we
generally not difficult to
emphаsized
establish. As
continually
their funda
applied
statute
types
to other
do
ac-
purpose
justice
mental
is to
to one who
tions, however, these issues
hazy
became
has suffered a loss
hands of another.
our efforts to enact
Howard,
principles
v.
es-
County
Clark
58 S.D.
due,
poused.
part,
This
(1931).
words,
N.W. 561
In other
when
liberal
interpretation
person
by failing
retains
money
attempt
rules in an
causes,
to honor
a loss he
should be
party to
the moneys
receive
charged
justly
due
sum he refuses
from another.
Corp.
Beka v. Lithium
injured
to tender to
party.
Gearhart v.
America,
S.D.
Hyde,
(1917).
N.W.2d 156
39 S.D.
($131,901.66), or the damages. reasonably amount ascertainable on ($103,733.22) on their that out costs Gearhart, supra. recognized valid Assum- as a date certain. been dates have Such pre- ing liability applying a certain amount. the sake of vesting of dates of County, interest, McKenna v. Roberts expect one would (date (1948) pocket of disburse- reach in obligor to effect his 32 N.W.2d Plastics, v. Industries Polaris ments); obligee he can hand over Inc., (Minn.1980) (date ultimately reasonably anticipate 299 N.W.2d he will be incurred). Fullerton expense item of pay compensate each for the loss held to Reindl, Co. v. Lumber v. Hanson Funk other. sustained Int’l, (when (S.D.1983) plaintiff should (S.D. 1985); Seeds Honey v. Melvin, damages); mitigated (D.S.D. his Cole P.Supp. Shaffer well, (S.D.1976) (upon the 1977) (test is, assuming liability, whether itself). injury ascertainable). happening of the reasonably are negli- Authority’s comparative But hand, However, at neither case reasonably been gence, this could have would is rеasonable. Neither solution done. the loss compensate Authority for properly by the were owed of use of funds which Authority obligated was At time Authority found was Dome, defendants. Since repaired the the cost pay those who by the partially responsible for its losses Also, reasonably be repair certain. at in- Authority jury, time, award question no that there was real that paid expense they terest from the date repairs related to roof’s fail- receiving Authority in total would result ure, question nor was there money it was not entitled repairs and cost thereof were reason- This would result Therefore, receive. Authority’s loss became able. expense at the reaping a windfall receiving liquidated upon billing for the obligated defendants were defendant repairs. repairs, upon pаying for such portion of the losses sus- It was time denied token, it *6 By the at the time. same tained it money use of due from defendants. principle with the not be consistent liqui- would Authority’s clearly If claim was not restitution, principle is the if that sole injury, dated at the time of the it became so involved, interest award billing repairs the time for the at all have been only after submitted. by Authority. Defendant would
incurred
required
Authority is not
to make a
fairly
incur a
and would not
then
windfall
repairs upon
for
payment
demand
in-
it
compensate Authority
expenses
requirement
defendants.
The demand
is
expense.
final
prior to the
curred
person
liable can
only
essential
where
suggests
Authority
The last alternative
he
reasonably
not
know what sum
owes.
each
grant prejudgment
interest on
is to
Jenkins,
Beka, supra
at 159. Jones v.
277
to Au-
damage when it was billed
item of
supra;
Safeco,
(Wis.1979);
815
N.W.2d
($111,284.92).
thority at
rate of 70.07%
Sons,
(8th
Aetna v. Studer &
F.2d 997
365
total
percentage is derived from the
This
Cir.1966).
or
The issue is not whether
not
less a reduction based
liable,
person
knew
liable
was
verdict,
appar-
jury
accountable
assuming liability he knew with
whether
findings
Authority’s
ently
jury
to the
certainty
phys
reasonable
the extent of
approach
This
is
comparative fault.
v.
ical loss. Amert Ziebarth Constr.
past.
dealt
in the
one
we have
which
(S.D.1987). Potter v.
presentation
payment
demand for
of money”
money
and “no
improperly re-
(date
County, supra
made. Clark
demand
tained, detained or withheld.” Id. at 131.
