*2 VANCE, and Circuit Before TJOFLAT TUTTLE, Judges, Senior Circuit Judge.
TJOFLAT,
Judge:
Circuit
Fleming,
H.
petitioner,
Son
is a
Georgia inmate
has
who
been convicted
Giddens,
of James Edward
City, a
Ray
small town in
chief
Georgia, and sentenced to death.1
south
applied
He
district court for writ of
corpus, contending that his convic
habeas
thirty-
tion
sentence were invalid on
and/or
grounds.
nine
All
federal constitutional
previously
the claims
been considered
rejected by
Georgia
their merits
on
courts.2 The district court refused
issue
raising
appeals,
eight
the writ. Petitioner
brought
to the district
claims
court.
affirm.
We
allegations
petitioner's
Superior Court
found
to be
convicted in the
court
1. Petitioner was
Georgia
County, Georgia
on
of malice murder
merit and denied relief. The
of Lanier
without
26,
and,
jury's
January
application
Supreme
petitioner's
recommen
1977
on
Court denied
dation,
ap
appeal
to death. On direct
probable
sentenced
cause to
for
certificate
Georgia Supreme
1980,
peal,
21,
Court affirmed
on November
decision on October
be
the death sentence
14,
but reversed
1980,
conviction
his motion for reconsideration.
Peti-
instructing
judge
cause
trial
erred
petition
writ
tioner
a second
for a
of cer-
filed
during
phase. Fleming
sentencing
v.
jury
Court,
Supreme
the U.S.
which was
tiorari
142,
State,
(1977).
240
Fol
240
37
Ga.
S.E.2d
Austin,
910,
Fleming
also
v.
452
denied.
remand,
change
lowing
moved for
3040,
(1981).
venue,
superior
judge
court
transfer
and the
County, Georgia for the
the case to Cook
red
(c)
2254(b)
(1982) state
§§
2. 28 U.S.C.
sentencing
jury again
trial. The
recommended
(b)
application for a writ of habeas cor-
An
penalty,
court
death
sentenced
custody pursuant
pus
person
of a
in behalf
Georgia Supreme
accordingly.
tioner
judgment
a State court shall not
to the
sentence,
the U.S.
the death
Court affirmed
applicant
granted
appears
unless
petitioner's application
Supreme
denied
Court
remedies available in the
has exhausted the
120,
State,
Fleming
243 Ga.
certiorari.
State,
or that there
either
courts of the
denied,
(1979),
S.E.2d
cert.
252
609
process
available State corrective
absence of
There
62 L.Ed.2d
rendering
circumstances
or the existence
after,
sought
corpus
habeas
relief in
protect
rights
process
such
ineffective
Georgia
County,
Superior
of Tattnall
Court
prisoner.
July
claiming
separate
On
errors.
I.
The three men robbed a convenience
evening
store that
between 10:00 and 10:30
presented
petit
The evidence
jury
Adel,
Georgia.6 Larry Fleming and Wil
during the state criminal
lis, one of them armed with a .22 caliber
case
introduced at
two trials.3 At
revolver, went into the
petition
store while
trial,
began
January
the first
which
They
er remained in the car.
accosted the
*3
guilty
found
manager,
register,
rifled the cash
and fled
malice murder and recommended that he be
paper bag
with a
money
brown
and a
sentenced to death.
trial judge,
The
re
cigarettes.
carton of Kool
quired by Georgia
jury’s
law to follow the
Giddens,
police
James Edward
chief
recommendation, imposed
penal
the death
Ray City,7
sitting
police
his
car in
ty.
Supreme
Georgia
The
Court
set
Ray City talking
friend,
with a
L.V. Du
sentence,4
aside
death
and he
pree, when he received a broadcast over his
sentencing
thereafter
received a new
trial.
police radio
robbery.
about
Shortly
trial,
5,
At
convened on December
thereafter,
the red and
passed
white Ford
1977,
parties, collectively,
introduced
through Ray City.
appeared
The car
essentially the same evidence adduced at
but,
fact,
occupants,
have two
there was
trial, and,
jury’s
the first
on the
recommen
a third who was hidden from view. One of
dation,
again
the court
sentenced
occupants
wore a
cap.
baseball
Chief
presentation,
For
to death.
ease of
we
pursued
Giddens
the car
investigate.
guilt
penal
recite
evidence as if the
and
later,
Moments
police
he radioed the
dis
phases
ty
trial had been held
patcher that he
stopping
the car and
jury.5
the same
gave
it,-includ
description
conclusive
ing the license number. Once both ears
A.
stopped, petitioner,
the driver of the
Ford, got
speak
out to
with Chief Giddens.
The murder of James Edward Giddens
One of the other
men with
place
p.m.
took
between 10:30 and 11:00
jumped Giddens and all
strug
three men
11,
Lakeland,
February
1976 near
Lanier
gled for his service
signifi
revolver. After
County, Georgia.
It was the last of a
difficulty,
cant
they
and,
subdued Giddens
night by
series of crimes committed that
gunpoint, placed
him in the Ford. Peti
petitioner,
Fleming,
Son H.
and his accom-
proceeded
tioner then
to drive the car over
Henry
plices,
Larry
Willis III and
Donnell
country
some isolated
roads.
