*1
North,
the factual situation
I do not believe
Mr.
by
conduct
join
I cannot
that in North.
similar to
instant case is
It is
cases are similar.
that the two
reasoning
in its
majority
Mr.
of conduct
pattern
I
a different
perceive
because
Simply
case.
in the instant
I
in the result
concur
Boswell
North.
to be a Mr.
appear
stated,
does
Mr. Boswell
Court Dec. *5 (Jacob Ginsberg, Raymond Hertz A. M. Hertz Raymond M. Associates, P.A., brief), Greenbelt, petitioner. on for & Smallwood, for Largo, respondent.
John M. BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, Argued before CHASANOW, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL, JJ.
CHASANOW, Judge. of a suit Flachs appeal Jeremy This arises out filed County for (Respondent) George’s the Circuit Court Prince (Petitioner) against compensation Millicent Somuah to recover legal Respondent provided for the services to Petitioner. review, Petitioner two issues for our which we have presents as rephrased follows: prospective failure to inform a Whether
client at the time of retention that he was not licensed to likely practice Maryland, where the client’s lawsuit would filed, attorney’s discharge? be constitutes cause attorney, contingent 2. Whether an who was retained on a fulfill- agreement discharged prior fee for cause from his contingency, may ment of the recover value of the services rendered to his dis- reasоnable charge? that, case, the circumstances of this a client
We hold under being has a faith dissatisfied with good basis her when she discovers the failed to inform her that he is practice Maryland, not licensed to the state where the action arose. the cause of and where the client attorney visited discharged because that where further hold We wish longer to no faith basis good has a the client attorney has attorney and where by the represented misconduct, attorney may recover in serious engaged reasonable value *6 client for the from the compensation The discharge. to his attorney prior by rendered services light in of measured is to be attorney’s compensation attorney’s result of the the client as a by obtained benefits the cause that led gravity of and the nature services cause fee contract contingent In a discharge. is contingency action, however, until does not accrue of fulfilled.
I. accident out of an automobile arises underlying dispute The were daughter and her in which Petitioner involving a taxicab 1992, 8, in occurred on March The accident severely injured. time of the acci At the County, Maryland. George’s Prince her Virginia with resided dent, that Petitioner appears it accident, Petitioner’s brother after husband.1 Sometime represent possibility regarding Respondent contacted still 3, 1992, Petitioner was while April On ing Petitioner. Respon Community Hospital, George’s at Prince recovering day, That same interviewed Petitioner. dent visited and regarding her a represent Respondent retained Petitioner result of this accident. injury claim as a personal possible not did April Respondent interview on During the initial practice not licensed to Respondent notify Petitioner into agreement The retainer entered Maryland. law in alia, contingency fee inter for a one-third provided, parties Petitioner payment expenses; deducted before the and trial investigation, preparation, agreed pay all costs case;2 right had the to cancel Respondent and that recuperate Maryland where she went to Petitioner also had a home 1. on June 1992. costs, etc., contingent apparently on Petition- Investigative were also investiga- recovery. Respondent never made demand for er’s if, agreement upon investigation, Petitioner’s claim did not appear to have merit. Petitioner, Respondent
After the initial interview with be- claim, gan investigating expending Petitioner’s considerable effort, as well аs a substantial amount of as took money he steps preserve to collect and evidence. Petitioner moved to 5, 1992, on after Maryland hospital. June her release from the thereafter, Shortly began to Respondent explore possibili- ty Maryland July of a lawsuit state courts. Wells, Respondent Maryland attorney, Gregory asked lawsuit, Maryland assist him in a him accompanied and Wells to Petitioner’s home to discuss this possibility. During meeting, Respondent notified Petitioner for the first time that he licensed to practice Maryland. After the meeting, accept Respon- Wells declined to the case. Before arrange meeting dent could with Petitioner and another local attorney, discharged Respondent attorney by Petitioner as her termination, August Respon- letter dated 1992. After his *7 requesting payment dent sent Petitioner a letter for the time spent expenses incurred Petitioner’s investigating claim. request. Petitioner refused this
In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Respon- against dent filed suit Petitioner to seeking recover the rea- of expenses paid during sonable value services rendered and representation course of his of Petitioner. Specifically, prior discharge agreement tive costs to as the fee had crоssed out a provision provided: agrees that "CLIENT that he will ... reimburse Attorney thirty receipt costs incurred within of of a state- day agreement provided: agrees ment.The fee further "CLIENT responsible filed, he will be for actual court costs a suit is and that in if filed, the event of a settlement of his claim before or after suit is that the provided may fee for herein and such actual costs as have been upon any money incurred shall be a lien received or recovered in this added). (Emphasis Respondent discharged case.” before suit was costs, however, filed. The issue of is not before this Court as the question petition in the for certiorari is whether the Petitioner is "liable [discharged] attorney any compensation his services.” for agreement provided for added). (Emphasis If the fee for immediate reim- expenses, bursement for Petitioner would be liable for reasonable expenses actually incurred. $11,324.66 paid expenses for requested Respondent claim. The Petitioner’s investigating $8,685.00 spent for time retained the Petitioner case for which accident automobile motions for Both filed parties pending. was still Respondent trial; all were judgment for and moved summary judgment favor a verdict returned jury subsequently denied. amount of in the compensation and awarded Respondent not- judgment motion for filed a $19,946.01. Petitioner then trial, alternative, a new or, in the verdict withstanding the denied. the trial court which reported in a Special Appeals the Court appeal,
On Petitioner, holding that against judgment affirmed opinion was not that he inform Petitioner failure to Respondent’s cause to dis- good not constitute did Maryland licensed immediate right his preclude so as charge Respondent services rendered value of for the reasonable compensation Flachs, Somuah discharge. Respondent’s (1997). timely Petitioner 303, 315, A.2d Md.App. granted by certiorari which was for writ of petition filed a Court.