North River Ins.
benefits);
for insurance
Constr., Inc.,
Co. v. Golden Rule
recently
We have
from
diverted
these
(S.D.1980)(date
insurance cov-
Triple
In Hepper
Enter
U
decisions.
erage refused); Bunkers,
supra
(mistake
Inc.,
prises,
(S.D.1986),
contract,
per-
in sale
interest accrued date
against
$286,000,
unliquidated
award
son
if
liable
notified thereof and
no
requested
defendant
prеjudgment interest
filed). Amert,
notification,
su-
date action
$202,000.
liquidated
pra
(date
an objective measurement of loss
elaboration,
simply
Without
we
said de-
defendant).
submitted
“damages arising
Heppers’
fendant’s
breach of contract were not certain ...
Unfortunately,
pro-
these cases do not
returned its verdict.” Id. jury
until the
vide an answer for the case before us.
denied interest
We
without further
Defendants asserted that
Pri-
underlying
discussion
issues.
contributorily negligent,
and the
clear-
upon Hepper, we
relying
again de-
marily
ly
that portion
found
bore a
liqui-
nied prejudgment
interest where a
blame since there was
clear reduction
*7
$7,222,530
by an
dated claim of
was set off
damages
obligated
of the
defendants were
$300,-
unliquidated
of
counterclaim award
pay.
to
We can find no similar
in
situation
Ranch,
Inc. v. Milbank Mutu-
Kehn
law,
thе
our case
nor
case law of
other
Co.,
(S.D.1986).
al Ins.
jurisdiction.
decisions,
past,
appli-
In the
have considered the
In these recent
as well as
we
they
previous
as
in
cation
setoffs and counterclaims
our
decisions we have held that
jury
prejudgment
damages
relate to
are
until a
uncertain
decision,
discussion,
has
prejudgment
with little
we found the amount
reached a
inter
Amert,
Fullerton, supra;
claim
est
although
certain
there
cannot lie.
Nebraska,
supra.
slight
premiums
for
Our
was a
setoff allowed
sister state of
River, supra.
North
party.
dealing
parallels
due
other
law which
our
with case
statute,
Agency
Ins.
inter
Williams
years
against prejudgment
Pour
later
decided
jury
Contrasting
v. Dee-Bee
est in
358 N.W.2d
a car/bus accident where
part
(S.D.1984),
pre-
negligence on
recovery
contributory
allowed
fоund
we
plaintiff
plaintiff.
stated
interest to both
The court
“[T]he
claims,
unliquidated and
liquidated
damages
al-
claimed were
defendant
sponsible
prejudgement
under
with refer-
incapable of determination
were
standards,
as
ordinary
to the
ence
21-1-11.
value. There was
and market
calculation
clearly
It
that the issue
should be
noted
liability could be
from which the
no data
counterclaim,
here
setoff or
but
is not a
Na
judicial intervention.”
fixed without
contributory
verdict,
negligence
rather a
Ins.
v. Evert
Fire
Co.
tional
Hartford
is no
for a defend-
way
and as such there
son,
N.W.2d
157 Neb.
reasonably
percent
know what
ant
also,
Enterprises
(1953);
Inc.
See
Muller
is, therefore,
It
fault a
would find.
Gerber,
Neb.
impossible
what
for a defendant to know
(1965).
uncertainty lies not
dam
The
damages
pay plaintiff
should
a
even
themselves,
propor
rather
ages
though
damages themselves are clear.
damages
those
defendant
tion of
Beka,
159;
Son, supra
Ed
supra at
Cox &
caused,
jury can decide.
only which
Fullerton,
Therefore,
291;
supra.
trial
court’s denial
must
is a balance
be struck
There
which
Authority
is affirmed.
our
interest stat-
applying
accepted
ute. While South Dakota
II.
ap-
principle that
DE-
DID THE TRIAL
ERR IN
COURT
compensation
an
propriate to insure full
MOTION FOR
NYING ARCHITECT’S
pre-
injured plaintiff, that
collect
FROM THE ENGINEER?
INDEMNITY
21-1-11
limited
’judgment interest under
a defendant can
to circumstances where
case, Authority sought
develop
certainty
with reasonable
what
ascertain
arena, capable
housing
enclosed
damages
damages
are. Those
are
those
football field. The funds available were
damages
respon-
defendant
for which the
to creatе
traditional struc-
adequate
goes
saying
without
the de-
sible.
