187 N.W. 423 | S.D. | 1922
This is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to a defense alleged in the answer.
The complaint alleges that on the 14th of September, 1920, plaintiffs entered into a written contract with defendant whereby
The defense demurred to alleges that, at the time said contract was entered into, defendant was a farmer engaged in raising grain and live stock which was his only source of income; that the payments to be made under said contract could be made only from such sources, and his ability to perform the conditions of said contract depended wholly upon 'his income from such sources, and upon the prices which he would receive for such commodities ; that when the contract was entered into prices of such commodities were such that each party was justified in believing, and did believe, that defendant would be able to pay for said land in accordance with the terms of the contract, and that none of the parties believed, or had any reason to believe, that prices of such commodities would suddenly, and within a short time, materially and drastically drop; and that each of said parties knew that, in case prices did materially and drastically fall, the defendant would be utterly unable to make the payments provided in said contract; that shortly after the execution of said contract the prices of such commodities fell until they were approximately one-fourth of what they were at the time of the execution of said contract; that such fall of prices was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of said contract; that de
“We are not attacking the validity of this contract, nor questioning the right of respondents to proceed at law for damages for its breach.”
They concede that such contracts may be enforced even though hardship might result, provided the consequences are not ruinous to the vendee. Appellants’ contention is summed up in the statement that:
“The contract is confiscatory, harsh and ruinous as to appellant on account of the changed economic conditions.”
“It is a well-established doctrine that the court will not enforce the specific performance of a contract, the result of which would be to impose great hardship on either of the parties to it; and this although the party seeking specific performance may be free from the least impropriety of conduct. The question of hardship of a contract is generally to be judged of at the time at which it is entered into; if it be then fair and just, and not productive of hardship, it will be immaterial that it may, by the force of subsequent circumstances or change of events have become less beneficial to one party, except where these subsequent events have been in some way due to the party who seeks the performance of the contract. For, whatever contingencies may attach to a contract, or be involved in the performance of either part, have been taken upon themselves by the parties to it. It has been determined that the reasonableness of a contract is to be judged of at the time it was entered into, and not by the light of subsequent events. * * *”
Id.214-:
“It will not constitute a case of hardship that the ultimate object which a party had in view of entering into a contract may have become impossible. The mere failure' of the purchaser’s speculation will not discharge him from his obligations to the vendor.”
“One who sells. real property has a -special or vendor’s lien thereon, independent of possession, for so much of the price as remains unpaid, and unsecured otherwise than by the personal obligation of the buyer.”
Section 1543, Id.:
“The sale of any property on which there is a lien, in satisfaction of the claim secured thereby * * extinguishes the lien thereof.”
Appellant’s main contention is that respondent should be remitted to their remedy at law for breach of contract.
In those states having separate law and equity courts, or courts in which legal and equitable remedies are separately
The order of the trial court is affirmed.