II. that we argument Respondent’s must first address We waived the issue Petitioner appeal dismiss this because should practice Maryland lack of a license Respondent’s of whether Respon- law for his termination. as a matter of law is cause this issue before that Petitioner failed to raise dent contends issue “[t]he and notes trial court for determination legal of a contract constitutes cause for termination what constitutes from issue of what is different representation also These issues Maryland. of law illegal practice *8 attor- non-Maryland a from the issue of what activities differ compеnsated.” in and be ney Maryland can do to decide an has some discretion Although this Court generally we will appeal, first time on issue raised by the “not raised in and decided any issue that was decide Lerman v. Hee- see also 8-131; Rule Maryland trial court.” 250
man, 439, 450, (1997). 426, 347 Md. 701 A.2d 432 In her motion for summary judgment judgment, and motion for Petitioner asserted that she was entitled to a judgment as matter law Respondent because the fact that a lacked termination, Maryland license constituted cause for his there- by precluding Respondent from collecting any compensation. We conclude that Petitioner adequately presented to the trial court the issue before this Court and thus has not waived issue.
HI. Court, Turning now the substantive issues before alleges Petitioner that she Respondent had cause to terminate as a matter of law because he failed to disclose at their initial the fact meeting that he was not licensed to in practice law Maryland, Respondent precluded and thus from recovering any compensation. Special The Court of in Appeals this case limited what terminating constitutes cause for an attorney’s representation, holding that “a client has cause for discharging if lawyer lawyer the contract between the and the client is invalid, if lawyer’s representation or is in violation of the law, professional rules of responsibility, violation other or agreement violation of the between the and the Somuah, client.” Md.App. 702 at A.2d 794. The appellate intermediate court concluded that lawyer’s “a failure a prospective tell client that he is not practice licensed to jurisdiction likely where suit will brought does not constitute the kind of fraud or other undue influence neces- sary Somuah, lawyer-client to invalidate a contract.” Md.App. at at 794. A.2d As we shall explain, right to an attorney-client client’s terminate relationship is not as limited as the Special Appeals Court of concluded.
It is a well-settled rule this State that a client has great latitude in or discharging attorney. his her An attor ney’s authority to act for a client is freely by revocable Miller, 331, 335, client. See Skeens v. 331 Md. 628 A.2d (1993); Brown, 309, 316, Palmer v. 184 Md. 40 A.2d
251
697,
385, 389,
Johnson,
125 A.
145 Md.
(1945); Boyd v.
517
attorney-
(1924).
terminate the
right to
The client’s
698-99
nature
the confidential
necessary given
relationship client
engendered by
that would be
and “the evil
relationship
such
335,
Skeens,
Although this Court
attorney-
terminating
an
proper
constitutes a
basis
what
extent
addressed to some
relationship, this Court has
may be
attorney’s compensation
an
the circumstances which
circumstances,
attorney’s
may
an
fee
certain
forfeited. Under
conflicting inter
attorney represents
be forfeited where
354,
347,
295 Md.
Sybert,
Atlantic
Co. v.
ests. See
Richfield
20,
(1983)(noting
agreement
that a fee
between
456 A.2d
23-24
ordinarily
a client
will be set aside where
interests,
adverse
whether
attorney simultaneously represents
client’s,
attorney fully
or another
unless
conflict of interest
to the client and the client
disclosed the
entered into the trans
voluntarily
knowingly
nevertheless
Israelson,
v.
240 Md.
attorney); Keyworth
action with the
(1965)(same).
addition,
302-03,
214
175
fee
A.2d
by fraud or
aside where it is induced
agreement will be set
influence,
undue
or where it involves an abuse
client’s
Korotki,
318 Md.
Attorney
confidence. See
Griev. Comm’n
"discharged
majority
jurisdictions
the rule that a
3. follow
quantum
Judy Beckner
attorney may
Sloan,
only on a
meruit basis.”
recover
Quantum
Law,
Equity
42 DePaul L.Rev.
Meruit: Residual
added).
(1992)(emphasis
646, 669,
1224, 1236
569 A.2d
(1990)(noting that an “increase in
fee
attorney through
obtained
threats to terminate a
representation
obliged
which the
to continue”
invalid).
will be held
We also have
noted
“an
who,
justification,
without
terminates an agreed undertaking,
all____” Korotki,
is not
fee at
atMd.
entitled
Moreover,
clearly
A.2d
a fee that is
*10
excessive will
enforced,
not be
and the court will reduce such a
fee what is
fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
v.
See Tucker
467, 474,
891,
(1960).
Dudley, 223 Md.