Fleming (petitioner’s nephew), in south cen-
Georgia.
tral
On the afternoon of Febru-
During
trip,
begged
Chief Giddens
11,
Moultrie,
ary
petitioner,
Georgia,
bor-
life,
spare
telling
them to
his
them that he
Terry
rowed red and white Ford car from
report
incident,
would never
that he
Coney,
p.m., peti-
a friend. At about 8:00
children,
had a wife and three small
and
left
in the
Larry
tioner
Moultrie
car with
that he was scheduled to retire from the
Fleming
Henry
Donnell
III
police
Willis
day.
force the next
Petitioner
passengers.
stopped
swamp
the car near a
every-
(c)
State,
applicant
Fleming
An
shall not be deemed
240 Ga.
was denied
in
proceeding,
stage of his criminal
critical
A.
and fourteenth
sixth
violation
Petitioner
that he was denied
claims
vitiating
amendments,23
automatically
thus
at a “critical
representation
of counsel
barring
Sec
his retrial.
conviction
proceeding,
his state criminal
stage” of
third,
effec
petitioner was denied
ond
14,
May
evidentiary
1976
guilt
both the
counsel at
tive assistance of
County justice
peace,
in
of the
the Cook
trial, in
phases
violation
penalty
and fourteenth
violation
sixth
fifth,
amendm
sixth and fourteenth
Alabama,
amendments,
v.
see Coleman
Fourth,
jury at neither
since the
ents.24
1,
1999,
90 S.Ct.
1443 14, evidentiary and focused instead on May question 1976 hear tation the The request of Millard prejudiced held at the of whether had been ing was Farmer, lawyer Larry proceeding. Atlanta criminal by The court found that attorney brought had into the Fleming’s prejudice had suffered no and case, the defense to discover to enable accordingly rejected his claim. pending all three evidence on State’s court, by being The district bound no fact evi contends that this charges. Petitioner findings regarding nature of the hear actually a committal dentiary hearing was thereat, petitioner’s representation by the court to determine hearing convened § 2254(d) (1982), see 28 U.S.C. pe referred to the then unindicted probable cause as magistrate claim to the titioner’s for an murder, crimes, robbery and malice armed evidentiary hearing. hearing After the tes should be bound whether accused witnesses, timony magistrate of several (The grand jury. accused had over to the 14, May proceeding found that 1976 County in Berrien already been indicted was, fact, hearing a committal and that kidnapping bodily injury, with and since represented had not been be capital they being held was a offense Parrish, court-appointed cause Edward State, in charge.) on that The without bail attorney kidnapping charge, on the chose hearing was response, contends that magistrate not to attend. concluded rather, hearing; committal it was not a Holloway v. Arkansas and Coleman that session, discovery albeit simply an informal v. Alabama mandated that con officer, request by judicial presided over aside, viction and death sentence set counsel, agreed by by ed defense he recommended that the district court is apparent This is from the fact prosecutor. sue the writ.29 judicial presiding that the officer made no probable cause determinations at the con court, object- after district the State proceeding.27 clusion of the recommendation, magistrate’s ed to the evidentiary hearing, convened an heard ad- raised his claim of denied Petitioner first testimony, petition- ditional and considered corpus peti representation in the habeas found, de novo. claim The court alter- er’s County to the Tattnall tion he addressed 14, natively, May proceeding that the court, 1976 following Superior That an Court.28 “agreed-upon discovery confer- evidentiary hearing, sidestepped ques 14, ence,” hearing, not a committal and that concerning May nature of the tions petitioner’s represen- attorney represented petitioner Farmer had proceeding and 1976 First, hearing provided by Georgia hearing. committal the Cook Jus- the commitment law, 14, stage.” subject jurisdiction supra a "critical had see note tice of the Peace matter Holloway County, held that the the crime in Cook Petitioner contends over committed stage" robbery; jurisdiction any at "critical vitiates armed he did not have denial of counsel any under re- conviction that follows also bars over the malice murder offense now view, making place the defendant. this conten- because that offense took in Lanier retrial of tion, 15-10-50(b) (1982), language County, of Coleman indi- or § he overlooks the Ga.Code Ann. offense, prelimi- cating kidnapping bodily injury denial of counsel at a be- County, nary hearing the defendant’s does not vitiate cause that offense occurred in Berrien id., grand jury already subsequent was "harm- returned an conviction if denial California, Chapman supra note 14. Sec- error under v. indictment ond, thereon. See less (1967).” justice peace entertained neither logical argument at 2004. The nor entered an on the issues U.S. at order Third, suggest hearing. holding posed by that a defense extension of this committal hearing merely a dis- defendant’s retrial would not be barred if the counsel viewed the as session; preliminary hearing covery attorney Farmer told the denial of counsel at hearing, request- proceedings. taint the retrial We district court at the habeas would not however, question, because ed the to discover the State’s case. need not decide the conclude, below, we as did the district court supra 28. See note 1. represented counsel May hearing. peti- magistrate point 29. The did not decide us, presents Holloway posi- strongly supports tioner now 27. The record the State’s May Arkansas would bar retrial. was not tion *9 1444 by The de- is well documented hearing. court therefore the court
at that reporter’s transcript hearing. claim. of the The nied portion transcript “Ap that indicating of May 14, proceeding 1976 Whether the i.e., identity pearances,” lawyers the and, thus, a committal constituted parties, appearing respective the stated for petitioner’s prosecution stage in a critical Farmer, Defender, that Millard “Senior right pur- to counsel sixth amendment for Council,” ap Georgia Justice Criminal peti- question. Had poses is a nettlesome According to peared “for the defendants.” companions already been tioner and his two case, the the defendants were style they for which of the crimes indicted for all III, petitioner, Henry Larry Willis and Don arrested, prelim- so as to render had been probable Fleming. lawyer inary hearing to determine cause nell Farmer was might difficulty unnecessary, have little we for appearance who entered an these def was, concluding proceeding as prosecutor, opening endants.33 The his it, merely a portrayed make- the State has beginning remarks to the court