30 Conn. App. 129 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1993
The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s judgment rendered in favor of the defendant on an action for the rescission of a trust instrument and for
The trial court found the following facts. In 1964, the plaintiff purchased the Hall-Brooke Hospital in West-port. Upon acquiring the hospital, the plaintiff established two corporations. One corporation owned the land on which the private hospital was situated and the other owned the hospital and its assets. In 1966, the plaintiff with the advice of various professionals in the areas of health care and nonprofit institutions set up Hall-Brooke as a nonprofit corporation. She made a gift of assets to the defendant, the Hall-Brooke Foundation, Inc. (foundation), but retained control of the real estate on which the hospital was situated. She understood that once she established this foundation, it would exist in perpetuity, and would not be dependent on any one person’s life or ownership, but would be governed by a self-perpetuating board of trustees. As a not-for-profit foundation, its board would have the power to run the organization. The plaintiff knew that she no longer would control its operations and that the board was obligated to act in the foundation’s best interests without concern for what might be beneficial to her.
The plaintiff, as a trustee, actively participated in the affairs of the foundation. She also signed an employment contract with the newly created foundation that provided for her to serve as executive director until the
In 1980, the defendant removed the plaintiff from all of her positions at the foundation. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action to rescind her gift to create the foundation because she felt that her intent was frustrated by the board of trustees, and specifically to enforce her employment contract with the defendant. She also included a prayer for “such other relief as the court deems necessary and just.”
After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that the plaintiffs gift to create the foundation was absolute. It also found that the plaintiffs employment contract with the defendant violated public policy and that she was thus an at will employee of the foundation whose employment could be terminated with or without cause. This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff asserts that the trial court failed to accord proper consideration to her intent as the creator of the defendant. She argues that the trial court made several errors with respect both to finding and to enforcing her true intention at the time she created the foundation.
We review factual findings of the trial court under a clearly erroneous standard. Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). We examine whether “ ‘the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous.’ ” Zarembski v. Warren, 28 Conn. App. 1, 4, 609 A.2d 1039, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 918, 614 A.2d 831 (1992), quoting Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc v. Manchester, supra. Our role is to determine if the trial court reasonably could have decided as it did. Harvey v. Daddona, 29 Conn. App. 369, 374, 615 A.2d 177 (1992). We will not retry the facts since the trial court in its role as fact finder has the “unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of the circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zarembski v. Warren, supra, 4-5.
II
The plaintiff also argues that even if the court properly found that the creation of the charitable foundation was not conditioned on her continued employment, the court cannot disregard her employment contract. She concedes that in this action, she primarily seeks the specific enforcement of the contract. In the alternative, she asserts that her claim for “such other relief as the court deems necessary and just” encompasses money damages for the breach of her employment contract. We disagree.
When prosecuting a civil matter, “the general rule is that a prayer for relief must articulate with specificity the form of relief that is sought. ... A party
The plaintiff asserts that her contract with the defendant was valid and enforceable. She argues that the defendant ignored the plain language of the contract, which permitted the defendant to fire her only if she were adjudicated in a criminal court of competent jurisdiction to be guilty of theft, fraud or embezzlement regarding the defendant’s assets. The court, however, found that her employment contract with the defendant was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. See Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 153 Conn. 527, 537, 218 A.2d 526 (1966).
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
This appeal is one of five before this court arising out of a consolidated trial.
She asserts that the court (1) failed to consider the plaintiff’s contemporaneous exchange of correspondence with the trustee who served as her personal attorney in the transaction when determining the true intent in creating the trust, (2) blatantly ignored both the testimony and the documen
The plaintiffs own conduct belies her assertion that her prayer included money damages. In a memorandum of law accompanying a motion to strike, the plaintiff asserted that she sought “only equitable relief.” In the motion to strike, she stated that the court lacks the jurisdiction to have this matter tried to a jury because “the relief requested is entirely equitable in nature.”
Moreover, the plaintiff failed to comply with Practice Book § 131, which provides in pertinent part that “[w]hen money damages are sought in the demand for relief, the demand shall include the information required by Gen. Stat. § 52-91.” General Statutes § 52-91 provides in relevant part: “When money damages are sought in the demand for relief, the demand for relief shall set forth: (1) That the amount, legal interest or property in demand is fifteen thousand dollars or more, exclusive of interest and costs; or (2) that the amount, legal interest or property in demand is two thousand five hundred dollars or more but is less than fifteen thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs; or (3) that the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than two thousand five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest and costs.”
Our Supreme Court stated that “[t]here is some authority for the proposition that directors have no power to hire an employee on a lifetime basis .... Such cases are generally based on the theory that a board of directors, in selecting the management personnel of the corporation, should not be allowed to hamstring future boards in the overall supervision of the enterprise and the implementation of changing corporate policy.” (Citation omitted.) Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 153 Conn. 527, 537, 218 A.2d 526 (1966).
General Statutes § 33-451 (b) provides in pertinent part: “A director shall cease to be in office upon ... (3) [her] removal from office in accord
General Statutes § 33-453 (b) provides: “Officers may be removed, with or without cause, but without prejudice to their contract rights, if any. The appointment or election of an officer for a given term, or a general provision in the bylaws or certificate of incorporation with respect to the term of the office, shall not of itself create contract rights.”