Sorriento v. DaddarioSorriento v. Daddario
Lead Opinion
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Canfield, J.), entered July 13, 2000 in Rensselaer County, which partially denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that each sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) when, in January 1993, a hotel minibus in which they were traveling was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by defendants. Upon defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff Carlo Sorriento’s claim for damages for his alleged serious injuries but denied the motion with respect to the claim of serious physical injury of plaintiff Arlene T. Sorriento (hereinafter plaintiff). Defendants appeal from so much of the order as denied their motion for summary judgment against plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged in the complaint and bill of particulars that, as a result of the 1993 accident, she was thrown to the floor of the minibus, landing on her knees and causing strain and significant aggravation of rheumatoid arthritis in her right knee.
Initially, we conclude that defendants met their burden, as the moving parties, of making a prima facie showing that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler,
We conclude that plaintiff failed to meet this burden. In opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from her physician who stated that, as a result of the accident, plaintiff experienced a right knee sprain with a probable torn medial meniscus and a significant aggravation of the arthritis in the right knee. He opined that 25% of her permanent injury necessitating the knee replacement was attributable to the accident. The opinion of plaintiffs expert, however, is conclusory and apparently based on plaintiffs subjective complaints rather than on any distinct medical findings. Although his affidavit refers to the existence of objective medical evidence, he neglected to identify any specific evidence of an injury related to the accident (see, Crandall v Sledziewski,
Mercure, J. P., Carpinello and Rose, JJ., concur.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. While the majority finds that the medical expert’s affidavit submitted by plaintiff Arlene T. Sorriento (hereinafter plaintiff) in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment insufficient as a matter of law, I do not share their view.
The majority labels that affidavit “conclusory and apparently based on plaintiffs subjective complaints rather than on any distinct medical findings” and would require this plaintiff to submit a detailed affidavit of her medical expert specifying not only the objective medical evidence upon which he bases his medical opinion, but also explaining how that evidence establishes that her serious injury resulted from this accident. Such a requirement imposes a more severe burden on this plaintiff to defend a motion for summary judgment than she would face at trial (see, CPLR 4515).
Here, plaintiffs medical expert, a licensed physician board certified in orthopedic surgery and one of plaintiffs treating physicians, properly stated his opinion that the subject accident caused plaintiffs probable right medial meniscus tear, aggravated her preexisting arthritic condition, was responsible for 25% of her permanent injury and made her total right knee replacement a necessary medical procedure. Such opinion evidence, supported by X rays taken before and after the accident and the physical examinations of plaintiff during the course of his treatment of her, is legally admissible and, if uncontradicted, sufficient to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff at trial (see, Matott v Ward,