at the by discovery provided not for shift session hearing, referred to Farmer as “coun law, parties which the ar- Georgia Farmer, respond sel for the defendants.” own convenience. But ranged for their remarks, prosecutor’s opening case; juries grand for this is not the said, correctly “I think stated.” yet not met Lanier Counties had Cook and witnesses, Eighteen by twelve called probable cause to believe that defendants, State six testified committed armed rob- three accused had testimony hearing. Their with all dealt not au- bery and malice murder had been investigation three all crimes under Thus, how to la- thoritatively determined. three all defendants. Farmer conducted is, indeed, proceeding this debatable. bel questioning, represent- as if he defense question, how We need not decide short, ed all In ac- three defendants. his ever, district agree with the court’s we completely tions consistent holding received alternative representation hearing. at that counsel, by Mr. representation of Farm important We to note Farm think er, holding, hearing.30 at that That suggested er never court or case, finding this constituted context of representing that he all clearly accept fact must unless which we 52(a). hearing. See three at the erroneous. See Fed.R.Civ.P. defendants Given Balkcom, (5th Baty also v. F.2d 391 experience expertise 661 vast in criminal denied, 1981), cert. law, Cir. Unit B especially capital cases such as this L.Ed.2d 73 1308 one, significance “ap Farmer knew the States, v. United (1982);31 Patterson defendants; pearing” for all the he knew Cir.1973)32(holding (5th that Rule F.2d 341 true, that, that if this were not for exam 52(b) applies factual determinations ple, represent petitioner, peti he did not § (1982) proceedings in the dis U.S.C. 2254 might well denied his tioner sixth court). trict counsel, right amendments fourteenth integrity of the State’s finding that Farmer district court’s May 14, open question. 1976 of would be represented petitioner at Prichard, City notwithstanding 32. 661 F.2d We this Bonner 30. reach conclusion appointed (en banc), judicial (11th Cir.1981) the fact that no officer court this petitioner. represent The absence of binding Farmer to adopted precedent all as decisions preclude appointment an Farm- official did not prior handed former Fifth Circuit down attorney-client having er and from 1, 1981. October hearing. relationship at that 33. record indicates that Farmer had several Inc., Securities, Reynolds 667 F.2d In Stein v. sitting with him at the counsel table assistants (11th Cir.1982), binding adopted court hearing, during it does not inform us but precedent of the former all decisions of Unit B they were who assistants were or whether these September Fifth Circuit handed down after lawyers. even
1445
Moreover,
relying exclusively
transcripts
if he
on the
Farmer knew that
misled
ap
proceedings
petitioner’s
nature of his
held in
as to the true
the court
defendants, especially in a
Superior
for the
Courts of
pearance
Lani
hand,
Counties,35
one at
serious as the
case as
er and Cook
concluded that his
The
disciplinary proceedings.
might
job
face
lawyers
good
had done a
and denied his
that Farmer
did not believe
district court
claim.
situation;
in this
the state court
misled
presented
his ineffective
When
represented petition
he in fact
found
court,
claim to the district
assistance
fully supports the court’s
The record
er.
County
concluded that
the Tattnall
court
therefore
Petitioner’s
claim
finding.
adequately
had not
Superior Court
devel
fails.34
oped and decided the facts on which
and, accordingly,
his claim
tioner based
B.
gen
See
evidentiary hearing.
an
scheduled
claims that his conviction
§
(1982).
erally 28 U.S.C.
At
because
must be set aside
and/or sentence
hearing, petitioner’s habeas counsel called
of coun-
ineffective assistance
he' received
attorneys,
petitioner’s
trial
Parrish and
penalty phases of
guilt
sel at both
Zeesman,
questioned
to the stand and
them
the sixth amend-
in violation of
his trial
extensively
pretrial
investiga
their
about
Richardson, McMann v.
ment. See
case,
petitioner’s
preparation
tion of
their
1449 n.
771 n.
trial,
strategy.
and their trial
for
Habeas
Petitioner had
L.Ed.2d 763
testimony
counsel also elicited
on the same
attorneys throughout
of two
the services
prosecutor.
points from
state
Coun
court-appointed Ed-
prosecution:
Georgia
final witness was
Bureau of
sel’s
Parrish,
prosecutor
state
a former
ward
Agent
Investigation
Greeson. Greeson had
lawyer who
criminal defense
and veteran
participated
taking
petition
of one of
thirty murder
approximately
tried
and,
police36
er’s statements to
there
bar,
forty-six years at the
in his
cases
after,
petitioner had con
discovered that
Zeesman,
by petitioner’s
retained
Benjamin
fessed to his cellmate
the Cook
lawyer
mother,
experienced trial
equally
kidnapped
jail that he
and murdered Chief
at-
years experience. Both
forty-five
with
Giddens.
with the
intimately familiar
torneys were
point
calling
counsel’s
Greeson
Habeas
crimes were com-
where the
communities
that, contrary
the testimo-
to show
occurred,
pros-
the trial
mitted and
Zeesman, they had not
ny of Parrish and
case,
assigned
and with the
ecutor
prior
pe-
adequately interviewed
Greeson
fact,
officers involved.
law enforcement
testimony did
trial.
titioner’s
Greeson’s
some
known the
Parrish had
Al-
point,
however.
not establish
relationship gave Parrish
This
forty years.
specif-
though Greeson could not recall
investigate
unique ability to
Zeesman a
may
he and
have dis-
ics of what
Parrish
case on an informal
evidence
trial, he
prior
petitioner’s
stated
cussed
that these two
The record discloses
basis.
any con-
that whatever Parrish said about
vigorous and thor-
attorneys conducted a
they had was correct.
versation
defense.
ough
testimony of these
In addition to the
County,
Tattnall
Superior
The
Court
witnesses,
introduced into
habeas counsel
pe-
jurisdiction
in whose territorial
Georgia,
of several witnesses
the affidavits
incarcerated,
evidence
considered
titioner had been
given favorable
they would have
who said
of coun-
ineffective assistance
petitioner’s
court,
testimony
behalf
corpus. character
claim on habeas
sel
supra note 1.
emphasize
35. See
sixth and
We
claim here is that he
amendments
fourteenth
May
hearing.
at the
was denied counsel
supra
note
36. See
represented
if Farmer
no claim that
He makes
performance was
Farmer’s
him at
inadequate.
made errors so
trial
show “that counsel
serious
sentencing phase of the
but
at the
functioning
law-
by petitioner’s
that counsel was not
as the
contacted
were never
evidence
rebutted this
guaranteed
the defendant
yers.
