This is thе defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s order opening a stipulated judgment
This appeal arises out of an action for specific performance of a contract by which the plaintiff was to purchase certain real estate from the defendant. At an earlier stage, we dismissed thе defendant’s appeal for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court reversed our decision and remanded the case to us for further proceedings. Solomon v. Keiser,
The only facts relevant to this appeal are that, prior to trial, the parties settled their dispute and recited their stipulation into the record. On May 27,1987, the trial court rendered judgment on the oral stipulation, pursuant to which the plaintiff deposited $100,000 in an escrow account, pending the parties’ agreeing on
The defendant claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to open the judgment becausе more than four months had elapsed since the rendering thereof. This claim is dispositive of the apрeal. General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 326 establish the procedures for setting aside or opening judgments. “[Ujnless otherwise provided by law . . . any civil judgment or decree rendered in the superior сourt may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered or pаssed. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 326; see General Statutes § 52-212a. This rule applies to stipulatеd judgments as well as to judgments rendered upon controverted facts. Kenworthy v. Kenworthy,
The plaintiff focuses on the opening phrase “Unless otherwise provided by law,” and she contends thаt Connecticut law does otherwise provide for stipulated judgments. She is correct that a stipulated judgment bears important distinctions from a judgment rendered following a trial of controverted facts. Instead of constituting a judicial determination of a litigated right, a stipulated judgment “ ‘may be defined as a contract
The plaintiff’s solе claim here is that there was a mistake as to the meaning of the judgment. The flaw in her argument is that the mistakе must be mutual; a unilateral mistake will not suffice. Celanese Fiber v. Pic Yarns, Inc., supra. The defendant responds by vigorously protesting that there was no mistake on his part, and, therefore, there was no possibility of a mutual mistake. In opening the judgment, the trial court made no finding that there had been a mutual mistake. Moreover, under General Statutes § 52-212 and Practice Book § 326, the court may open a judgment only upon motion of one of the partiеs. In the present case, neither party moved to have the judgment opened. We conclude, thеrefore, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to open the stipulated judgment.
The judgment is reversed аnd the case is remanded with direction to reinstate the stipulated judgment of May, 1987, and to disburse the funds to the рlaintiff and the defendant according to the terms of said judgment, as more specifically articulated on August 12, 1988.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
In her Supreme Court argument, the plaintiff conceded that the trial court’s June, 1988 order releasing the escrowed funds was comparable to an order opening the judgment. Solomon v. Keiser,
In view of our disposition on the jurisdictional issue, we do nоt reach the second claim of abuse of discretion in releasing the escrow funds.
As part of an articulation dated August 12,1988, the trial court stated: “The court’s reading of the transcript of the agreement, аs well as its recollection of the agreement that was announced to become an order, did not recognize an additional $100,000 credit.” This articulation clearly answers the question presented in the plaintiffs motion for clarification.