164 A.2d
896
our
decision,
142,
recent
v. Bregman,
Post
349 Md.
253 negotiations during settlement to withdraw threatening by fee, attorney but contingency higher to a agreed unless client review rendered), recovery services not forfeit all did (Fla.1994). examples of denied, For other 870 649 So.2d Schoemann, 20 Cal.2d 150, v. Salopek cause, see discharge of discharge that (Cal.l942)(noting 124 P.2d legal effect misstate[d] “an justified where was through ignorance, his client either procedure facts or and mistake, indicate[d] advice his byor carelessness unquestion would lead of action which a course pursue[d] then proper to the client’s declared contrary ably to results value of the reasonable attorney could recover objectives,” but 998, 40 King, v. Tobias rendered); Ill.App.3d services (Ill.App.Ct.1980)(noting 406 N.E.2d Ill.Dec. client was dissatis for cause where discharged was made little that had attorney’s handling of case fied with attorney was years, one-half but in three and progress services); value recovery for reasonable barred from Cairns, (La.1996)(upholding O’Rourke 683 So.2d for cause discharged judge’s finding trial *11 client, was uncer with attorney was uncommunicative where client’s regard to the substantively and with strategically tain claim, unprofessional an and exhibited malpractice medical of confi demeanor, to the client’s lack contributing all social meruit recovery was but quantum attorney, dence Inc., 492, Foundry, v. 699 So.2d permissible); Osborne Vulcan finding court’s trial (La.Ct.App.1997)(upholding 496-97 client terminated for cause where attorney discharged was attorney to not want attorney because the client did wife, attorney the client’s but both the client and represent writ, denied, 1205 704 So.2d compensation), was entitled to Co., Fund Ins. v. Firemаn’s (La.1997); 293 So.2d Guilbeau failure to 216, attorney’s that an (La.Ct.App.1974)(noting 218 duties, i.e., nothing filing petition but doing or her perform his quantum cause, may constitute but during two-year period, Corp. Dagny Management meruit applicable); cf. Meltzer, 337, 711, 339 & 199 A.D.2d 606 N.Y.S.2d Oppenheim discharged for that firm was (N.Y.App.Div.1993)(concluding 254
cause where firm with interfered and frustrated client’s at- tempts to settle action holding that firm’s misconduct was fee). serious enough require forfeiture of its Block, Garland, 91, In H & R Inc. v. Md. 359 (1976), 79, A.2d 130 we cited Ferris v. Polansky, Md. 85- (1948), 59 A.2d for the following proposition: law, Maryland “Under a contract which provides that of performance personal services must satisfactory be employer entitles the employer terminate the contract if is, fact, he honestly performance dissatisfied with the employee, did use such dissatisfaction as a mere pretense.” Block,
H R&
who is employed long as as the services are satisfactory. We stated: agrees employ to employer the
“In contract where employ- the satisfactory, long as the services are another as discharge the contract and to terminate the right er the has faith he, good is acting the employer, whenever employee, applies, work. This the employee’s dissatisfied with actually contract have employment to though parties even the the operativе during a be stipulated that the contract shall to term, are if the services provides definite it It is not employer. of the performed to satisfaction by the adequate grounds exist deemed necessary that there He is the employer’s for the dissatisfaction. trier of facts However, satisfactory. services are judge as to whether the discharge employee, dissatisfaction, justify to mercenary, or capricious, pretended, must be real and not If employer feigns design. of a dishonest result discharge is employee, dismisses the dissatisfaction and of dismissal exercising right employer wrongful. in good and honestly must do so because of dissatisfaction omitted). (Citations faith.”
Ferris, 85-86, right 752. The of a Md. at 59 A.2d at is discharge attorney analogous an dissatisfied client employee an employer discharge a dissatisfied right of employee’s of that the employment specifying under a contract satisfactory employer. services must be just discharges attorney A client without cause with the being client has no basis for dissatisfied when the discharge or the is bad faith. Under attorney’s services circumstances, attorney has immediate cause these hand, other for breach of the fee contract. On the action discharge attorney her when the client has cause his or being basis dissatisfied with the any good client has faith performed competentl has attorney, though even circumstances, these is entitled to y.4 Under Appeal As noted: “The relation between the Court Louisiana relationship personal is far a close which more is profession- complex simply performing his than whether the obligations proper responsibilities manner.” Smith v. al in the *13 256
recovery for the work done prior but, to discharge, as will be discussed, recovery on a contingent fee contract must await the occurrence of the contingency. From our review of the case jurisdictions, law other it is also apparent that a finding that a client had cause to discharge his or her does not require a finding fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct by the attorney. Cause for discharge does not require proof that the discharged attorney failed to act competently, but the client must good show a faith basis for being dissatisfied with the Kandel, representation. Vogelhut 183, 192, 308 Md. Cf. 1092, 1097 A.2d J., (1986)(Rodowsky, concurring). As we have explained, cause for discharging attorney can be divided First, into groups: two where commits serious misconduct, i.e., conduct, fraud or illegal etc.; second, where competently acts and there is no serious misconduct, but good the client has a faith basis to be dissatis fied with the In attorney. situation, the former the attorney is entitled to fee. In situation, the latter the attorney is entitled to compensated for the work done to dis charge, but in a contingent contract, fee must await the occurrence of the contingency. discussed, As will be this is based on agreement that no fee payable will be unless and until contingency occurs. out,
Respondent points concedes, and Petitioner that Re- spondent performed competently prior to his discharge, and we note that there was no misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit on part of Respondent. In support of argument his uphold judgment court, of the lower Respondent asserts that it was unclear where a lawsuit would be filed because Petitioner’s claims could have been filed in federal court. During the first two months of his investigation Petitioner was Virginia resident, and thus a possible federal claim existed jurisdiction. based on diversity addition, Respondent con- tends that there was a substantial likelihood of a federal writ, Lines, Inc., Westside Transit (La.Ct.App.1975), So.2d
denied,
(La.1975).