State
‘counsel’
*11
people
com-
at —,
of five
who
the affidavits
Id.
104 S.Ct.
Sixth Amendment.”
unfavor-
petitioner’s character
professional
mented
on the
We focus
at 2064.
ably.
un
counsel’s assistance
of
reasonableness
circumstances, bearing in mind that
der the
petition-
decided
court thus
The district
ways
provide
effec
there are countless
counsel claim
of
ineffective assistance
er’s
at —,
given
case. Id.
tive assistance
testimony of his trial
on the live
based
Second,
37. Parrish court, change pick a fair why He felt that he could he moved for a in the district County requested change sentencing retrial. See Lanier and therefore petitioner's of venue notoriety en- venue. selected Cook The court supra note 1. He stated site, County by petitioner's first the retrial Parrish acceded gendered in Lanier during court’s decision. and did not subside trial substantial g- e. Petitioner performance faults counsel’s
Petitioner faults counsel’s failure to in- respects. at trial in several We discuss his County- terview his cellmate in the Brooks points in order. jail, prosecution’s key witness to whom unqualified made an confession. i. Long began, before the trial Parrish con- Petitioner asserts that counsel failed to County, ferred the Sheriff of Brooks object the court’s excusal of several precisely and he knew what the cellmate consciously opposed capital veniremen going say. Parrish did not inter- punishment. As we have indicated in the because, explained view the cellmate as he margin,39 each of these veniremen were court, tip to the district he did not want to properly excused under Witherspoon v. Il strategy. linois, off his cross-examination (1968); impressed by peti-
district court was not consequently, L.Ed.2d 776 counsel’s object failure handling preju criticism of caused no tioner’s counsel’s situation, dice. perhaps because neither claimed nor demonstrated re- ii. sulting prejudice. Petitioner also criticizes asserts counsel failed ade adequacy of counsel’s interview of quately *13 investigate prepare to for the Georgia Investigation Agent Bureau of hearing Jackson-Denno the trial court con Greeson, but, again, explained he has not during vened the State’s case in chief to any prej- how counsel’s conduct caused him voluntariness, determine the and therefore adequate udice. This failure of interview admissibility,40 post-arrest the of the state specie according- of sixth amendment claim petitioner gave ments to law enforcement
ly fails.
February 12
officers on
and 15 and twice
16,
(In
February
our recitation of
f.
supra,
the facts in Part I.B.
only
we cite
Petitioner asserts error in counsel’s fail
February
12 statement and the second
file a
Brady
seeking
ure to
motion
formal
February
they
statement of
because
prosecution’s
exculpatory
disclosure of
only
were the
ones
guilt
introduced at the
evidence. A
Brady
formal
motion was un
trial.)
phase
gist
petitioner’s
case,
necessary
prosecutor
in this
as the
claim is that counsel failed to interview the
already given
had
counsel full access to his police
present
officers
peti
at the scene of
why
file. This is one of the reasons
Parr
and, therefore,
tioner’s arrest
did not learn
unnecessary
ish considered it
to attend the
police
thirty policemen
that fifteen
cars and
May
discovery hearing
in Cook converged on the site within a matter of
County. Petitioner overlooks the fact that minutes,
atmosphere
was emotion
conference,
attorneys,
pretrial
his
at a
ally charged,
punched
and that an officer
request
any Brady
made an oral
mate
petitioner’s accomplices
one of
in the stom
might
rial the State
have. The
ach and kneed him the face. Petitioner
responded that he had none. The trial
that,
conjectures
had counsel interviewed
judge
ordered the State to turn over
officers,
these
counsel
have sum
would
Brady
subsequently might
material that
testify
moned them to
at the Jackson-Den-
appear,
prosecutor,
as far as we
portray
no
to
the arrest scene and
discern,
can
did
Petitioner’s Brady
so.
convince the court that the events which
place
claim is frivolous.38
took
there intimidated
him,
supra
required by
38. See
note 22.
as
failed
caution
Miranda v.
Arizona,
16 L.Ed.2d
39. Id.
(1966),
they interrogated
him
supra
took his statements. See
note 12.
made
claim in the
no
state trial
court,
now,
police
and makes
that
none
subsequent
questioning
deceptive
extent
state-
was
such an
involuntary.
police
confusing
were
to put
ments to
and tended
words in his
mouth,
they
urged
thus
the court to
petitioner’s
support
does
The record
product
exclude the statement
First, there
no evidence indicat
claim.
improper police conduct. At the close of
that counsel failed
interview the
judge
the trial
held the state
evidentiary hearing
At his
in the
officers.
voluntary
ment
and therefore admissible.
court,
pursued
petitioner neither
district
that,
however,
added,
He
if the
questioning
Parrish and Zees
point
evidence,
offered the statement
into
through other
nor established it
testi
man
objections
would entertain defense
Second,
allegations
trial
mony.
interrogators’ questions
appeared
to suppress
made
their motion
counsel
leading
or testimonial
nature.
strongly
suggest
statements
prosecutor subsequently decided not to in
questioned
counsel had
someone who
troduce the statement.42
arrest.
