124 Ky. 153 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1906
Reversing.
On tlie 24th. day of March, 1903, the appellee, who lives in Newport, Ky., boarded a street car of the appellant company which was so crowded that he remained standing on the steps of the platform, and held on with his right hand to an upright iron bar fastened to the car, called in the record a “handhold,” in order to avoid falling or being thrown off. "While he was riding in this position, the conductor, who was inside the car when he boarded it, came to the rear door and called for his fare. Appellee had placed his fare in a pocket on the right side of Ms overcoat, and in order to get it out, released his grasp upon the “handhold,” and, as he did so, the car, which was going at a rapid rate of speed, reached a curve, in rounding which appellant was thrown, or forced to jump, from the platform to the ground, by the lurching motion incident to the sudden change of direction, which so jarred him that he suffered a rupture, and was thereby permanently injured. Although, the car stopped for him, he did not again get aboard but waited and took another, and went to his place of business in Cincinnati. To recover damages for the injury received as above narrated, he instituted this action in the Campbell circuit court, alleging that the accident was due to the negligence of the appellant company in the operation of its car. The essentials of his cause of action are contained in the following excerpt from the petition: “Plaintiff says that he was injured as aforesaid by and through the wrongful and willful neglect and default of the defendant in this, to-wit, that the defendant wrongfully, willfully, and negligently constructed and
On the trial of the case two grounds of negligence were relied on: First, that the appellant company permitted its rear platform to become so overcrowded that the appellee was- compelled to remain standing thereon; and, second, that it was propelled around the curve at so rapid a rate that he was thrown from his position, on the platform by the resulting lurch when the ear suddenly changed its direction.. When the appellee took passage on the car he knew of its crowded condition, and boarded it voluntarily ‘in preference to waiting ' for one less
Two things are patent upon appellee’s own statement : First, that he boarded the ear voluntarily when it was so crowded that he was compelled to stand on the platform; second, that even there he was perfectly safe until he released his grasp on the “ handhold.” This he did voltmtarily. .The conductor did not force, or even ask him, to do so, or know that this was necessary in order for him to pay his fare. Appellee knew the car was running rapidly, and that there were curves in the track, for he, in another part of his testimony, states that he had traveled the line twice daily for three or four years. It is true, he did not have it in mind that he was so near the curve, but when he released his grasp, the retention of which made his otherwise perilous position on the platform secure, this was a voluntary act for which the company was in nowise responsible. The request of the conductor, that he pay his fare, was not of that urgency which required him to imperil
There is nothing in this record that tends to show that any act or omission on the part of the company was the proximate cause of appellee’s injury; but, on the contrary, his own statement shows beyond question that he was injured by his own reckless .negligence in releasing his grasp of the “handhold” while standing on the edge of the platform of the car. It takes but little familiarity with street cars and natural laws to know that if a passenger stands on the edge of the platform, without ' holding on to something to prevent him from falling, when the car strikes a curve — whether it be going fast or slow — he is in great danger of being thrown off. Appellee knew this, and, so knowing, he had no right — at the expense of the company — to imperil his life or limb in the manner which his own statement shows he did. His negligence in this matter is too plain for dispute.
The trial court should have sustained appellant’s motion for a peremptory instruction to the jury to bud for it at the close of appellee’s testimony; and for this reason the judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent herewith.
Petition for rehearing by appellee overruled.