72 Wis. 659 | Wis. | 1888
Lead Opinion
The following opinion was filed November 8, 1888:
The information charged the plaintiff in error with having murdered his wife, Esperance Soquet, on the 13th day of June, 1873, by poisoning, and the trial was had in April, 1SS8. The evidence tended to prove the following facts: The plaintiff in error and one August Mainsort, in June, 1873, lived as neighbors, on farms one mile apart. The family of the plaintiff in error consisted of himself and his wife, Esperance, and seven children, and that of Mainsort consisted only of himself and wife; and a criminal intimacy appeared to exist between the plaintiff in error and the wife of Mainsort. Mainsort suddenly died, and on au
The exceptions taken in behalf of the defendant at the trial are very numerous. But inasmuch as there may be no occasion for the same exceptions on another trial, we shall consider only such as arc the most important and material, and upon which we are compelled to reverse the judgment of conviction.
The witness Dr. Munro made about the only diagnosis of the fatal sickness of the deceased, and he stated to the jury the various symptoms that came under his observation, and other witnesses testified to other symptoms and appearances. This witness having detailed the symptoms he had himself observed, was asked by i the district attorney, “What are the syin'ptoms of arsenical poisoning?” Objection was made by the counsel for the prisoner that the witness was not shown to be an expert. The court sustained the objection until the witness could be further examined as to his qualifications to testify as an expert. He was thereupon asked, “Are you a member of any medical society?” and the witness answered, “Yes.” He was further asked, “Graduate of any medical college?” and he answered, “No.” He was then asked, “ What medical society are you a member of ? ” and he answered, “Brown county.” He was asked, “How long have you been a member of that society?” and he answered, “ Ten or twelve years.” He was then asked, “ How long has your practice as a physician covered ? ” and he answered, “ Twenty-five or thirty years.” He was then asked, “Has it covered cases of poisoning?” and he answered, “Not that I remember just now.” He was then asked, “Have you made a study of that branch of practice as well as other branches, and in the same wa3r?” and he answered, “Just in the same way. Yes.” He was then asked: “ State whether a knowledge of poisons and their effects is a part of the knowledge of a physician practicing?” and he an
Dr. Olmstead, offered as another medical witness and expert by the district attorney, testified that be was a phy
The testimony of these two medical witnesses was very
I have quoted the testimony of Doctors Munro and Olm-stead, by questions and answers, fully1' and correctly, that the application of Boyle v. State might clearly appear. The testimony of such medical witnesses is at best merely hearsay,— what medical books and teachers taught or told them, repeated from memory. The learned counsel of the state asks this court to review and overrule that case as not supported by authority. But it is supported by authority, and equally by reason. The decision was made deliber ately, and we can see no reason for revising or cbangingit. It is to be deplored that it escaped the attention of the court and the counsel of the state in a case of such serious consequence. The result and consequence of such a palpable error must be the same as in the case of Boyle v. State. The judgment must be reversed. It is more important to the public and the state than the conviction of the prisoner, that he be convicted, if at all, on legal and competent evidence. It would seem not to be difficult to find a sufficient number of medical witnesses to testify in such a case, who are'competent from knowledge and experience.
Rehearing
A motion for a rehearing was made by the defendant in error, and it was urged that the case of Boyle v. State, 57 VVis. 472, is clearly distinguishable from this case. The question here is not whether an expert witness may testify as to what an author says, but whether a person may become an expert on any given subject by close attention and discriminating study of that subject, together with practical experience in a profession of which that subject is a part. That a witness may testify from knowledge so acquired, see, besides cases cited on the former argument, Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648; State v. Terrell, 12 Rich. 321; Bierce v. Stocking, 11 Gray, 174; State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1-16: The extent of the special knowledge to be required of an expert is so much a matter of discretion with the trial court that its decision should be disturbed only when the witness is shown to be wholly incompetent. Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63 Pa. St. 146; Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645-648; Tucker v. M. C. R. Co. 118 Mass. 546; Nelson v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co. 71 N. Y. 453; Ft. Wayne v. Coombs, 107 Ind. 75; Warren v. Spencer Water Co. 143 Mass. 9; Perkins v. Stickney, 132 Mass. 217; Howard v. Providence, 6 R. I. 514; Bemis v. C. V. R. Co. 58 Vt. 636; Best on Evi. (Morgan’s Notes), sec. 513, p. 868, note 3, p. 876, note 1, and p. 882, per Miller, C. J.
Counsel for the plaintiff in error cited, besides cases previously cited by them, Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117; Bouvier’s Law Dict. tit. Expert; Nelson v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co. 71 N. Y. 460.
The motion was denied December 22, 1888.