scene
place
recited the
which took
Counsel
events
transcript
Our
examination
the trial
alleged
peti
there and
that the statements
convinces us that defense counsel’s strate
subsequently gave the
were
tioner
gy,
in objecting
February
to the first
engendered by
product
fear
statement,
entirely
reasonable. Pe
atmosphere
permeated the
hostile
which
statements,
titioner’s
two of which
other
scene.41
arrest
presented
jury,43 provided
were
hearing,
pros
At the
Jackson-Denno
closing
counsel’s
argument
foundation for
presented
ecutor
the four statements
petitioner, normally
law-abiding per
given
As
police.
we have
tioner
son,
was himself
victim of two hot
margin,
supra
set forth
see
note
accomplices,
headed
who took undue advan
they
February
12 oral statement
tage of
him. Without these statements
Gaskins;
Register
Detective
and Sheriff
evidence,
argument
this defense
February 15 tape-recorded
statement to
and,
speculation
have been
than
little more
*14
Greeson;
February
Agent
tape-re
case,
prosecution’s strong
in the face of the
Register
statement to Detective
and
corded
perhaps worthless.
Gaskins;
subsequent
Sheriff
Feb
iii.
oral,
to
ruary 16
unrecorded statement
Petitioner contends that counsel acted
lawyers
Alderman. Petitioner’s
did
Sheriff
they
incompetently
placed
when
him on the
(the
object
three
not
to
of these statements
present
witness
and
him
stand
allowed
first, second,
fourth),
they
because
con
alibi,
pre-
an
was
because
exculpatory,
them
and thus intro
sidered
did,
to,
pared
thoroughly impeach
they
no
to indicate that
duced
evidence
story.
As the state habeas court and
fact, they
involuntary.
used these
clear,
district court
have
made
below
both
argue
peti
to the
that
statements
counsel faced the
task of de-
unenviable
accomplices
two
forced
tioner’s
fending
hopeless
an almost
case.
.
part
spree
in their crime
to take
tioner
guilt
State’s evidence of
was overwhelm-
lawyers
objected
his will. The
against
ing.
petition-
Counsel went
with
forward
tape-recorded February 16
er’s alibi
insist-
defense because
Register
to Detective
and Sher
statement
ed that his alibi was true. We cannot label
was
This statement
most
iff Gaskins.
incompetent
professionally
defense counsel
damaging to
because
contained
having their
under these circumstances for
many inconsistencies and vacillations
so
which,
believed,
present testimony
client
if
appeared that it
be unbelievable. Coun
interrogators’
defense.
that
method would make out
absolute
sel claimed
thought
lawyers initially
supra
42. See
note 12.
41. Petitioner’s
that his
resulted from
statements
charged
atmosphere
permeated
scene
which
Id.
subsequent
investigation
his arrest. Their
of
disclosed
that such
not the case.
was
ticipate
kidnapping
in
iv.
and murder of
Chief Giddens.
failing to
faults counsel for
Petitioner
investigation,
As a result of this
allegedly improper and
defense
object to several
to use
pros
counsel decided
Sheriff Alderman as
made
inflammatory comments
their character witness. The State called
jury.
to the
final summation
ecutor
purposes,
Alderman for other
and the de-
ques
the comments
have examined
We
fense,
cross-examination, brought
out
propriety was
that their
tion and conclude
telling him
that
cried while
about
have
objections
could
debatable
murder;
petitioner usually
told the
Counsel’s heat-
on the defense.
backfired
truth;
respected
obeyed
that he
law
object
are under
decisions not
of-trial
officers; and that he had nev-
enforcement
hindsight,
we can
here. Even
standable
charged
felony.
er
with a serious
Pe-
been
v. Wash
fault them. See Strickland
—
testimony
points
on these
at —,
titioner’s
1452 closing argument jury, Viewing In Parr- argument counsel’s as a whole evidence; in ish addressed this conflict light everything that had tran- that he made it was in this context spired jury, say before the we cannot that challenges. Parr- comment now knowledge petitioner's the mere that case point jury was that ish’s might up in federal wind court led the statement, beating, had made about sentencing jurors responsibili- to take their desperation out of sheer and fear for his Zant, v. 549, Corn ty lightly. 708 F.2d jail in Petitioner had been almost two life. State, (11th Cir.1983); but Prevatte v. cf. suggested pres- years, and Parrish (1975) (the 214 S.E.2d Ga. great him so that he sure on prosecutor’s effect” “inevitable of the em- say anything willing to to save his life. In phasis right on the defendant’s to an auto- short, asking jury Parrish was not to appeal encourage jury matic was “to allegation hold the misconduct consequence attach diminished to their ver- against his client. dict”). certainly Counsel’s statement did finding The district court based its of no not affect the outcome of sen- sixth amendment violation in this instance tencing proceeding. solely petitioner’s penalty on the record of summary, persuaded we are hot trial; apply accordingly, we do not by petitioner’s argument attorneys that clearly erroneous rule to the court’s deci and Zeesman him Parrish rendered ineffec Rather, sion. we review the same cold tive assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s ex record to determine whether defense coun amples professional dereliction dissolve down Wash by laid sel satisfied test away scrutiny, under leaving close at best ington. Washington’s conclude, We a handful of A colorable claims. defense words, that counsel made no error “so seri attorney solely is not ineffective because functioning ous that counsel was not as the his client is sentenced to death. “Intrusive guaranteed ‘counsel’ the defendant — post-trial inquiry attorney perform into Amendment,” at —, Sixth U.S. ance,” such as that which has been re at and that there is no reason case, quired may “dampen that, the ardor probability had counsel not made able comment, impair independence challenged “the result of the defense counsel, proceeding discourage acceptance have been different.” as at —, Id. cases, signed 104 S.Ct. and undermine the trust be Washington attorney tween and client.” f. — Strickland, at —, 104 S.Ct. at objection lawyers’ final to his Petitioner’s here, performance, 2066. Counsel’s en- performance concerns counsel’s statement fundamentally sured a “fair trial” which closing argument that: at —, Id. “produced just result.” hope goes I this case not into Federal S.Ct. at 2064. There is no reason to set Courts, always stuck to our state we’ve penalty aside conviction or his court, got represent our but we’ve representation on account of the he re- it, espe client —that’s all there is to ceived. injustice cially when we feel an done. But, hope say stops We here . . . . we C. side, take Be on the safe don’t his life. eighth Petitioner contends that always give