IV.
we
determined that Petitioner had
Since
have
representation
for
with her
good
being
faith basis
dissatisfied
if,
when,
we
determine
Respondent,
now must
Respon
dent
to quantum
recovery
is entitled
meruit
based on the
prior
reasonable
services rendered
to his discharge.
value
cause,
As with
the determination
the determination of
discharged attorney
whether a
is
any compensation
entitled to
in a
case
given
depends
the facts
upon
and circumstances
that,
before the court.
It is a
in this
well-settled rule
State
where a
attorney-client
client terminates an
relationship with
cause,
out
or an
any
attorney terminates
relationship
with
cause,
attorney may
entitled to
quantum
immediate
client, i.e.,
recovery
meruit
from the
the reasonable value of
legal
services
rendered
discharge.
Skeens,
335-36,
Petitioner contends under the circumstances of case, this Court should find as a of matter law that discharged misconduct, Petitioner for Respondent serious and thus is not to Respondent entitled compensation whatso ever. would Specifically, Petitioner have us hold that Petition- his to inform Petition of for failure discharge Respondent er’s Maryland in constitutes рractice to he was not licensed er that Respon se termination per thereby precluding with cause a contention, Petitioner In of her recovery. support dent’s Petitioner’s claims investigation of that argues Respondent’s in without a license Maryland of law practice constituted (1989,1995 Repl.Vol.), Business Code Maryland and notes that 10-601(a)5 Article, and §§ 10- Professions and Occupations Governing Admission to 602,6 Maryland Rules of the Rule of Professional Bar,7 Lawyers’ Rules Maryland and the of law in this practice the unauthorized regarding Conduct or incompetent from those public “to protect State exist further protect in this State and to practice law unable several Petitioner further cites of the integrity profession.” out- proposition other jurisdictions cases from engages in legal locally attorney who renders services of-state compen may of and not recover law practice unauthorized his her client for such services. sation from or contention, relies on primarily of Petitioner support her right to four which the courts addressed cases in a state which compensation legal performed services (1989, Repl.Vol.), Occupations Maryland Business 5. Code Article, 10-601(a) provid- provides: "Except § as otherwisе Professions law, practice, person may practice, attempt or offer to by ed not practice Bar.” law the State unless admitted to the (1989, Repl.Vol.), Occupations Maryland 6. Code Business Art., provides: § 10-602 Professions State, person by practice may law to law in the “Unless authorized title, lawyer', represent public, by including use of a law’, services, law', description or ‘counselor at otherwise, methods, procedures, person or is authorized or practice law the State.” 14(a) Maryland Governing Admission to Bar of Rule the Rules permits member Bar this State who is an of record in "[a] *16 any political pending this ... or of its an action subdivisions, in court of State move, attorney writing, is a may in that an who member practice good standing another be admitted to in of the Bar of state purpose appearing participating in in this State the limited and for as the the action co-counsel with movant.” 260 attorney was not licensed to v. practice: Perlah S.E.I 43, 612
Corp.,
Conn.App.
(Conn.App.Ct.1992);
29
A.2d 806
Amsel,
(Conn.Su
225,
v.
23
180
Conn.Supp.
A.2d 756
Taft
Ltd.,
398,
per.Ct.1962);
v. Shore
Ill.2d
Heights,
66
6
Lozoff
(Ill.1977);
Sachs,
Ill.Dec.
‘We do not mean in holding today our to have it understood that there can never bе circumstances that will allow an out- 707[, is not of-[s]tate who within Rule permitting an out-of-state participate court proceedings,] to recover for legal recognize services. there We are parties transactions involving attorneys from more than one which require State would result from different today’s holding.”