It
Thus, the
ture.
chose
build
responsible
cannot be
fendant
supported
system,
unique
air
roof
is, therefore,
It
he has not caused.
which
only
alternative other than
was the
question in this case of what losses
not a
open
field
traditional
football
and a
field
sustain,
plaintiff
did the
but rather what
against
initially
house. Architect
advised
plaintiff
the defendant owe the
for the
does
supported
the air
dome. Funds were not
which the
sustained. We
alternately proposed
for the
en-
available
very
structure,
recently
stated that “When the
closed steel
however.
does not
supported
who
liable
know what
then
that an air
struc-
insisted
owes, however,
requested
pro-
or cannot
sum he
ascertain
ture
Architect
be built
ought
Engineer
develop
the amоunt
with reason
ceed to
with
work
exactness,
supported
he cannot be in
air
dome. Architect did so. At
able
then
default
added)
Engi-
Architect
paying.” (emphasis
Arcon
time
contracted
neer,
Plant,
there
domes of an air
two
v. S.D. Cement
world,
also, Amert,
supported
in the
(S.D.1987).
supra;
nature
both built
See
Aet
Gearhart,
na,
Beka, supra;
Engineer.
ultimate failure
supra;
su
Dome
the result of a failure
perhaps
21-1-11 could
more
structure was
pra. SDCL
Engi-
read,
designed by
part,
system
melt
specifically be
follows:
snow
from the roof
“Every person
is entitled to
neer to remove
snow
who
recover
(caused
another) certain,
collapse
the three occa-
or which caused
*8
being
question.
certain
sions
capable of
...”.
If the
of
caused
another are
extent
asserts that it is without
Architect
certain,
then
not
plans
being ade
for the
not
personal fault
lie under this statute.
should not
Engineer
that
quate. Architect contends
cannot,
expertise and
with
de- had the sole and exclusive
any
a defendant
Since
responsibility
preparation
for the
of those
an
gree
certainty,
tender
simply
plans,
the Architect was
a
jury
until a
sets the
and that
to a
Authority.
fault,
be
re-
conduit of that information
proportionate
he cannot
held
Fritzel,
recognize
building
facility
Kroeger,
the
of such
ant
Berg
We
Griffin &
is
recognize
unique.
only
We
that
Archi-
liable
was
because of acts or omissions of
originally
type Geiger-Berger,
not recommend this
tect
did
and is otherwise without
facility,
facility
was
jury
and that
fault?” The
basical-
no.
answered
Because
ly
by Authority
only
jury
as the
question
mandated
answered the
nega-
tive,
to create
enclosed football
means
an
field.
the issue for the court is whether
us, however, what
The issue before
there was basis in
the record for
jury
responsibility
in fact the
and activities of
to find that Architect
atwas
fault in some
through
Architect.
manner other than
Engineer.
It is
guess
not for this court to second
the find-
Bagman,
Degen v.
ings
jury,
of the
to determine
(1972),
if
must be
such should have been
III.
Thus,
done and was not done Architect.
DID
IN DE-
THE TRIAL COURT ERR
in the
again, there is evidence
record that
THE
MOTION
NYING
ARCHITECT'S
affirmatively
carry
Architect
failed
out
FOR
NOTWITHSTAND-
obligations
Au
JUDGMENT
under the contract with
ING
ON ESTOPPEL?
thority.
THE VERDICT
*10
HENDERSON,
Architect moved for directed ver
(concurring
Justice
specially).
dict at the close of the evidence based
estoppel,
grounds.
as well as other
How
Beginning
my special
writing in
ever,
preserved
the motion must be
after
Eng’r
Northwestern
v. Thunderbolt En
motion for
the verdict
rendered
a
421,
terprises,
(S.D.1981)
301 N.W.2d
judgment notwithstanding
as
the verdict
(Henderson, J., concurring
part,
dissent
requesting
as
a directed
in the
well
verdict
ing
part), through my most recent dis-
movant’s favor. Architect filed its motion sent in Hageman
Vorste,
v. Vander
judgment notwithstanding only
(S.D.1987),
N.W.2d
I have consist
indemnity.
issue
ently
position
taken a
on the determination
prejudgment
interest. Two of my writ
raised,
proper,
To be
the motion
be
must
ings
majority
involving
have been
decisions
not
at the close of
evidence before
legal subject, namely,
Hanson v. Funk
verdict,
verdict,
also
after
before
(S.D.1985),
Seeds
nate amount
opinions,
authoring
researching,
minority
FOSHEIM,
J.,
Retired
concurs.
opinions,
attempting
distinguish
HENDERSON, J.,
easy
differences in cases. It is not
task.
specially.
concurs
understood,
deep
Let it be
I
no
MORGAN,
SABERS, JJ.,
concur
conceptual
Judge
difference with
Tice’s ba
part
part.
and dissent in
mooring
sic
affirmance of
Honor
Judge
Court
Hertz.
able Circuit
E.W.