you’re safer to the life sen amendment, interpreted by Supreme tence. Florida, Court Edmund v. argues this statement im- 3368, 3379, properly jury informed the (1982), imposition foreclosed the could seek relief in the federal courts fol- penalty death his case because of “the lowing imposition penalty of the death [petitioner] proof absence of killed or jury and led the to believe attempted contemplated that might to kill ... or executed even if the *17 premises him life Petitioner sentenced to death. would be taken.” fragments theory argument parties of the whether the under on two which the judge presented the argued the trial jury instructions the case to the proof phase guilt the the of his jury at close of safely can say were such that we the concept the of The first involves trial. jury guilty defendant found the of malice murder; conspi- felony the second concerns murder. If we cannot make that determi postulates liability. ratorial nation, way only a penalty then the death may him jury have convicted of Chief the (or sentencing if the imposed jury can be is believing that he murder without Giddens’ sentencer)46 if the judge, judge is true the kill, or “kill[ed], attempted] intended] explicitly malice murder. finds Such was killing or that lethal place a take force not the case here. We therefore turn to id. at employed,” 102 S.Ct. at charge guilt-phase jury the to determine if may Giddens’ murder have been because jury the case the received under the multi product felony, kidnapping with the of a posed ple liability theories has bodily injury, conspiracy peti- a which or and, so, theory if under which whether jury participated. The returned a tioner parties argued jury the case to accordingly, peti- general guilty; verdict of proof jury led nevertheless to con argues, his thesis cannot be refuted. tioner guilty clude that of malice require explicit an Edmund does not murder. (court finding by jury) or the sentencer 1. “kill[ed], attempted] that the defendant charged in this The indictment case kill, killing place or that a take intended] employed” petitioner solely with malice lethal murder. force be or imposed. penalty jury can be What is the death court instructed the that effect sentencer be satisfied important proceeded jury to inform about in- evidence establishes defendant’s so, doing murder. In elements of malice extent Ed- the murder volvement felony the court made a brief reference to not, mund requires. If the sentencer is or murder. reference was That embedded be, satisfied, Edmund deems not so could following instruction: unreasonably penalty disparate the death Now, charge here is murder. imposition. thus forbids its Now, person commits murder when a Edmund vio determining In whether afore- unlawfully, malice first look to the place lation has taken we thought, expressed implied, either or jury received under which instructions causes of another human be- the death guilt the case the conclusion ing. If, example, jury of the trial. for phase Now, expressed malice is that deliber- guilt it could find instructed that unlawfully away the ate to take intention it the defendant commit unless found that creature, life of which is mani- a fellow murder, Georgia re malice which ted capable of fest circumstances external caused the vic quires that the defendant Now, implied proof. malice shall be aforethought, malice death with tim’s provocation ap- where no considerable guilty charged, the defendant it found pears, all of circumstances and where If, end.45 would how the Edmund inquiry ma- killing an abandon and show in ever, jury the case under received lignant heart. authorize to base that would structions Now, person also commits felony murder or malice murder or guilt on when in commis- crime murder then, murder, in order to sus conspiratorial he causes the death felony sion must penalty, death we determine tain the Florida, not, course, judge example, the is the pre- trial finding guilt A sentencer, advisory serving Virginia, in an a Jackson v. clude 2781, 2791-92, (1979), chal- capacity. § Fla.Stat. 921.141 lenge was not sufficient for that the evidence petitioner guilty trier to find the rational of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. malice murder *18 1454 irrespective being, human sequently another rendered the reference to felony of
malice.
meaningless.
murder
Now,
you would be authorized
jury’s
“guilty
charged”
The
verdict of
as
guilty
Defendant
of the of-
to find the
finding of malice.
jury
confirmed the
murder, you must find and be-
fense of
deliberation,
during
had the indictment
beyond a reasonable doubt that the
lieve
charged petition-
knew that the indictment
did,
aforethought,
malice
Defendant
with
murder,
knew,
only
malice
er
with
expressed
implied,
or
cause the
either
instruction,
from the court’s
that it could
Edward
death of James
Giddens.
finding
not convict
absent a
And,
charge you
you
I
that if
find and
aforethought.”
“malice
The erroneous ref-
prior
any
that at
time
to the date
believe
murder,
therefore,
felony
erence to
was returned into this
this Indictment
surplusage.
mere harmless
did,
court,
the Defendant
Petitioner contends that
this does
Lanier,
Georgia,
with
State
inquiry
not end the
because the court also
aforethought,
kill and murder
malice
conspiracy liability
referred to
for murder
way
Edward Giddens in the
James
said,
charging
jury.
The court
Indictment,
manner set forth
then
conspiracy
is
“Where
shown
act of
you
find the De-
would be authorized to
the act of all insofar as
one becomes
guilty murder.
fendant
concerned,
conspiracy
furtherance of the
added.)