261 Spivak, in Finally, 225, N.E.2d at 1049. Lozoff, 6 Ill.Dec. 362 for services compensation a was denied California in connection to a York resident in New York New rendered divorce, reviewing separation drafts of included her which with of knowledge on the based his advising agreements and at Spivak, 263 N.Y.S.2d law. New York and California both of court, 954-55, the Court 211 329. Like the N.E.2d Lozoff numerous multi-State “recogniz[ed] of York New Appeals and cautioned relationships of modern times” transactions in an out-of- holding its to all cases which against applying negotia- or New York for “conferences attorney comes to state somehow York client and a transaction to New relating tions 956, at 211 N.E.2d Spivak, to York.” 263 N.Y.S.2d tied New 329. can distinguished on which Petitioner relies
The cases behind from us. In rationale particular, the case before to on the of appears decisions be based violations these of law. In the practice of the unauthorized prohibition statе’s Petitioner, clearly practicing attorneys cited were cases practice by they in a in which were not licensed to law state matters drafting advising regarding documents or the clients Spivak, appears of it also exception of local With the law. may have them attorneys represented that the in these cases attorneys they as in which were selves state Perlah, Moreover, in maintained licensed. in to state in which the was not licensed office Maryland not have a practice. Respondent did not and does office, solicitation engage any advertising and he did not in or Furthermore, two that led his introduction to Petitioner. se rule per denying explicitly against cautioned decisions trans attorneys perform to all out-of-state who compensation licensed, noting they actions in which are not a state See transactions of multi-state modern times. frequency 329; Lozoff, 956, 6 Spivak, 263 211 N.E.2d Ill.Dec. N.Y.S.2d at 225, 362 N.E.2d prohibition “goal Court has noted that the
This public from against practice protect unauthorized law— preyed upon by competent practice those not being 262 unethical,
from
or
incompetent,
irresponsible representation.”
R.G.S.,
In re
Md.
Application
312
541 A.2d
(1988).
Ass’n,
Kennedy
v. Bar
A.2d
Md.
(1989),
against
which involved a
who
complаint
practice
was admitted to
law in the United States District
Court for the District of
Maryland, but not admitted
Maryland, we
the attorney’s
addressed
that he
argument
permitted
practice
should be
federal and
law
non-Maryland
from
his office
noted
Maryland. We
that the “unauthorized
*18
of law ...
not
to
practice
practice
is
limited
the
utilizing
common
and
of Maryland.” Kennedy,
law
statutes
316
atMd.
662,
In discussing
While we with that when out- Petitioner an of-state takes a case that to may need be filed Maryland he or she should disclose fact to the client and retained, might advise the client that local counsel to have do not agree Respondent’s we failure to so do results of all complete Although forfeiture New compensation. York prohibit courts discharged for cause from
263
whatsoever,
jurisdictions
majority of
recovering any fee
to recover
discharged
cause
permitted
have
ser
attorney’s
of the
the reasonable value
quantum, meruit
discharge.
attorney’s
prior to
competently rendered
vices
941;
124
Brown,
See,
Salopek,
at
&
S.W.2d
e.g., Crockett
104;
also
24; Tobias,
400, 406 N.E.2d at
see
40 Ill.Dec.
at
P.2d
Rhodes,
247 S.E.2d
N.C.App.
Covington
denied, 296 N.C.
251 S.E.2d
(N.C.Ct.App.1978), review
(N.C.1979); Collins,
primary
at 917. The
473 S.E.2d
recovery
pre
to
meruit
is
permitting quantum,
rationale
of the
of the benefits
unjust
to
client
vent
enrichment
Moore,
325 P.2d
discharge.
See
attorney’s
prior
services
addition,
entire fee could
attorney’s
In
forfeiture
thus
a harsh
in an
to the client and
result
undue windfall
Scheller,
awarding
at 954.
629 Sо.2d
remedy.
See
he or
value of the services
discharged attorney the reasonable
discharge,
“preserved]
the court
she rendered
restric
right
discharge
his
without undue
client’s
com
tion,
yet
attorney’s right
fair
acknowledge^]
Fracasse, 100
pensation
performed.”
Cal.Rptr.
for work
attorney-
of an
attorney’s
violates a condition of the contract
client,
with the
applicable
professional responsibil-
rules of
Somuah,
any
314,
ity, or
other
Md.App.
law.”
118
702 A.2d
earlier,
at 793-94. As we noted
Court
has indicated that
attorney’s
an
compensation may be forfeited
the attor-
where
interests,
ney represents
conflicting
or
attorney’s
fee
agreement with the client was
or
induced
fraud
undue
cited,
influence. See cases
swpra, part
III.
agree
We also
with
jurisdictions
have
indicated that quantum meruit
that
may
recovery
be
inappropriate
attorney engages
where
misconduct,
client,
prejudicial
for
attorney
which the
may
disciplined,
recovery by
be
or where
would
See,
Polen,
contrary
to public policy.
