[¶ 1] William Everett and 14 others (collectively “Everett • defendants”) appeal from a judgment quieting title to certain McKenzie County mineral interests in Craig and Barbara Sorenson against the
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[¶ 2] In 2010 the Sorensons sued the Everett defendants and others to quiet title to certain mineral interests, claiming they had succeeded to ownership of those interests because the interests were abandoned under the Termination of Mineral Interest Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1. The Everett defendants each filed stipulations to dismiss the quiet title action against them with prejudice because “they have no financial or ownership interest” in the minerals at issue. Judgments against the Everett defendants were subsequently entered stating they are “hereby adjudicated to have no claim in the property at issue in Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to the parties[’] Stipulations,” and dismissing them from the quiet title action with prejudice. The district court then granted the remaining defendants summary judgment dismissal of the quiet title action because the Sorensons had not complied with the notice provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1 and the minerals had been “used” within the relevant time period.
[¶ 3] In 2012 the Sorensons commenced another quiet title action against the same defendants claiming entitlement to the same minerals because those interests were abandoned under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1. In July 2015 a partial judgment was entered based on a stipulation between the Sorensons and the defendants other than the Everett defendants resolving various issues about mineral ownership. On November 20, 2015, the Everett defendants moved for summary judgment dismissal of the Sorensons’ 2012 quiet title action. The Everett defendants argued they were not represented by counsel during the 2010 quiet title, proceedings, they “mistakenly stipulat[ed] to entry of a judgment entered against them that disclaimed ownership of the mineral interests,” and the “incorrect Stipulations” did not make the Sorensons “the owners of these minerals.”
[¶ 4] On January 26, 2016, the Everett defendants filed a N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion in the 2010 case to vacate the stipulated judgments because the judgments were based on the “mistaken belief’ that they “did not own a portion of the mineral interests at issue.” On January 29, 2016, the district court in the 2012 litigation granted the Sorensons’ cross-motion for summary judgment and quieted title in favor of them against the Everett defendants. The court ruled the Everett defendants’ lack of counsel when they entered into the stipulations disclaiming any interests they may have had in the minerals was “not grounds for invalidating the valid and binding Judgments.” On February 24, 2016, the court entered an order in the 2010 case denying the Everett defendants’ N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to vacate the stipulated judgments because the motion was untimely and the Everett defendants’ “mistaken belief they had no interest in the minerals at issue is not a sufficient reason for disturbing final judgment.” The court denied the Everett defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the judgment in the 2012 litigation, and the Everett defendants appeal only from that judgment.
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[¶ 5] The Everett defendants argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment quieting title in the Sorensons because the judgments in the 2010 litigation did not convey the minerals to the Sorensons and the Sorensons failed to provide sufficient evidence that they complied with the lapsed mineral procedures in N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1.
Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether the information available to the district court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record.
Hamilton, v. Wall,
[IT 7] The Sorensons argue that the issues raised by the Everett defendants on appeal were not raised in the district court and should not be considered here because “[i]t is well-settled that issues not raised in the district court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”
Paulson v. Paulson,
[¶8] The Everett defendants also argued to the district court that their “incorrect Stipulations” did not make the Sor-ensons “the owners of these minerals,” making the quiet title determination inappropriate for summary judgment. However, this is a quiet title action and N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01 provides in part:
An action may be maintained by any person having an estate or an interest in, or lien or encumbrance upon, real property, ... against any person claiming an estate or interest in, or lien or encumbrance upon, the same, for the purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest, lien, or encumbrance.
The statute “authorizes a person with an interest in real property to bring a quiet title action against any other person claiming an interest in the property to determine adverse claims.”
Dennison v. North Dakota Department of Human Services,
[¶ 9] Whether collateral estoppel applies is a question of law.
See Holkesvig v. Grove,
Ill
[¶ 10] It is unnecessary to address other issues raised. The judgment is affirmed.