Sosa v. StateSosa v. State
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Tyson
Lead Opinion
ON RETURN TO REMAND
Heriberto Sosa was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of
I
The appellant contends that the trial court erred to reversal by admitting a search warrant and suppоrting affidavit into evidence. Although the search warrant and affidavit were inadmissible as primary evidence to establish guilt, Satterwhite v. State, 364 So.2d 359 (Ala. 1978), it is clear from the record that the warrant and affidavit were never read or published to the jury during the trial and were withdrawn from evidence prior to the jury‘s deliberations. (R. 1136-1138). The jury never heard or saw the objectionable evidence. Thus, any error in the original admission of the warrant and affidavit was harmless.
II
The appellant contends that the State used its peremptory strikes to remove black jurors from the jury panel in violation of the equal protection clause of the
III
The appеllant contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury, “We have a rule of law in this State that says that all witnesses whо take the stand in a court of law are presumed under the law to speak the truth.” (R. 1115) Initially, we agree that this isolated statement is error, because there is no such presumption in Alabama and such an instruction “is a derogation of the jury‘s exclusive right to determine the credibility of witnesses.” Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179, 181 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987). See also Williams v. State, 538 So.2d 1250 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988). Any error, however, is harmless, because the trial сourt also instructed the jury that if there was a conflict in the testimony which could not be reconciled, it was their duty tо determine which witnesses were worthy of belief. They were also instructed that they could accept or rеject any part of the testimony of any witness. The jury was also instructed as to the factors to be considered in weighing the testimony of the witnesses. ” ‘[T]he fact that isolated instructions are erroneous or misleading is no ground for reversal where the instructions as a whole present the case properly.’ ” Williams, 538 So.2d at 1253 (quoting, Harris v. State, 412 So.2d 1278, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982)). We have carefully reviewed the court‘s oral charge to the jury in its entirety. We find that any error in the charge was cured by the complete charge and was, therefore, harmless. E.g., Ex parte Holifield, 562 So.2d 254 (Ala. 1990); Weaver v. State, 568 So.2d 309 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989); Touart v. State, 562 So.2d 625 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989).
IV
The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in grаnting a severance of two defendants on the day of the trial. He argues that the severance constitutеd reversible error because his trial strategy was based on being tried as a co-defendant and not as a sоle defendant. The record reveals that one of the co-defendants was severed because hе was a witness for the State and had entered into an agreement with the State to plead guilty. (Remand Recоrd p. 3.) The other defendant was severed because she was a witness for the State.
The record reveаls that upon the appellant‘s objection to the severance, the trial court indicated that it would be receptive if a continuance was requested, because it would be the first continuance requestеd by the appellant. After conferring with the appellant, his attorney informed the court that they would proсeed to trial. The appellant was offered additional time to prepare his case as a sole defendant. Thus, we find that he was not prejudiced to reversal by the severance. We also note that a severance is required if any defendant or the State may be prejudiced by a joint trial.
V
The appellant finally contends that he was denied a speedy trial. He was аpparently arrested and incarcerated on September 9, 1987, and was tried on July 25, 1988. The factors to be wеighed in determining whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial are the “[l]ength of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant‘s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.” Arnett v. State, 551 So.2d 1158, 1159 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989) (quoting, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). An examination of the lattеr three factors is not required unless the length of the delay is “presumptively prejudicial.” Arnett; Wade v. State, 381 So.2d 1057 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 381 So.2d 1062 (Ala. 1980). We find that the nine-and-a-hаlf-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial. E.g., Mitchell v. State, 530 So.2d 908 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988); Cofer v. State, 440 So.2d 1116 (Ala.Crim.App.), rev‘d on other grounds, 440 So.2d 1121 (Ala. 1983).
We note that the delay was caused by a discovery difficulty and by faulty indictments. Misunderstanding or negligence on the part of the State is weighed less heavily than a deliberate attempt to delay a trial. Arnett; Kimberly v. State, 501 So.2d 534 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986). The record does not indicate that the State attempted to delay the triаl in bad faith or for an improper purpose. Furthermore, although a State-requested continuance was granted on February 19, 1988, and the case was not reset on the March 21 or March 28 dockets, the appellаnt did not file his motion for speedy trial until April 6. The appellant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the dеlay. Dykes v. State, 452 So.2d 1377 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984); Cofer.
For the reasons set forth above, this case is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All the Judges concur except BOWEN, J., who dissents with opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent from the holding of the majority, because I believe that Batson does apply to Hispanics. United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989); People v. Hernandez, 140 A.D.2d 543, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1988), affirmed, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 552 N.E.2d 621 (1990); State v. Sandoval, 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (N.M.App. 1987).