e.g.,
Where for but that cause forfeiture, cause does not justify some courts have reduced the quantum meruit recovery attorney by a percentage due tо the “nature gravity the cause leading discharge.” See, O’Rourke, Polen, 704; e.g., see also 683 So.2d at at 472 (noting N.W.2d where an bears substan- tial his or responsibility discharge her the court “should deduct the costs of duplicated work had to be or modified from discharged quantum recovery”). counsel’s meruit As one of several to be in determining factors considered meruit, fee under quantum reasonable Illinois courts consider the discharged benefits the client from the Klecan, attorney’s services. See Johns v. 198 Ill.App.3d 145 Ill.Dec. 556 N.E.2d (Ill.App.Ct.1990). discharged situations where an because has a faith good being basis dissatisfied with attorney, *20 but attorney’s the conduct was wrongful the that sense of justified, forfeiture all fees would be we strike balance between the right discharge client’s absolute his or her for right compensation to fair attorney’s the attorney and discharge. rendered competently services value ser determining the reasonable client, note the we that discharged attorney to of a vices the court are listed by considered may be factors which Conduct 1.5: Rule of Professional Maryland Lawyers’ “(1) difficulty novelty the and required, and labor the time involved, perform requisite and skill the the questions of legal properly; the service
(2) likelihood, client, acceр- the if that apparent the will other particular employment preclude tance of the lawyer; employment by the
(3) locality in the similar customarily charged the fee services; legal obtained;
(4) and the results amount involved the by (5) by the or the imposed limitations client the time circumstances;
(6) relationship length professional the the nature client; with the
(7) lawyer or ability of the reputation, and experience, the services; and lawyers the performing (8) or contingent.” the is fixed whether fee is to have attor- consideration what extent primary Kenny client. See ney’s directly benefitted the services 521, 525, McAllister, (1951)(noting 84 A.2d 198 Md. attorney’s determining one to be considered in fees factor from ren- by obtained the client the services benefit Reid, Linda Ann Crockett see also by attorney); dered Broum, Fee Determining P.A v. Courson: Cause”, Attorney 738-39 Discharged “for Ark. L.Rev. of the “benefit of (1994)(discussing jurisdictions’ consideration when attorney’s services to client deter- discharged recovery”); mining the amount Am. 2d Jur. § dis- Attorneys (1997)(noting at Law 302 only charged may cause recover from client, have his or her services benefited “amount which *21 266
who, the by in absence the recovery attorney, would be services”)(footnote omitted). by such unjustly enriched an Where bears substantial responsibility his or discharge, her the client should not be liable for the costs of required work that was to be or duplicated modified from Polen, discharged attorney what the had done. See Furthermore, at 472. the court N.W.2d should consider the gravity nature and of the cause that led to adjust any discharge quantum recovery by meruit such O’Rourke, an amount. See So.2d do not even We recovery rule out of an appropriate proportion of the contin- gent fee. policy supports
Public result this case. Petitioner is proceeding products with a claim liability against Chrysler her through attorney. current There is in the evidence record that accepted Respondent’s Petitioner some of benefits of services, retaining such as that experts Respondent origi- nally hired photographs Respondent that took of the riding. addition, which In taxicab Petitioner was Respon- dent secured and stored the that it vehicle so be used could as evidence. current lawyer Petitioner’s has this vehicle his possession. any Petitioner’s retention of of Respon- benefits compensation dent’s services without to Respondent would Petitioner, in an result undue windfall to and thus it would be to compensate unfair not Respondent under the circumstances of this case.
V.
The result in
requires
this case
us to address another issue:
Where the
was retained on a contingency basis and
by
discharged
a dissatisfied client
prior
the fulfillment of
the contingency,
may
when
compensation
recover
?
quantum meruit
Skeens,
this Court
timing
addressed the
of an attorney’s
action
compensation
for the reasonable
value
services
performed prior
discharge
where the
was retained
contingent
on a
agreement
fee
and was discharged
faith
occurrence
good
basis
any
client without
336-37,
In his
The Skeens decision does not similar Respondent discharged in as was because the instant case good being a basis for dissatisfied with the client had faith any contingent fee is on attorney-client relationship. Where case, where, in this there has recovery by the client and as being some basis for the client dissatisfied with been prior the fee occur attorney, contingency generating must attorney’s recovery. We conclude ie., contingency, upon claim accrues the fulfillment plaintiff/former judgment. client final where obtains in therefore must wait until Petitioner recovers Respondent against Chrysler her action in order to his action for maintain compensation.
Although issue, we need not decide the we note that it may even advantage conceivable there be some occurs, i.e., if Respondent waiting to the contingency see that the recovers for large the accident. If there is a recovery that is in significant Respondent’s measure due to efforts, quantum argument can made for good basing meruit recovery on a of If percentage the total fee.8 there is no recovery, there will be no fee. situations where the occurs, quantum meruit contingency recovery will have as a maximum the appropriate portion generated the total fee recovery. Respondent discharged Because in good faith, has right compensation but not forfeited the' quantum meruit based on the reasonable value of services discharge rendered his with consideration factors discussed in this we opinion, judgment reverse the Special Court of with Appeals instructions to remand this case to Circuit County Court for Prince George’s proceedings upon further conditioned recovery Petitioner’s against injuries her action Chrysler for sustained the auto *23 8,1992. mobile on accident March THE JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS CASE REMANDED THAT REVERSED. TO COURT WITH REMAND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUN- TY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT THIS IN WITH OPINION. COSTS COURT AND THIS discharged attorney 8. percentage If the to recover a sues of the contin- fee, gency attorney joined new party the must be as to the action discharged attornеy's recoveiy because the will be derived from the attorney’s recovery. new share of the This division will based on the discharged attorney's prior legal contribution successful efforts to 169, 142, discharge. Bregman, the Post v. 349 Md. 707 A.2d Cf. (1998)(observing attorneys may 819 that contract division for a of fees long good represents proportion so as the division in faith the actual performed). services to be BY BE PAID APPEALS TO OF SPECIAL THE COURT RESPONDENT. WILNER, J., RODOWSKY, in which
Dissenting Opinion by J., joins.
RODOWSKY,
dissenting.