(Emphasis
fully responsible
and each is as
for the act
argues
that the italicized
carrying
of the other in
out the common
portion of this instruction authorized the
he, himself,
if
purpose as
had committed
jury
guilty
felony
to find him
murder
instruction,
alone,
standing
the act.” This
determining that he
to kill
without
intended
rule;
did not violate the Edmund
im
persuaded.
the victim. We are not
“[A]
plicit
require
in the instruction was the
single
jury may
instruction to a
not be
jury
ment that
find that
the murder
isolation,
judged
artificial
but must be
pur
under consideration was the “common
charge,”
viewed in context of the overall
i.e.,
pose,”
object,
the intended
of the con
Cupp
141, 146-47,
Naughten,
doubt,
any
spiracy. To remove
the court
396, 400,
(1973),
94 S.Ct.
further,
jury
informing
instructed the
it
light
jury
heard and
of what the
saw
defendant,
it
convict
could not
as
progressed,
beginning
the trial
from
as
conspirator,
that he intend
unless
found
Jernigan,
end. Lamb v.
683 F.2d
killing.47
ed the
The court’s chal
victim’s
denied,
(11th Cir.1982),
cert.
lenged conspiracy instruction therefore did
L.Ed.2d
Edmund
rule.
not contravene
Immediately preceding its reference to
supra,
As we stated
these conclusions
murder,
felony
the court
instructed the
regarding felony
conspiratorial
concerning
jury
malice murder and how
Edmund
inquiry.
end the
We
should
aforethought”
“malice
can be demonstrat-
proceed,
subparts
2 and 3
nonetheless
reference,
Immediately following
ed.
infra,
parties’
to demonstrate that the
ar-
jury
that it must
the court instructed
guments
jury
proof
before it
find malice before it would be authorized to
jury
impose
did not lead the
an unlawful
guilty
find the defendant
of malice murder.
mandatory prerequisite
of malice con-
sentence.
person
guilty
any
charged
crime either in
47. The court twice
follows:
er
is not
or;
fact,
legal incapacity;
because of
No. 3:
or
Every person concerned in the commission
Intentionally
aids or abets in
commission
party
may
of a crime is a
thereto and
crime;
advises,
Intentionally
or No. 4:
charged
convicted of commission of
hires,
procures
encourages,
counsels or
anoth-
person
A
in the com-
crime.
is concerned
words,
crime.
er to commit
other
if
he,
Directly
mission
No. 1:
crime
if
things they
they
of those four
did
one
crime;
Intentionally
commits the
or No. 2:
conspiring together.
would be
person
causes
some other
to commit
added.)
(Emphasis
crime
that the oth-
under such circumstances
*19
authorized,
would have been
under
the
instructions,
to find
court’s
opening
in both its
prosecution,
The
felony
conspiracy
murder or
guilty of
mur-
jury, present
closing arguments to the
and
der.
case,
petition
the
single theory of
ed a
times with
three
at Chief Giddens
er shot
revolver.
.38 caliber service
officer’s
presented,
in this case
The evidence
theory
on
based
prosecutor
The
closing argument,
in its
the defense stated
in the
to his cellmate
confession
tioner’s
First,
mutually
scenarios.
exclusive
three
defense, in its clos
County jail. The
Cook
accomplices shot Chief
and his
three scenarios
jury had
ing, said that the
death with his .38 caliber ser-
to
Giddens
not at the scene of
petitioner was
before it:
pistol.
a .22
Sec-
revolver and
caliber
vice
kidnap
crime;
participated
ond,
Larry Fleming kidnapped
and
Willis
against his will
murder but did so
ping and
petitioner,
and forced
Giddens
Chief
guilty; he
be found
could not
and thus
will,
his
to drive them to the mur-
against
murder,
prosecu
as the
malice
committed
petitioner,
En
and
der scene.
route
Gid-
tion contended.
dens,
Fleming spare
pleaded that Willis and
conspiracy,
mention
prosecutor did
Fleming
then in-
Giddens’ life. Willis
voluntary,
of a
the context
only within
but
car;
stop the
Willis
structed
to
per-
and one other
enterprise: “If me
joint
out,
got
taking
Fleming
Giddens
him and
and killed
kidnapped
person
son
them,
swamp.
went off into the
Peti-
pulling the
if I’m
driving the car or
if I’m
tioner,
behind,
remaining
beg
continued to
whatever,
guilty
of us are
trigger, or
both
Fleming then
life. Willis and
Giddens’
counsel
The defense
just
like the other.”
swamp.
him in the
the Chief and left
shot
remarks with
prosecutor’s
clarified
Third,
involved in the
petitioner was not
agree-
must be an
“There
these words:
murder;
robbery, kidnap, or
he was Val-
up to the
something], and it’s
do
ment [to
visiting
uncle at the time.
dosta
agreement before
prove that
state
scenarios, the one the
The first of these
what someone else
responsible for
you’re
accept,
estab-
urged
jury
State
continued,
a man can’t
They
“Now
does.”
testimony
petitioner’s
through the
lished
kill when
conspiracy to
charged with
cellmate,
to whom
confessed
the ones that did
pleading with
he’s
placed in
shortly after he was arrested and
the law.
just
That’s
not
killing not to do it.
scenario,
County jail.