TICE,
Judge, sitting
Circuit
fact,
Judge
precise question,
Tice
WUEST, C.J., disqualified.
us,
precisely
been
instructs
never
be
MILLER, J.,
having
majority opinion,
us.
I
been
fore
His
which take
be,
simply
member of
court at
the time this
that a
understand
court,
cаse was submitted to the
did
defendant
over
to a
cannot
participate.
proportionate
until
sets the
*11
legal
An
this
involving contributory
authority
eminent
makes
jury
in
fault
a
trial
general
in-
he,
defendant,
prejudgment
observation about
can
the
negligence because
“Actually,
terest:
the
been
decisions have
certainty,
the
not,
degree of
know
any
with
moving
greater willingness
toward
he would
damages which
owe.*
amount of
time,
for a long
interest
but
award such
opinion, is the
Beka,
majority
cited in the
very
this
movement
left a certain
going upon the
light
to avoid
beacon
cases,
this,
in the
and
amount of conflict
writing
Judge
is anchored
Tice’s
shoals.
together
the influence of local stat-
with
Son,
165, 132
81 S.D.
v. Ed
&
on State
Cox
utes,
impossible
sin-
makes it
state
Beka,
370,
(1965),
77
282
S.D.
N.W.2d
gle
accuracy.”
rule
set of rules with
D.
author, on
This
behalf
I all claims from such as we in not except say I would trial have here. 21-1-11 one. reverse the court SDCL does prejudg prejudgment every person its dеnial is entitled be- certain, offset, unless there is an damages interest, capa- cause these ment contract, negli- summary, plaintiff contributory sued counterclaim or claim two, negligence. damages are specifies Plaintiffs gence. The statute contract, supported negligence. i.e., two, exceptions, prevent- debtor where contrib- 1) law, 2) paying the To extent that defendant’s creditor ed successful, utory negligence claim was debt. both interest on purports deny majority opinion The already those been denied. a “contrib- interest because second deny prejudgment To interest a negligence” impossi- “makes utory claim contrary time sustainable reasonably know for a defendant ble spirit 21-1-11. letter and As pay plaintiff. should stated what it difficulty and Much of this fuss would Amert, should be able to defendant if exist interest rate were argument himself unless he avail of this 2) 1) reasonable, and either lower or the payment or an of- has tendered fact post-judgment same rate. as the language of payment. the stat- fer Legislative lacking common sense is during “except such time as provides, ute *13 pre higher interest rate is 3% law, by by prevented the debtor -judgment than interest. post See creditor, paying act of the from the debt.” (prejudgment SDCL 54-3-4 and 54-3-5 §§ case, In this does even claim the debtor interest), interest), (post-judgment 54-3-5.1 law, prevented by he the act that was (state rates). and 54-3-16 interest creditor, paying the of the from debt. MORGAN, I am authorized to state that fact, continually vigorously per- and he has J., joins part this concurrence right in his resist the debt. Obvi- sisted part. dissent in right ously, a debtor has the to resist the meantime, debt, but had the pay should money
use of the interest obligation in accordance with SDCL
21-1-11, Brothers, Inc., Meyer Dixon v. (S.D.1985),Amert, supra, others. 21-1-11 to the reference SDCL EWALT, upon particular day. As to recover Pat and Yvonne Plaintiffs or capable Appellees,
soon as are certain being calculation refer- certain prevailing markets for ence labor MEREEN-JOHNSON MACHINE materials, then are vested and COMPANY, corporation, begins to run. Interest should be Appellant. Defendant and each item ex- awarded the date Nos. 15567. pense was incurred. The trial court denied because it believed it Supreme of South Dakota. Court definite could ascertain a date when April 24, began There on Briefs 1987. to accrue. Considered difficulty, certainly it was been some Decided Oct. possible here. The time is a there tolling period in- before reasonable to
terest runs is if tried the debtor accept. creditor 21- refused to above, question is a
1-11. As stated proof
whether reflects elements does, proof If and it
SDCL 21-1-11. case,
does in this then the court should
mathematically compute