Judge,
Miller,
in effect overrules Skeens
majority opinion
(1993),
denying
transparently
A.2d
while
331 Md.
decisis,
disregard
of stare
addition to its
it does so.
concerning
Maryland law
muddles
unnecessarily
opinion
the
contracts,
to be
concerning contracts
retainer
attorney-client
concerning
and
promisee,
of the
to the satisfaction
performed
implied
contracts.
express
between
the difference
I
rights
the
concerning
law
today’s
Maryland
Prior to
decision
to an
retainer contract
attorney-client
parties
the
First,
authority of
“the
relatively
aspects.
well-settled
five
act for
revocable at the will
attorney
a client is
is an
discharge
the
power
The client’s
client.
at
Id.
628 A.2d
term of the retainer contract.”
at
implied
omitted).
“[bjecause
(citations
Second,
client’s power
the
implied
the
term of the retainer
relationship
еnd
if
the
contract,
modern
the
terminates
the
rule is
cause,
with or
client does
without
representation,
thus,
contract,
attorney is not
the retainer
breach
Third, “[i]f
to recover on
contract.” Id.
[express]
entitled
cause,
discharges
prevailing
the client
any compensation.”
that the
not recover
attorney may
rule is
Fourth, “if
representation
by
is terminated either
Id.
justification,
cause or
with
client without
compensated
is entitled to be
for the reasonable
Id.
legal
value of the
services rendered
termination.”
Fifth,
at
claim for the
628 A.2d
*24
prior
value of
rendered
to termination
reasonable
services
when
terminates
may
representation
be asserted
the client
cause,
had
on a contin-
parties
agreed
without
even where the
gent fee. This fifth rule was the holding in Skeens. Id. 344,
Nothing in the prior decisions of this Court suggests “cause” for the termination
services,
of an attorney’s
which
precludes the attorney’s right to any compensation,
any
thing other than a material breach of the contract by the
attorney. St. Paul at
Co.,
Chase v.
Ins.
Manufacturers Life
192, 217-18,
denied,
12, 25,
Md.
cert.
278 A.2d
404 U.S.
(1971);
92 S.Ct.
What
call “High Grade”
majority
terms
‘cause’
for the
Somuah,
forfeiture
compensation.”
On “basis,” or “Low in as thing, my opinion, is no such There sue, where the cause, attorney’s right and the Grade” the client without by terminated has been contract retainer ie., cause, or convert- not deferred traditional, is High Grade contingent a claim. ed into constitutes the not what does address majority opinion
The it, cause, majority would define even as the total absence claim of dissatis- would be a bad faith it that this appears but I contract. terminating for the retainer as the reason faction circumstances, that, majority would these infer under for and an immediate suit Maryland permit law present honor Thus, to termination. prior of the services rendered value meruit quantum action attorney’s permitting instead of or High of traditional Grade whenever there is an absence termination, by permitting an immediate action cause with the if a faith claim of dissatisfaction only there is bad services, majority practical purposes has for all in Skeens recognizes accrual of the changed holding quantum meruit in cause of action at the time of termination traditional or any case which the client terminated without cause. High Grade majority’s of the creation of Low
Patently, purpose the case at bar from purportedly distinguish cause is Grade Skeens. majority opinion Part tells us that V in Skeens attorneys really limited to cases which holding cause, the instant discharged High are Grade whereas If, however, involves Low cause. the client’s matter Grade cause, then, under only reason for termination is Low Grade rationale, no claim for majority compen- has in the termi- contingency specified sation unless and until the Maryland law nated retainer contract is fulfilled. Under cause, or today High cause was either traditional or Grade at all. it was cause not have traditional petitioner
In the instant matter the did subject George’s cause. The accident occurred Prince a low County, Maryland highway on a dual lane with concrete a petitioner passenger median. The was a taxicab that was driver, a vehicle driven a drunk who by by struck in the rear $100,000 coverage. impact had of insurance The apparently over the median propelled strip, caused the taxicab to be upside petitioner and to land down. The was thrown flip, vehicle, as a result of a defective seat or seat possibly from the bеlt, jaw. and she suffered several broken limbs and broken sought petitioner’s family. was out He respondent George’s in Prince petitioner Hospital visited the General by signed contingent agreement. fee Thereaf- engaged *26 following: respondent ter the did report; the police (cid:127)obtained eyewitnesses; four
(cid:127)interviewed the three or investigating eyewit- officer and the (cid:127)arranged meet scene further to what hap- nesses at the accident determine pened; hospital records from the and from the
(cid:127)obtained medical treating physicians; three or four highway design safety on (cid:127)engaged expert report an median; of the possibly design defective County, Maryland on notice under the (cid:127)put George’s Prince Act; Local Government Tort Claims nationally expert design safety known in auto (cid:127)engaged by or seat report possibly design on defective seat belt manufacturer;
(cid:127)located, taxicab; and stored the demolished purchased, photographs and obtained from others (cid:127)photographed film “day-in-the-life” and caused a video petitioner made; to be petitioner occasions. petitioner approximately
(cid:127)met with the on six claim had petitioner’s developed respоndent When been brought, should he concluded that point to the where suit for Prince the action should be filed the Circuit Court all George’s County, inferentially potential because defendants respondent thereupon, quite properly, were suable there. The arrangement local counsel under be- sought to associate would involve no addition- counsel and himself that tween local who was not admit- petitioner. to the As al cost Court, had associate local the Bar of this but who ted to file and counsel, permitted try peti- would be respondent Governing 14 of the Rules Admis- tioner’s action under Rule Bar, Maryland, Maryland Rules Annotated Code sion 14(d) over permits judge presiding at 671-72. Rule Vol. local requirement presence trial to waive the at trial of counsel. Maryland point relationship petitioner
At the between being sought, petitioner when a local counsel was respondent authority of Skeens re- discharged respondent. Under suit, awaiting without the out- spondent brought instant attorney. action in the hands of another petitioner’s come which jury Trial of the instant action was to a was instructed Maryland jury on the five rules of law set forth above. The told, objection, “good without that cause means and valid $11,324.66 in Respondent out-of-pocket reason.” ex- claimed $11,261.01. penses, jury respondent and the awarded The compensation by valuing claimed for his services 57.9 hours of hour, per time devoted to the matter at or a total of $150 Because, $8,685. $8,685. jury concededly, awarded there *27 High terminating was no Grade cause for the petitioner’s contract, majority retainer the is forced to create the Low variety Grade of cause in case in order to find a this “basis” “if, making for meruit claim an respondent’s quantum as and claim. when” majority
The
seeks to
Maryland
recogni-
demonstrate
law’s
tion of Low
cause
from
by borrowing
involving
Grade
cases
contracts under which
promisor’s obligation
the
to continue to
pay
personal
expressly
services is
conditioned on the
Somuah,
254,
promisor’s continued satisfaction.
