5 S.D. 584 | S.D. | 1894
This was an original action in this court to recover an unpaid portion of salary, claimed by plaintiff as deputy superintendent of public instruction. The opinion is published in 58 N. W. 804. Plaintiff asks a rehearing on the single ground of alleged error of this court in holding that plaintiff, being appointed to hold during the pleasure of his principal, had no term of office, within the meaning of section 3, art. 12, of our state constitution, declaring that “the corn-compensation of no public officer shall be increased or diminished during his term.” In his petition for rehearing plaintiff thus states his position: “The appointment of the plaintiff carried with it a term, tenure, service, or duration to the extent of that of the principal, unless removed by the principal, and no one else. * * * If a term depended upon a contingency, then there is not a term of office connected with any office in this state or the United States.' They are all depending upon some contingency. The president of the United States, elected for four years; the governor of South Dakota, for two years, — all their terms depend upon certain conditions, and are subject to impeachment. There can be but little difference in theory, if a term depends upon a contingency, whether it is for the time during the pleasure of the principal or for the time during the pleasure of the impeaching power. ”
We might say, before closing, that constitutional prohibitions, similar to ours, against changing the compensation of a public officer during his term, have been held to apply alone to offices created by the constitution, not affecting or limiting the power of the legislature with respect to offices created by statute. See Douglass Co. v. Timme, 32 Neb. 272, 49 N. W. 266; State v. Kalb, 50 Wis. 178, 6 N. W. 557, As this particular question was not presented or 'discussed in the argument, and as we are content to rest our decision on the grounds - stated, we do not further notice the point or examine its ten ability. Our confidence in the correctness of the former opinion is unshaken after a re-examination of the points made by plaintiff in his petition for rehearing, and the petition is denied. All the judges concur.