114 Kan. 900 | Kan. | 1923
The plaintiff held a certificate of deposit issued by The Butler County State Bank. The bank was operated under the bank guaranty system. It became insolvent on March 30, 1923, but the defendant refuses to issue to plaintiff a certificate on the guaranty fund because of an alleged uncertainty as to the due date appearing on the face of plaintiff’s certificate of deposit. The certificate reads:
“Ed Dorado, Kansas, Jan. 5, 1923. No. 4408. -
“Harvey L. Songer has deposited with
“The Butler County State Bank, of El Dorado, Kansas,
“Eight Hundred Fifty-seven and ^oo Dollars $857.15
“Payable to the order of himself.
“On the return of this certificate properly endorsed 6 or 12 months after date with interest at four per cent per annum, no interest after maturity.
“Not payable until maturity.
“Not subject to check. (Signed) “L. D. Haddet,'
“Assistant Cashier.”
The bank commissioner’s answer sets up certain orders of his department promulgated by his predecessor which provide that only time certificates of deposit bearing a definite date of maturity shall be protected by the guaranty fund. The question therefore is: Does the certificate in question lack that requirement? Counsel for the bank commissioner strongly contend that it does. Considerable evidence of little importance has been adduced by the litigants and has been carefully read. There was testimony that the former bank commissioner who promulgated the order requiring time deposits protected by the guaranty fund to have definite date of maturity was inclined to the view that a due date of 6 or 12 months from date was indefinite but he did not condemn certificates specifying more than one date of maturity, as, for example, “July 5, 1923, or January 5,1924.” Of course the bank commissioner’s opinion is not controlling. It is but the operative interpretation of the order by the official who promulgated it, but it has some value as an aid to a correct judicial interpretation of the rule. (Harrison v. Benefit Society, 61 Kan. 134, syl. ¶ 2, 59 Pac. 266; Bank v. Reilly, 97 Kan. 817, 823, 156 Pac. 747.)
The court has no hesitancy in saying, however, that there is no uncertainty of a date of maturity when there is nothing lacking to its ascertainment but the simplest kind of a mathematical compu
Some refinements of argument against this view are advanced which would show the impolicy of a bank issuing that sort of an obligation — that it could not loan out the money to earn the 4 per cent and an operating profit if it could not be assured of keeping the money for 12 months. We cannot believe that the banking business of this state is operated on so narrow a margin of safety that a stipulation for an accelerated due date on the interest-bearing time certificate would imperil a bank’s solvency. The same sort of argument could be advanced more potently against the issue of three per cent demand certificates, yet these are sanctioned by the guaranty act.
Under the statutory authority conferred upon the bank commissioner by the guaranty act it is probably within the power of that officer to promulgate a positive rule that interest-bearing certificates of deposit issued by guaranteed banks shall have but one due date which shall not be subject to acceleration at the option of the holder, but no such order has yet been promulgated. The certificate now under scrutiny does not fall under the ban of any fairly interpreted rule yet issued, and the plaintiff is entitled to the writ applied for.
A subsidiary question is also raised: Should the certificate on the guaranty fund include the interest accrued on the deposit certificate from its date, January 5, 1923, to the time of the bank failure,
Writ allowed.