352 Md. at
that,
Maryland
Ferris v.
191 Md.
inn
involved a contract under which an
hired
majority,
the
11,
evenings
to
on weekend
from October
small band
perform
1947,
1946,
30,
through April
following proviso:
but with the
“
subject
contract is
to 2 weeks
proves unsatisfactоry
‘If Band
”
82,
explained
Id. at
The retainer contract between provision, any express does not contain satisfaction action relationship nature of the between “in view of the confidential engendered by attorney and client and the evil that would Skeens, distrust,” 628 A.2d at it friction or 331 Md. at a agreement that a retainer could contain such is doubtful on operate would as a limitation provision. provision Such event, totally it is power any of the client to terminate. majority provision for the to read a satisfaction unnecessary as those contracts are agreement into retainer inasmuch terminable at will. Id. Skeens,
The rules that are set forth in and the cases cited Dobbs Law Remedies Dobbs, therein are described in 3 D. (2d 13.5, ed.1993), § at 556 as follows: discharges attorney “When the client before the con- substantially performed, personal tract is and confiden- attorney tial The relationship implicated. and client traditional that because of the nature of the special view is attorney-client client must to dis- relationship, be free charge imply time. This view seems to that the client would not be on the contract if he liable discharges fully per- before the has view, formed. Under the client is liable to make restitution for benefits received but not liable for the attor- otherwise, ney’s expectancy. Put recovers meruit, quantum damages.” not contract (Footnote omitted).
II
majority
postpones
the instant matter
accrual of the
claim for
in a
contingent
restitution
fee retainer contract
aby
has been terminated
client for Low Grade cause until
i.e.,
contingency,
plaintiff/for
“the fulfillment of the
where the
Somuah,
judgment.”
mer client obtains a final
As Dobbs way reaching of question mainly accrual roundabout restitution?” issue: how should the court measure different 13.5, matter, § Law Remedies at 558. the instant Dobbs by multiplying the value of his services respondent proved rate, jury hourly the time devoted to the matter his that presented concerning No issue is this case agreed. Therefore, view, my judgment method of calculation. Special Appeals should be affirmed. Court
Ill
Further,
inconsistency
between the
appears
there
opinion
reasoning
and the
of the
majority
mandate under the
interrogatories
jury
that
in this
majority.
special
The
$11,261.01
clearly
answered
awarded
as reimbursement
case
of the
expenses.
portion
That
respondent
out-of-pocket
not, even
respondent
in the circuit court for the
judgment
contract, subject
contingency.
The
express
under the
n.
at 683 n.
majority,
“Client case, and authorizes and directs [re- tion and trial of the share of spondent] proceeds, to deduct from Client’s suit, recovery underlying is no in the the client is liable to the If there prior attorney only if the terminated the for the value of services employment retainer contract without traditional contract cause. doctor, or other directly hospital, expert, credi- pay tor, any due them for Client’s care and unpaid balance treatment, testimony or for their services related to and/or this case.” for the unconditionally places obligation
The first clause client, on the the second expenses described while clause is any recovery authorization for the to withhold from otherwise to the client the amount of the payable described the mandate at least should affirm expenses. Consequently, expenses. part judgment awards Judge joins WILNER has authorized me to state that he *30 herein. expressed views
721A.2d698 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION MARYLAND, Petitioner,
OF MASSAGLI, Respondent. Edward Charles AG, Term, Sept. Misc. Docket No. 1998. Appeals Maryland. of
Court Dec. ORDER This matter came before the on the Court Joint Petition Attorney Maryland Grievance Commission of and Respon- dent, Massagli, Esquire. Edward Charles Court, Petition, having considered the it is this day 18th December,
ORDERED Respondent, Massag- that the Edward Charles li, hereby be and he is from indefinitely suspended prac-