The second
Cook
it. A con-
remotely close to
even
It’s not
jury
urged the
which
counsel
go ahead
agreement
spiracy must be an
one,
accept
rejected
if it
the third
appears plain illegal act.” It
an
and do
to the
by petitioner’s statement
established
parties
liability the
conspiracy
us that
scenario,
police
February
on
16. The third
intent-
not the sort of
addressing is
alibi,
by petitioner’s
was established
killing Edmund
condemns.
vicarious
less
February 12 and
statement
to the
felony
lawyers mentioned
None of
testimony
stand.
on the witness
fact,
In
addressing
jury.
murder
murder,
finding petitioner guilty of
In
petition-
jury that
prosecutor cautioned
reject
and third
jury
had to
the second
robbery or
for armed
on trial
er was not
scenarios,
portrayed him as an inno-
which
he had
it that
reminded
kidnapping and
man,
adopt the
one. That
cent
first
only to
crimes
of those
evidence
introduced
murder
pure
malice
scenario described
murder.
for the
petitioner’s motive
show
fully
intent stan-
satisfied Edmund’s
not
that “we’re
emphasized
dard.
involved
trying a man who wasn’t
[in
try-
murder],
there. We’re
who wasn’t
analyzing
We draw three conclusions
theory.”
ing some abstract
First,
in-
Edmund
claim.
malice
charged petitioner with
dictment
parties’
nothing in the
find
In sum we
only,
court instructed
jury that
of the case
submission
the elements
jury
it had to find all of
conclude that
lead us to
murder,
kill,
(1982).1
including intent to
malice
L.Ed.2d 1308
These con
Second,
parties,
simply
him.
their
clusions are more than
findings
convict
primary or
arguments,
prose-
They
did not treat the
historical fact.
are
closing
also
conclusions as to the
felony
conspiratorial
or
Sixth and Fourteenth
cution as one for
implications
Amendment
Third,
of such facts.
jury’s
verdict could not
murder.
event,
appropriate
if
even
this were
felony
conspiratorial
or
have been based on
review, my
case for deferential
view the
of malice
murder to the exclusion
murder.
amply
record
demonstrates
these con
*20
III.
by
clearly
the district court were
clusions
erroneous.
peti-
no constitutional error in
We find
According-
conviction or sentence.
tioner’s
(b)
Hearing
The Committal
ly,
judgment
affirm the
of the district
we
law,
Georgia
a
hearing
Under
committal
court.
may
probable
be held to determine if
cause
AFFIRMED.
guilty
an
exists to believe
accused
of an
and,
so,
charged
offense
if
to bind him over
TUTTLE,
Judge, concur-
Senior Circuit
grand jury
for indictment. Neal v.
to a
dissenting
part:
in
ring
part
State,
498, 499,
Ga.App.
160
1461
concluded,
waiv-
that
the harmless error stan
will not
deemed a
request counsel
be
Williams,
387, 404,
dard utilized Coleman
applicable
is
Brewer v.
430 U.S.
still
er.
(1977);
1232, 1242,
L.Ed.2d 424
51
to denial of counsel claims where the
S.Ct.
con
97
Cochran,
506, 513,
v.
U.S.
82
Carnley
non-capital
369
a
offense. See
viction is for
Brown
(1962);
Rose,
884, 888,
458,
70
(6th
8 L.Ed.2d
McKeldin v.
631 F.2d
460
S.Ct.
607,
(5th
Wainwright,
611
Cir.
v.
969,
665 F.2d
denied 450 U.S.
Cir.1980),
cert.
101
banc). Thus,
1982) (en
own
1488,
(1981).
619
How
67 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
at
representation
demand
failure
Holloway, the rule is otherwise
ever,
under
right to
a waiver of his
hearing was not
capital
a
conviction is involved.
when
Moreover,
Mr. Parrish
since
counsel.
mandatory regardless of the
Reversal is
appoint-
capacity
in no
other than as
served
stage at
counsel
denied and
which
charge, kidnapping
counsel on
ed
which the denial of
regardless of
form
authority
no
to waive
had
counsel took. That this is so is clear from
the committal
right
represented
at
two of the cases on which the court relied
charge.
on the
holding Holloway.6
In Hamilton
for its
Alabama,
157,
v.
52,
368 U.S.
82 S.Ct.
7
Appropriate
(c)
Relief
(1961),
Supreme
L.Ed.2d 114
Court re
Arkansas,
475,
Holloway
v.
In
435 U.S.
had
versed
conviction where counsel
been
1173,
(1978),
426
55 L.Ed.2d
98 S.Ct.
arraignment,
any
at the
at which
absent
Supreme Court held:
defenses, including insanity,
available
had
deprived
is
of the
a defendant
[W]hen
pleaded. The
in
to be
Court declined to
attorney,
assistance of his
presence and
quire
actually
whether
defenses were
or dur-
throughout
prosecution
either
defendant, holding
available to the
instead
in,
least,
prose-
stage
at
ing a critical
55,
Id. at
prejudice
presumed.
82
offense,
is
capital
reversal
cution of
at
S.Ct.
159.
Wainwright, 372
v.
automatic. Gideon
59,
Maryland,
White v.
In
373
U.S.
83
792,
L.Ed.2d
335
S.Ct.
9
799]
[83
1050,
(1963),
also cited
S.Ct.
Alabama,
Hamilton v.
(1963);
368 U.S.
Holloway,
pleaded guilty
the defendant
(1961);
157, L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
7
114]
[82
preliminary hearing, at
he was
at a
which
Maryland,
U.S. 59
S.Ct.
White
[83
by
Although he
represented
counsel.
1050,
judgment of the district corpus. habeas of a writ of
the issuance KING, Jr.,
Amos Lee
Petitioner-Appellant, STRICKLAND, Jr., Warden,
Charles G. Penitentiary,
Florida Louis L. State Smith,
Wainwright, Attorney and Jim
General, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 82-5306. Appeals,
United States Court of Circuit.
Eleventh
Dec. III, Tallahassee,
Baya Harrison, Fla., for petitioner-appellant. Kotler, Gen., Atty.
Michael J. Asst. Tam- Fla., pa, respondents-appellees. ON REMAND THE SUPREME FROM COURT OF THE UNITED STATES KRAVITCH, Before RONEY and Circuit TUTTLE, Judges, Senior Circuit Judge.
RONEY, Judge: Circuit convicted of King, Amos Lee Jr. to death degree first and sentenced
